e360Insight, LLC. v Comcast Corporation

On January 15, 2008, e360Insight, LLC., filed suit against Comcast for blocking mail.

This will be the sad saga of this short lawsuit filed by a little company that can't seem to deliver its email without the assistance of the federal judiciary.

Apparently, someone forgot to tell e360's principal and its attorneys about 47 USC 230(c)(2)(A), provided here with emphasis added:

(2) Civil liability

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected

Complaint

Of all of the pathetic lawsuits I've seen....

Well, this one's got it all.

Deferring a connection is tarpitting and is a denial of service attack. Not delivering mail is a denial of service attack. Using a spam filter is not legal (or maybe it's just that it's not kosher -- we'll have to find a rabbi to rule on that one). Not telling a sender how to evade filters is fraudulent. A sender's inability to design a system that can cope with sending more email while waiting for deferred messages to timeout and retry is a denial of service attack caused by the receiver. e360Insight has even tossed in a First Amendment claim and I was pretty sure that we moved past that by 1999. And finally, having a whitelist or a feedback loop that you don't let everyone have is a violation of fair trade rules.

It's stunning. It really is. I'm not entirely sure how you get to be this dense, but I suspect that it's a painstaking (and probably painful) process involving frontal lobotomies and maybe electroshock treatments.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMPLAINT

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC, by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, L.L.C., and for its Complaint against Defendant Comcast Corporation, states as follows:

PARTIES

1. e360Insight, LLC (hereafter “e360”) is an Illinois limited liability corporation located in Wheeling, Illinois. e360 is an internet marketing company.

2. Comcast Corporation (hereafter “Comcast”) is a Pennsylvania corporation principally located in Philadelphia Pennsylvania. Comcast is an internet service provider.

JURISDICTION

3. Jurisdiction is proper and based on 28 USC § 1332 as the parties are citizens of and principally located in separate states and the amount in controversy exceeds seventy-five thousand dollars. Jurisdiction is also proper based on 28 USC § 1331 as this action arises under 18 USC § 1030, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

FACTS
4. e360 is an email marketing company whose business practices have, at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint, complied with, and continue to comply, with all
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federal and state requirements, laws and standards pertaining to the sending of commercial email, including the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 USC § 7701 (“CAN-SPAM”).

5. e360 delivers its messages to its customers at addresses provided by said customers. The customers thus require e360 to use Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), such as Comcast. At all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint, e360 has complied, and continues to comply, with all Accepted Use Policies and Terms Of Service agreements stated by Comcast.

6. e360 has at all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint, complied, and continues to comply, with all Accepted Use Policies and Terms Of Service agreements stated by Comcast.

7. e360 is hired by and partners with companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet. This marketing is targeted to persons “opting in” to a list whereby they agree to accept email announcements and/or advertisements. These persons sign up at websites owned by e360 or at websites owned by e360’s marketing partners. e360 then may attempt to verify the desire to receive emails utilizing a “double opt-in” process, which involves sending a confirmatory email allowing the customer to affirm or terminate its decision to receive marketing emails. Those customers who affirm their interest in receiving email messages are included in subsequent email messages until they unsubscribe at a later date or until e360 receives bounce information (showing the email account in question is closed) from Comcast.

8. e360 provides the consumer the ability to “opt-out” of receiving emails in every email sent and promptly complies with every request made by a consumer.

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9. e360 does not engage in “spamming,” which is essentially the digital equivalent of sending junk mail that is not requested. e360 only sends email messages to persons who first sign up or opt-in and provide their email address to e360 or to one of e360’s marketing partners. e360 employs a variety of permission processes that it controls and that its marketing partners use to obtain permission from and provide notice to the consumer that received the email.

10. e360 has been approved by ReturnPath, a leading provider of reputation monitoring services to the ISP community, including Microsoft/Hotmail. In an independent audit of e360’s mailing practices, ReturnPath approved e360 for the SenderScore Certification Program, which is Return Path’s highest level of certification among legitimate email marketers.

11. Comcast is an internet service provider (“ISP”) that provides email service to its customers and who has agreed to act as an intermediary in delivering and receiving emails on behalf of its customers.

12. Comcast provides to its customers and the public on its website Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services, attached and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit A.

13. At all relevant times, e360 has complied with Comcast’s Acceptable Use and Abuse Policies.

14. At all relevant times, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast regularly blocked emails e360 has repeatedly attempted to send to emails to Comcast customers (who have signed up to receive such emails,) including some of who have double-confirmed their wish to receive the emails. Such blocking by Comcast interferes with e360’s ability to do business and interferes with e360’s business relationship with its customers who use Comcast.

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15. All instances where Comcast has blocked e360 email addresses are too voluminous to mention in this complaint. As a recent example, Comcast blocked virtually all of e360’s email messages on August 23, 2007. e360 attempted to send email messages to its customers, including those who have “double-confirmed” their interest in receiving e360’s email messages. e360 used IP address 63.210.103.209 to connect to Comcast’s mail servers. e360 received the following error message from Comcast for all of the messages e360 attempted to send.

“550 5.2.0 63.210.103.209 blocked by ldap:ou=rblmx,dc=comcast,dc=net ->
BL004 Blocked for spam. Please see
http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/index.jsp?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18628”

By following the link provided in the Comcast error message, e360 was directed to the following information on Comcast’s website:

“Mail to Comcast is rejected and is returned with an error message containing the code BL004. What does this mean?

Our filters have determined that email from your mail server has been sent in patterns which are characteristic of spam. In an effort to protect subscribers, your mail server has been blocked from sending email to the Comcast network. Mail servers are typically shared by many users so it may be the case that another party using your mail server has sent spam, even if you have not.”

16. e360 cannot reasonably ascertain how its messages may have been sent “in patterns which are characteristic of spam.” Comcast refuses to provide e360 with any information as to how e360 could modify its email messages to avoid triggering the block of its rightfully sent email messages or the delivery of this error message.

17. e360 has on numerous occasions contacted Comcast in attempts to get Comcast to allow e360’s email to get through to its customers. Comcast has refused to allow such emails.

18. At all relevant times, and possibly commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly held or severely and significantly delayed emails e360 has attempted to send to
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Comcast customers who have signed up to receive such emails, and refused to release such emails, a practice commonly known as “tar-pitting” and is type of “denial of service attack” on e360’s mail servers. Comcast regularly transmits bogus response data in an attempt to lock up e360’s connections in order to slow or incapacitate e360’s mail servers. e360’s sending mail servers track and report average response time for each recipient domain. The average response time is defined as the time it takes for the recipient domain to process a message; to receive the message and to acknowledge receipt. As recently as December 11, 2007, e360 recorded an average response time of 18,433 seconds or 5.1 hours to process a single email message. During this time, Comcast’s mail servers transmit bogus response information to keep the connective active and to erode e360’s system capacity. In doing so, Comcast has interfered with e360’s ability to send email, not just to Comcast customers who are also e360 customers, but to all e360 customers by shutting down e360’s servers.

19. At all times relevant hereto, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly blocked emails e360 has attempted to send to Comcast customers who have signed up to receive such emails, some of who have double-confirmed that they wish to receive the emails on the grounds that such emails contain specific words or phrases, such as “free”. Such arbitrary censorship by Comcast violates e360’s First Amendment rights and is an unacceptable infringement of e360’s commercial speech based on content.

20. Comcast uses multiple email filters, including third-party companies and internal blacklists, to filter and block emails. Comcast uses Spamhaus SBL/XBL/ZEN, a London based self-appointed internet “watch dog” company to monitor and screen emails on its systems. Comcast’s use of the Spamhaus blacklists is documented on Comcast’s website (http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/index.jsp?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18627). Spamhaus
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mistakenly listed e360 as a spammer on its ROKSO list, SBL blocklist and Zen blocklist despite being repeatedly told of its error. Spamhuas has since removed e360 from its lists per a Court Order but occasionally violates the Order. On March 5, 2007, e360 notified Comcast that Comcast’s use of the Spamhaus blacklist was improperly blocking e360’s email messages and was improperly interfering with e360’s legitimate business. e360 provided copies of the judgment and permanent injunction against Spamhaus from United States District Court case number 06 C 3958. Notification was sent to Comcast legal counsel via FedEx tracking number 798120681231. e360 did not receive a response from Comcast. Attached and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit B is a copy of the March 5, 2007 letter.

21. Comcast has blocked and continues to block emails sent by e360 to its customers based on the Spamhaus listing above even after being told of the error. As of the date of this filing, the most recent incidence of improper blocking by Comcast via the Spamhaus blacklist was December 9, 2007.

22. Comcast has blocked and continues to block emails sent by e360 to its customers based on other third-party and internal blacklists and other software filters supplied by third parties. Some of the known blocking technologies used by Comcast include MAPS by TrendMicro and Brightmail by Symantec.

23. Comcast has engaged in ‘denial-of-service’ attacks on e360’s network and computer system by consuming, destroying, altering or withholding emails sent by e360 to its customers. Such attacks overwhelm and disable e360’s network and prevent them from sending or receiving emails from e360’s consumers in an attempt to halt e360’s business.

24. Comcast has transmitted fraudulent bounce information to e360’s mail servers specific to email addresses contained on e360’s opt-in marketing list. The responses sent by
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Comcast mail servers to e360 are fraudulent because they contain information indicating that the email address is invalid and not active. As an email marketer, e360 relies on bounce information from Comcast’s mail servers to determine whether e360’s customer email addresses are still active and deliverable. e360 has information and reason to believe Comcast is intentionally transmitting fraudulent bounce information to e360 in an attempt to discourage e360 from sending additional email messages. By transmitting fraudulent bounce information, Comcast is effectively destroying e360’s proprietary assets and the value contained in e360’s opt-in database of email addresses. Such statements are made on information and belief as only Comcast has access to and knowledge of the accounts it has and will not allow e360’s emails to be delivered regardless of account activity.

COUNT I
(Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)

25. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

26. Under Illinois law, “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage has four elements: (1) plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of a valid business relationship with a third party; (2) defendant must know of the prospective business relationship; (3) defendant must intentionally interfere with the prospective business relationship such that the prospective business relationship never materializes; and (4) the interference must damage the plaintiff. Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 957 F. Supp. 142, 145-146 (N.D.Ill 1997).

27. e360 only sends emails to consumers who: a) purchase goods and services from its proprietary company owned website; or b) sign-up to receive emails either through e360 or through one of its marketing partners. As such, e360 only sends emails to individuals who have done business with e360 or who have expressed an interest in doing business with e360 or its
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marketing partners. Thus, e360 has a reasonable expectation of valid business relationship with the consumers it emails.

28. Comcast, an internet service provider, has agreed to act and is compensated for acting as an intermediary in delivering the email sent by and to its customers. Comcast has no right to interfere in the business relationship between e360 and its clients or potential clients.

29. Comcast has knowledge of the e360’s prospective business relationships with Comcast users. Indeed, Comcast has been notified numerous times by e360 of e360’s attempts to contact e360’s customers and potential customers.

30. Comcast has intentionally interfered with e360’s prospective business relationships by blocking the emails e360 has sent or tried to send to its customers. Despite being notified on numerous occasions by e360 of such interference, Comcast has refused to stop interfering in e360’s prospective business relationships.

31. Comcast’s ‘denial of service’ attacks interfere with e360’s ability to send emails to any of its clients or potential clients thereby interfering with e360’s business relationship with its clients. Such attacks cause significant damage to e360 by preventing it from communicating with its clients or potential clients.

32. Comcast blocking e360’s emails to its clients and potential clients interferes with e360’s prospective business relationships with its clients and potential clients such that those relationships never materialize.

33. Comcast’s refusal to allow e360 to communicate with any its clients and potential clients interferes with e360’s business relationship with its clients and potential clients.

34. Comcast’s interference with e360’s business relationships causes e360 significant damage. e360 estimates the damage to exceed $4.5 million per year from 2005 through 2007.

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35. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e360Insight LLC, requests that this Court enter a judgment in its favor and against Comcast as follows:

(a) Compensatory damages in the amount of $9,000,000.00;

(b) Injunctive relief requiring Comcast to stop interfering with e360’s prospective business relationship and stop blocking e360’s emails sent to its customers and potential customers;

(c) Punitive damages to be determined; and

(d) Any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II
(Violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act)

36. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

37. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (hereafter “Act”) prohibits anyone from: (i)“knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected computer....or...(iii)intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii).

38. The Act also requires that the “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period...aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).

39. Under the Act, any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of the Act may obtain compensatory damages, economic damages and injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).

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40. Comcast intentionally and knowingly engaged in denial of service attacks upon e360’s system by slowing process times of its emails by hours. Such delay slowed and all but stopped e360’s systems from being able to function. This intentional damage to e360 prevented e360 from being able to do business and cost e360 in terms of lost business along with excessive wear and tear on e360’s systems and incremental infrastructure costs to overcome the system load created by Comcast’s denial of service attacks.

41. e360 relies on Comcast to provide accurate and truthful information regarding the deliverability of mail and the activity status of email addresses of Comcast customers on e360’s emailing list. In fact, e360 has no other resource available to it to obtain this accurate information and thus requires Comcast’s cooperation in providing reliable, accurate information.

42. Comcast frequently transmits false bounce information to e360’s mail servers. When Comcast transmits false information on the status of an email account, e360’s removes the address from its mailing and updates its database to reflect that the email is no longer valid.

43. When Comcast provides false information regarding an email account to e360 and causes e360 to remove an active email address from its database, Comcast’s actions have directly resulted in the destruction of e360’s proprietary data and asset, its database.

44. e360 estimates that such denial of service attacks upon its systems have cost it five hundred ninety-one thousand two hundred ($591,200.00) dollars.

45. e360 estimates that Comcast false bounce information and destruction of its email database has caused it $2,498,924.00 dollars.

46. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e360Insight LLC, requests that this Court enter a judgment in its favor and against Comcast as follows:

(a) Compensatory damages in the amount of $3,090,124.00;

(b) Injunctive relief requiring Comcast to stop denial of service attacks upon e360’s systems and prevent Comcast from transmitting fraudulent bounce information to e360’s email servers;

(c) Punitive damages to be determined;

(d) Substantial attorney fees and costs to be determined; and

(e) Any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III
(Violation of First Amendment Rights)

47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

48. Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection as long as it concerns lawful activity and it not misleading. Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). “Indeed, we recognized that a “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information...may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Id. at 763.

49. It is also recognized that commercial communication “that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).

50. e360 has the right to send commercial emails to its consumers and consumers who have asked or agreed to receive its emails. e360’s emails concern only lawful activity and are not misleading.

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51. Comcast’s arbitrary and capricious use of its network to systematically deny e360 the ability to send commercial emails to its customers and consumers who have asked to or agreed to receive such emails is a violation of e360’s First Amendment rights.

52. Comcast’s actions have caused significant damage to e360’s ability to communicate and do business with its customers. Specifically, since e360 is an email marketer, e360 has no other way to communicate to its customers who subscribe to or have their email through Comcast. This loss of communication in the marketplace harms not only e360 but also all of its customers.

53. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e360Insight LLC, requests that this Court enter a judgment in its favor and against Comcast as follows:

(a) Compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000.00;

(b) Injunctive relief requiring Comcast to allow e360 the ability to communicate with its customers;

(c) Punitive damages to be determined; and

(d) Any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT IV
(Unfair Competition and Business Practices)

54. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

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55. In Illinois, it is unlawful for any business to use unfair methods of competition and business practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, in the conduct of trade or business. 815 ILCS 505/2.

56. Comcast provides to its customers and the public on its website Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services. Implicit in these policies is the understanding that if one complies with the Comcast’s policies, the mail sent will be delivered.

57. Although e360 has complied with Comcast’s polices at all times, Comcast has refused to comply with their own policies and deliver the mail sent by e360.

58. At the same time that Comcast is blocking e360’s email messages that are compliant with Comcast’s polices, Comcast is allowing other email marketers with substantially similar business practices as those employed by e360 to send email messages to Comcast’s customers.

59. Comcast’s refusal to deliver email sent by e360 while allowing its competitors to freely transmit email puts e360 at a disadvantage and creates an un-level playing field on which e360 must compete.

60. Upon information and belief, Comcast has made agreements, either written or verbal, to allow certain email marketers to send or transmit email without interruption regardless of whether such email meets Comcast’s Acceptable Use policy. Based on these agreements, Comcast has applied its policies with certain email marketers in a way that is materially different than Comcast’s application of its policies to e360’s email messages. Such statement is made upon information and belief because only Comcast can verify with whom they have agreements with to allow mail to be sent to their customers.

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61. Comcast’s refusal to create a fair playing field for legitimate email marketers to compete has caused serious damage to e360’s business and damaged its reputation.

62. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e360Insight LLC, requests that this Court enter a judgment in its favor and against Comcast as follows:

(a) Compensatory damages in the amount of $9,000,000.00;

(b) Injunctive relief requiring Comcast to allow e360 the ability to communicate with its customers;

(c) Punitive damages to be determined; and

(d) Any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

e360Insight, LLC.,

By: /s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] complaint.pdf06/28/09 1:05 pm236.21 KB

MOTION for Expedited Discovery

e360Insight can't wait for Comcast to file its answer in this case to start discovery. You'll find this set of proposed discovery chock full of hardee-har-har goodness. I'll let you put your favorites in the comments.

For those of you who want to know what I think: I think that there's not much here that we won't find Comcast object to as being over-broad, burdensome, and in violation of one or more privileges. But, nice try there, Dave. No one can say that you're not paying your attorneys enough.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DICOVERY

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC ("e360"), by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, LLC, and for its Motion for Expedited discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), states as follows:

1. e360 filed its Complaint for injunctive relief and damages on January 15, 2008.

2. e360 has also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion.

3. Defendant was served with a copy of the Complaint on January 30, 2008.

4. e360 wishes to serve written discovery immediately, including requests for production of documents, interrogatories and requests for admission. (Copies of the discovery e360 wishes to serve are attached to this motion as Exhibit A.)

5. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), this Court can order expedited discovery in advance of the conference required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f).

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6. As detailed in the Complaint, Defendant is, among other things, tortiously interfering with e360's business, transmitting inaccurate response data in an attempt to significantly delay e360's connections in order to slow or incapacitate e360's mail servers and violating e360's First Amendment rights.

7. Defendant continues to engage in this tortious conduct by blocking e360's attempts to deliver e-mail to its customers who utilize Comcast as an Internet Service Provider.

8. Defendant continues to transmit inaccurate response data in an attempt to significantly delay e360's connections in order to slow or incapacitate e360's mail servers.

9. e360 has demanded that Defendant cease and desist from its harmful conduct and notified e360 of the harmful consequences that e360 is experiencing directly resulting from Defendant's conduct.

10. Given Defendant's continued tortious conduct, which has not decreased despite e360's demands to cease and desist, e360 believes that there are additional occurrences of Defendant's wrongdoing that are substantial and significant.

11. e360 needs to ascertains as quickly as possible the full extent of Defendant's transgressions so that it can assess and attempt to mitigate the damage that is being caused.

12. e360 needs the requested discovery to identify why Defendant is blocking its email so that e360 can present as clear a picture of all of Defendant's wrongdoings (tortuously interfering with e360's business and violating e360's First Amendment rights) to the court at the time of the hearing on e360's motion for preliminary injunction.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e3601nsight, LLC, respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order granting it leave to immediately serve on Defendant, Comcast Corp., requests for production of documents, interrogatories and requests for admissions.

Respectfully submitted,

E360Insight, LLC.,
By: /s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, LLC
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois
60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Expedited Discovery was served upon the attorneys listed below electronically through CM/ECF on February 21, 2008.

Douglas N. Masters dmasters@loeb.com Joseph L Kish jkish@synergylawgroup.com,nmcdonald@synergylawgroup.com Carla Elizabeth Buterman cbuterman@butermanlaw.com
Nathan John Hole nhole@loeb.com,ahill@loeb.com,chicagopto@loeb.com, vmelero@loeb.com

/s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Their Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6`f' Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

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GROUP EXHIBIT
A
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANT

Plaintiff, e360lnsight, LLC ("e360"), by and through its attorneys, by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 33, propounds the following Interrogatories to Defendant Comcast Corporation, (Defendant), to be answered within 30 days of the date of the attached certificate of Service.

Definitions

A.The term "you" or "your" means Defendant, Comcast Corporation, and any of its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, current and former employees, partners, agents, attorneys, representatives, and all other persons acting in concert with or on behalf of Defendant, Comcast Corporation.

B.The term "person" or "persons" means a natural person or an entity, any business entity, corporation, partnership, joint venture, firm, trust, group, association, sole proprietorship, any other business entity or any federal, state or local government agency or governmental body.

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C.The term "document" or "documents" as used herein means the original and any identical or non-identical copy, regardless of origin or location, of all written, typewritten, printed, handwritten, computer, recorded or graphic material of any kind or character, including, but not limited to, computer files, drafts, letters, correspondence, telegrams, memoranda, records, tapes, transcripts, programs, photographs, tape recordings, charts, graphs, indexes, minutes, contracts, leases, agreements, handwritten notes, notations of conversations or conferences, interoffice communications, periodicals, bills, schedules, price sheets, time cards, work records, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, studies, notices, summaries, papers, reports, books, teletype messages, facsimile messages, emails, invoices, worksheets, computer printouts, data sheets, data processing tapes, cards, or disks, interoffice communications, forms insurance policies, vouchers, expense account reports, recordings and transcripts thereof, and any other writings, recordings or information stored in computer memory, however produced or reproduced which are now or have ever been in your possession, custody or control or in the possession, custody or control of any of your agents, officers, employees, representatives, or attorneys, and any other document and tangible item subject to discovery under Fed, R. Civ. P. 26.

D.The term "communication" or "communications" means any and all inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, electronic mail (e-mail), letters, notes, memoranda, telegraphs, advertisements, and any and all other forms of verbal exchange, whether oral, written, or electronically transmitted, or any summaries, paraphrases or records of any of the foregoing.

E.The term "identify" (with respect to natural persons) means to set forth the person's (i) full name, (ii) present or last known business or residence address, (iii) present or last known place of employment and position, and (iv) telephone number. Once a person has
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been identified in accordance with this subparagraph, only the name of that person needs to be listed in response to subsequent discovery requesting the identification of that person.

F.The term "identify" (with respect to business organizations) means to set forth (i) the full name of the organization, (ii) its address, (iii) the form of the organization (e.g. corporation, partnership, etc.), and (iv) the state under whose laws such organization was formed.

G.The term "identify" (with respect to communications) means to set forth (i) the types, manner, or means of the communication (i.e., by letter, telephone call, e-mail, interview, meeting, etc.), (ii) the date of the communication, (iii) the place of the communication, (iv) the general subject matter(s) of the communication, (v) sender(s) and recipient(s) of the communication, and (vi) each document that embodies, relates to or refers to the communication.

H.The term "identify" (with respect to documents) means to set forth (i) the type of document (ii) its date, (iii) its general subject matter(s), (iv) each author, signatory, addressee, and recipient thereof, (v) its custodian, and (vi) its present or last known location.

I. The term "relate" or "relating to" means to refer, pertain, concern, describe, establish, demonstrate, evidence, or bear or touch on.

J.As used in these requests, the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular; the masculine, feminine or neuter pronouns include each other; the disjunctive "or" and the conjunctive "and" include each other; and each of the functional words "each", "every", "any", and "all" shall include all of the other functional words, as necessary to bring within the scope of this request any documents that might otherwise be construed to be outside the scope.

K.These interrogatories seek information concerning the time period of January 1, 2005 to the present unless otherwise specified.

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L.As used in these requests, "customers" of Defendant shall mean all individuals who maintain or maintained an e-mail account with Comcast and who were the intended recipients of e-mail sent by Plaintiff that was blocked by Defendant from being delivered.

Instructions

M.In responding to these interrogatories, furnish all information in Defendant's possession, custody or control and in the possession, custody or control of Defendant's members, managers, employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, and any other persons acting on Defendant's behalf, and not merely such matter as is in Defendant's possession.

N.These interrogatories are to be deemed continuing. Defendant is requested to provide, by way of supplementary responses, such additional information and documentation as may hereafter be obtained by Defendant, or any person on Defendant's behalf, that will augment, supplement or otherwise modify the answers now given to the following requests.

O.If any of these requests cannot be responded to in full, answer to the extent possible, specifying the reasons for Defendant's inability to answer to the remainder and stating what information you do have concerning the unanswered portion.

Privileged Matter
You are requested to identify and list all documents or responses called for by these interrogatories but withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, or on any other basis, and to specify in writing the grounds for your withholding such documents. All such documents shall be segregated, and retained by your counsel pending a ruling by the Court on the claimed privilege. Each document shall be identified by:
(1) Author and recipient(s), including titles of such persons;

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(2) Date of document;

(3) Number of pages, attachments, and appendices;

(4) A general description of the nature and subject matter of the document;

(5) Subject matter and nature of privilege claimed;

(6) Present custodian; and

(7) Reason the document was not produced.

Material Lost Or Destroyed
If any responses to these interrogatories are incomplete because have been lost, discarded or destroyed, the materials so lost, discarded or destroyed shall be identified as completely as possible, including identification as set forth above under "Privileged Matter" and the following information: date of disposal or loss, person authorizing the disposal, persons having knowledge of the disposal or loss, and person disposing of the document.

Interrogatories

1. Identify all communication between and among Defendant and any third-party regarding Plaintiff.

2. Identify all communication between and Defendant and any third-party concerning this litigation.

3. Identify all communication between Defendant on the one hand and Plaintiff on the other.

4. Identify all communication between Defendant on the one hand and intended recipients of e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant on the other concerning this litigation.

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5. Identify all communication between Defendant on the one hand and intended recipients of e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant on the other concerning the subject e-mail.

6. Identify all sources used by Defendant in its determination to block e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant.

7. Identify the person or persons involved in the decision to block e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant.

8. Identify all persons with knowledge of the messages sent to Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff's attempt to transmit e-mail to customers of Defendant.

9. Identify all persons with knowledge of the e-mail filters used by Defendant to screen incoming e-mail messages.

10. Identify all communications between and among Defendant and any other entities regarding the blocking of e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant.

11. Identify the policies or procedures that you believe are applicable to the decision to block e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant.

12. Identify all email marketing companies that are not regularly blocked from sending email to Comcast's mail servers and why these entities are materially different from Plaintiff.

13. Identify all entities that provide financial compensation to Comcast in any form, including payment, advertising services, barter of services, press services or any other form of compensation to Comcast for delivering email messages to Comcast subscribers.

14. State the basis for your decision to block e-mail sent by Plaintiff to customers of Defendant.

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15. Identify the policies or procedures that you believe are applicable to the decision to transmit inaccurate response data to Plaintiffs computer servers in response to email sent by Plaintiff to its customers who utilize Defendant as an ISP.

16. State the basis for your decision to transmit inaccurate response data to Plaintiffs computer servers in response to email sent by Plaintiff to its customers who utilize Defendant as an ISP.

17. Identify the policies or procedures that you believe are applicable to the decision to hold or severely and significantly delay email Plaintiff has attempted to send to its customers who utilized Defendant as an ISP who have signed up to receive such emails, and the decision by Defendant to refuse to release such emails through its system.

18. State the basis for your decision to hold or severely and significantly delay email Plaintiff has attempted to send to its customers who utilized Defendant as an ISP who have signed up to receive such emails, and the decision by Defendant to refuse to release such emails through its system.

Respectfully submitted, e3601nsight, LLC.,
By:
/s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, LLC
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261
Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REOUESTS TO PRODUCE

Plaintiff, e3601nsight, LLC ("e360"), by and through its attorneys, by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34, propounds the following Requests to Produce to Defendant Comcast Corporation, (Defendant), to be answered within 30 days of the date of the attached Certificate of Service.

Definitions

A. The term "you" or "your" means Defendant, Comcast Corporation, and any of its predecessors, successors, subsidiaries, current and former employees, partners, agents, attorneys, representatives, and all other persons acting in concert with or on behalf of Defendant, Comcast Corporation.

B. The term "person" or "persons" means a natural person or an entity, any business entity, corporation, partnership, joint venture, firm, trust, group, association, sole proprietorship, any other business entity or any federal, state or local government agency or governmental body.

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C. The term "document" or "documents" as used herein means the original and any identical or non-identical copy, regardless of origin or location, of all written, typewritten, printed, handwritten, computer, recorded or graphic material of any kind or character, including, but not limited to, computer files, drafts, letters, correspondence, telegrams, memoranda, records, tapes, transcripts, programs, photographs, tape recordings, charts, graphs, indexes, minutes, contracts, leases, agreements, handwritten notes, notations of conversations or conferences, interoffice communications, periodicals, bills, schedules, price sheets, time cards, work records, bulletins, circulars, pamphlets, studies, notices, summaries, papers, reports, books, teletype messages, facsimile messages, emails, invoices, worksheets, computer printouts, data sheets, data processing tapes, cards, or disks, interoffice communications, forms insurance policies, vouchers, expense account reports, recordings and transcripts thereof, and any other writings, recordings or information stored in computer memory, however produced or reproduced which are now or have ever been in your possession, custody or control or in the possession, custody or control of any of your agents, officers, employees, representatives, or attorneys, and any other document and tangible item subject to discovery under Fed, R. Civ. P. 26.

D. The term "communication" or "communications" means any and all inquiries, discussions, conversations, negotiations, agreements, understandings, meetings, telephone conversations, electronic mail (e-mail), letters, notes, memoranda, telegraphs, advertisements, and any and all other forms of verbal exchange, whether oral, written, or electronically transmitted, or any summaries, paraphrases or records of any of the foregoing.

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E. The term "identify" (with respect to natural persons) means to set forth the person's (i) full name, (ii) present or last known business or residence address, (iii) present or last known place of employment and position, and (iv) telephone number. Once a person has been identified in accordance with this subparagraph, only the name of that person needs to be listed in response to subsequent discovery requesting the identification of that person.

F. The term "identify" (with respect to business organizations) means to set forth (i) the full name of the organization, (ii) its address, (iii) the form of the organization (e.g. corporation, partnership, etc.), and (iv) the state under whose laws such organization was formed.

G. The term "identify" (with respect to communications) means to set forth (i) the types, manner, or means of the communication (i.e., by letter, telephone call, e-mail, interview, meeting, etc.), (ii) the date of the communication, (iii) the place of the communication, (iv) the general subject matter(s) of the communication, (v) sender(s) and recipient(s) of the communication, and (vi) each document that embodies, relates to or refers to the communication.

H. The term "identify" (with respect to documents) means to set forth (i) the type of document (ii) its date, (iii) its general subject matter(s), (iv) each author, signatory, addressee, and recipient thereof, (v) its custodian, and (vi) its present or last known location.

I. The term "relate" or "relating to" means to refer, pertain, concern, describe, establish, demonstrate, evidence, or bear or touch on.

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J. As used in these requests, the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular; the masculine, feminine or neuter pronouns include each other; the disjunctive "or" and the conjunctive "and" include each other; and each of the functional words "each", "every", "any", and "all" shall include all of the other functional words, as necessary to bring within the scope of this request any documents that might otherwise be construed to be outside the scope.

K.These interrogatories seek information concerning the time period of January 1, 2005 to the present unless otherwise specified.

L.As used in these requests, "customers" of Defendant shall mean all individuals who maintain or maintained an e-mail account with Comcast and who were the intended recipients of e-mail sent by Plaintiff that was blocked by Defendant from being delivered.

M.As used in these requests, "White List" shall mean any and all documents that memorialize or otherwise reference an agreement by Defendant to allow the delivery of e-mail sent by third-parties to individuals who utilize Defendant as an ISP.

Instructions

N. In responding to these requests, furnish all information in Defendant's possession, custody or control and in the possession, custody or control of Defendant's members, managers, employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, and any other persons acting on Defendant's behalf, and not merely such matter as is in Defendant's possession.

O. These requests are to be deemed continuing. Defendant is requested to provide, by way of supplementary responses, such additional information and documentation as may hereafter be obtained by Defendant, or any person on Defendant's behalf, that will
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augment, supplement or otherwise modify the answers now given to the following requests.

P. If any of these requests cannot be responded to in full, answer to the extent possible, specifying the reasons for Defendant's inability to answer to the remainder and stating what information you do have concerning the unanswered portion.

Privileged Matter

You are requested to identify and list all documents called for by this request but withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, or on any other basis, and to specify in writing the grounds for your withholding such documents. All such documents shall be segregated, and retained by your counsel pending a ruling by the Court on the claimed privilege. Each document shall be identified by:

Author and recipient(s), including titles of such persons;
Date of document;
Number of pages, attachments, and appendices;
A general description of the nature and subject matter of the document;
Subject matter and nature of privilege claimed;
Present custodian; and
Reason the document was not produced.

Material Lost Or Destroyed

If any documents requested herein have been lost, discarded or destroyed, the documents so lost, discarded or destroyed shall be identified as completely as possible, including identification as set forth above under "Privileged Matter" and the following information: date of disposal or
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loss, person authorizing the disposal, persons having knowledge of the disposal or loss, and person disposing of the document.

Documents Requested

1. All documents relating to the e-mail filters, blacklists and blocking technologies utilized by Defendant.

2. All documents referred to by you in your answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories.

3. All documents related to any content filtering systems utilized by Defendant.

4. All documents relating to any third-party sources used in connection with Defendant's decision to block e-mail sent by Plaintiff.

5. All documents relating to your communications with any person about Plaintiff.

6. All documents relating to your communications with Plaintiff.

7. All documents relating to why you placed blocked e-mail sent by Plaintiff to your customers.

8. All documents relating communications you had with anyone discussing why you placed blocked e-mail from Plaintiff.

9. All documents relating communications you had with anyone discussing why you placed blocked e-mail sent by Plaintiff.

10. All documents relating to Plaintiff violating Defendant's Acceptable Use Policy.

11. All documents relating to Plaintiff violating Defendant's Terms of Service agreements.

12. All documents relating to any communications Defendant had with Spamhaus, Spamhaus Technology, Spamhaus volunteers, other businesses relating to Plaintiff.

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13. All documents relating to any communications Defendant had with Spamhaus, Spamhaus Technology, Spamhaus volunteers, other businesses concerning this litigation.

14. All documents relating to following error message from Comcast for all of the messages e360 attempted to send:
"550 5.2.0 63.210.103.209 blocked by ldap:ou=rblmx,dc=comcast,dc=net -> BL004 Blocked for spam. Please see http://www.comcast.net/help/fag/index.isp?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18628"

15. All documents relating to the integration of Brightmail technology into the Comcast network and all documents describing the features and functions contained in the Brightmail application that are used to identify, score, block and/or filter inbound email messages.

16. All documents relating to the integration of MAPS technology by TrendMicro into the Comcast network and all documents describing the features and functions contained in the MAPS application that are used to identify, score, block and/or filter inbound email messages.

17. All documents relating to any agreements to allow the delivery of e-mail by other entities (entities that are "White Listed") that deliver email messages to individuals who utilize Comcast as an ISP.

18. All documents relating to any written or verbal agreements between Comcast and any email marketing companies, including email service providers (ESPs) that related to the delivery of email messages to Comcast's network.

19. All documents related to complaint rates, bounce rates, trap hits, message volume sent and any other metrics used by Comcast to determine whether an email message should be blocked or filtered from its intended recipient.

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20. All documents related to complaints received by Comcast regarding e360.

21. All documents, including but not limited to logs created or used by email administrators, related to blocked email messages.

Respectfully submitted,

e360Insight, LLC.,

By: /s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, LLC
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

-21-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUESTS TO ADMIT

Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC ("e360"), by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Guterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 36, propounds the following Requests to Admit to Defendant Comcast Corporation, (Defendant), to be answered within 30 days of the date of the attached certificate of Service.

Request to Admit

1. Plaintiff has not violated Defendant's Acceptable Use Policy.

2. Plaintiff has not violated Defendant's Terms of Service agreements.

3. Defendant is an internet service provider ("ISP") that provides email service to its customers and Defendant has agreed to act as an intermediary in delivering and receiving emails on behalf of its customers.

4. Commencing as early as 2005, Defendant blocked emails e-mail messages e360 repeatedly attempted to send to Comcast customers.

5. Defendant refuses to provide e360 with any information as to how e360 could modify its email messages to avoid triggering the block of its rightfully sent email messages.

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6. Plaintiff has contacted Defendant in attempts to get Defendant to allow Plaintiff's email to get through to parties utilizing Comcast as an ISP.

7. Defendant has transmitted inaccurate response data to Plaintiffs computer servers.

8. Defendant has blocked e-mail sent by Plaintiff to e-mail accounts of Defendant's customers.

9. Defendant uses multiple email filters, including third-party companies and internal blacklists, to filter and block emails.

10. On March 5, 2007, Plaintiff notified Defendant that Defendant's use of the Spamhaus blacklist was improperly blocking Plaintiff's email messages and was improperly interfering with Plaintiffs legitimate business.

11. Defendant has blocked and continues to block emails sent by Plaintiff to its customers based on information obtained from Spamhaus.

12. Defendant has blocked and continues to block emails sent by Plaintiff to its customers based on other third-party and internal blacklists and other software filters supplied by third-parties.

13. Use of the software filters includes blocking e-mail based on the content of the e-mail sent.

14. Defendant has transmitted inaccurate bounce information to Plaintiffs mail server.

15. Defendant has knowledge of the Plaintiffs prospective business relationships with Comcast users.

16. Defendant intentionally and knowingly slowed its processing time of when contacted by e360 computers in and effort to send e-mail.

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17. Defendant knows that entities sending e-mail to Defendant's customers rely on Defendant to provide accurate and truthful information regarding the deliverability of mail and the activity status of email addresses of Defendant's customers.

18. Plaintiff has the right to send commercial emails to its consumers and consumers who have asked or agreed to receive its email.

19. Defendant informs third-parties that if the third-party adheres to Defendant's Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services the e-mail from the third-party to Defendant's customers will be delivered.

20. Defendant has entered into agreements, either written or verbal, to allow certain email marketers to send or transmit email without interruption regardless of whether such email meets Comcast's Acceptable Use policy.

Respectfully submitted,
e360Insight, LLC.,
By: /s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, LLC
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

Remember when I said "This will be the sad saga of this short lawsuit filed by a little company that can't seem to deliver its email without the assistance of the federal judiciary"?

Well, here it is! This is the official request by e360Insight to have the federal judiciary "make the Bad Man let me send my email!"

The two attachments are not included in the OCR version, but are in the PDF file. One is an extremely conclusory affidavit by Linhardt wherein he vigorously protests that what he sends isn't spam and that Comcast is generally mean and evil for prosecuting a Denial of Service attack against him by "consuming, destroying, altering, or withholding" e360's email. He also claims to be following Comcast's Terms of Service agreement (except, apparently, for the arbitration clause) which is attached as the second exhibit.

=======================================
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360lnsight, LLC ("e360"), by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Joseph L. Kish of Synergy Law Group, LLC, and for its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 against Defendant, Comcast Corp. ("Comcast"), states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

e360, an internet marketing company seeks a preliminary injunction against Comcast, an internet service provided ("ISP") to enjoin Comcast from wrongfully and repeatedly blocking email sent by e360 to e360's customers, who have requested to receive e-mail from e360, from violating e360's first amendment rights by blocking e-mail based on the content of the e-mail, from transmitting inaccurate response data in an attempt to significantly delay e360's connections in order to virtually incapacitate e360's computer mail servers and from transmitting inaccurate bounce data regarding the status of e-mail accounts managed by Comcast. Comcast's activity has already caused e360 to lose substantial and significant business.

Despite e360 informing Comcast that e360 was only sending e-mail to customers who have requested that e360 send them e-mail and despite informing Comcast of the damage its
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actions caused (and continues to cause) e360, Comcast continues its refusal to allow the delivery of e-mail sent to the customers of e360 who receive e-mail through their own e-mail accounts with Comcast. Further, Comcast has continued to transmit inaccurate response data to e360's computers that are trying to send such e-mail. Finally, Comcast has continued to transmit inaccurate bounce data regarding the status of e-mail accounts managed by Comcast. Comcast should be preliminarily enjoined from (1) arbitrarily blocking all e-mails sent by e360 to e360's customers who have e-mail accounts with Comcast; (2) violating e360's free speech rights by censoring e360's e-mail based on the content of the e-mail; (3) transmitting inaccurate bounce data; and (4) engaging in denial of service attacks on 360's computers.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. e360 is an e-mail marketing company whose business practices have, at all times relevant to the allegations in the Complaint, complied with, and continue to comply, with all federal and state requirements, laws and standards pertaining to the sending of commercial e-mail, including the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 USC § 7701 (CAN-SPAM). (See Affidavit of David Linhardt attached hereto as Exhibit A).

2. e360 delivers its messages to its customers at addresses provided by said customers. Id. The customers thus require e360 to use Internet Service Providers ("ISP") to deliver the requested e-mail. Id.

3. Comcast is an ISP that provides e-mail service to its customers and who has agreed to act as an intermediary in delivering and receiving e-mail on behalf of its customers.

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4. Comcast provides to its customers and the public on its website Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services, attached and incorporated into this Motion as Exhibit B.

5. At all relevant times, e360 has complied with Comcast's Acceptable Use and Abuse Policies. (See Exhibit A).

6. e360 is hired by and partners with companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet. Id. This marketing is targeted to persons "opting in" to a list whereby they agree to accept e-mail announcements and/or advertisements. Id. These persons sign up at websites owned by e360 or at websites owned by e360's marketing partners. Id. e360 regularly attempts to verify the desire by such customers to receive e-mails utilizing a "double opt-in" process, which involves sending a confirmatory e-mail allowing the customer to affirm or terminate its decision to receive marketing e-mail. (See Exhibit A). Those customers who affirm their interest in receiving e-mail messages are included in subsequent e-mail messages until they unsubscribe at a later date or until e360 receives information showing the e-mail account in question is closed. Id.

7. e360 provides the consumer the ability to "opt-out" of receiving e-mail in every email sent and promptly complies with every request made by a consumer. Id.

8. e360 does not engage in "spamming.". e360 only sends e-mail messages to persons who first sign up or opt-in and provide their e-mail address to e360 or to one of e360's marketing partners. Id. e360 employs a variety of permission processes that it controls and that its marketing partners use to obtain permission from and provide notice to the consumer that received the e-mail. Id.

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9. At all relevant times, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast regularly blocked e-mail e360 attempted to send to Comcast customers (who had signed up to receive such e-mail) including some of who have double-confirmed their wish to receive the e-mail. (See Exhibit A). The blocking of these messages by Comcast interferes with e360's ability to do business and interferes with e360's business relationship with its customers who use Comcast. Id.

10. All instances where Comcast has blocked e360 e-mail addresses are too voluminous to mention in this complaint. As a recent example, Comcast blocked virtually all of e360's e-mail messages on August 23, 2007. e360 attempted to send e-mail messages to its customers, including those who have "double-confirmed" their interest in receiving e360's email messages. e360 used ip address 63.210.103.209 to connect to Comcast's mail servers. e360 received the following error message from Comcast for all of the messages e360 attempted to send. "550 5.2.0 63.210.103.209 blocked by ldap:ou=rblmx,dc=comcast,dc=net -> BL004 Blocked for spam. Please see http://www.comcast.net/helpMq/index.jsv?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18628"

By following the link provided in the Comcast error message, e360 was directed to the following information on Comcast's website:

"Mail to Comcast is rejected and is returned with an error message containing the code BL004. What does this mean? Our filters have determined that e-mail from your mail server has been sent in patterns which are characteristic of spam. In an effort to protect subscribers, your mail server has been blocked from sending email to the Comcast network. Mail servers are typically shared by many users so
-5-
it may be the case that another party using your mail server has sent spam, even if you have not."

11. e360 cannot reasonably ascertain how its messages may have been sent "in patterns which are characteristic of spam." Comcast refuses to provide e360 with any information as to how e360 could modify its e-mail messages to avoid triggering the block of its rightfully sent e-mail messages or the delivery of this error message. (See Exhibit A).

12. e360 has on numerous occasions contacted Comcast in attempts to get Comcast to allow e360's e-mail to get through to its customers. Id.

13. At all relevant times, and possibly commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly held or severely and significantly delayed e-mail e360 has attempted to send to its customers who utIllzed Comcast as an ISP who have signed up to receive such e-mails, and Comcast has refused to release such e-mails through its system, a practice commonly known as "tar-pitting" and is type of "denial of service attack" on e360's mail servers. Id. Comcast regularly transmits inaccurate response data in an attempt to significantly delay e360's connections in order to slow or incapacitate e360's mail servers. Id. e360's sending mail servers track and report average response time for each recipient domain. The average response time is defined as the time it takes for the recipient domain to process a message; to receive the message and to acknowledge receipt. As recently as December 11, 2007, e360 recorded an average response time of 18,433 seconds or 5.1 hours to process a single e-mail message to a customer using Comcast's e-mail service. Id. (A typical e-mail message sent to a recipient where the ISP is not engaged in a denial of service attack is delivered in less than 2-5 seconds). Id. During this time, Comcast's mail servers transmit inaccurate response information to keep the connection active and to erode e360's system capacity. In doing so, Comcast has interfered with e360's
-6-
ability to send e-mail, not just to Comcast customers who are also e360 customers, but to all e360 customers by shutting down e360's servers. (See Exhibit A).

14. At all times relevant hereto, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly blocked e-mail e360 has attempted to send to its customers who utIllze Comcast as an ISP and who have signed up to receive such e-mail, including customers who have double confirmed their wish to receive e-mail solely on the grounds that such e-mail contains specific words or phrases, such as "free". Id. Such arbitrary censorship by Comcast violates e360's First Amendment rights and is an unacceptable infringement of e360's commercial speech based on content.

15. Comcast has blocked and continues to block e-mail sent by e360 to its customers based on third-party and internal blacklists and other software filters supplied by third-parties. Some of the known blocking technologies used by Comcast include Spamhaus, MAPS by TrendMicro and Brightmail by Symantec.

16. Comcast has engaged in `denial-of-service' attacks on e360's network and computer system by consuming, destroying, altering or withholding e-mail sent by e360 to its customers. Id. Such attacks overwhelm and disable e360's network and prevent it from sending e-mail to or receiving e-mail from e360's consumers in an attempt to halt e360's business. Id.

17. Comcast has transmitted inaccurate information to e360's mail servers specific to e-mail addresses contained on e360's opt-in marketing list. Id. The responses sent by Comcast mail servers to e360 are inaccurate because they contain information indicating that the e-mail address is invalid and not active. As an e-mail marketer, e360 relies on the information from Comcast's mail servers to determine whether e360's customer e-mail addresses are still active and deliverable. Id. e360 has information and reason to believe Comcast is intentionally
-7-
transmitting inaccurate bounce information to e360 in an attempt to discourage e360 from sending additional e-mail messages. (See Exhibit A). By transmitting inaccurate bounce information, Comcast is effectively destroying e360's proprietary assets and the value contained in e360's opt-in database of e-mail addresses. Id.

ARGUMENT

I Legal Standards Applicable to Preliminary Injunctions

Because this action is based on diversity jurisdiction, the Court must apply the substantive law of Illinois. Assn Ben. Servs. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 849; 2007 U. S. App. LEXIS 16750 * 16 (7th Cir. 2007).

Preliminary injunctions are interlocutory remedies. Interlocutory injunctions are intended to provide immediate but durational relief prior to the final adjudication of a controversy on the merits. Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 151 Ill.2d 142, 601 N.E.2d 720, 176 Ill.Dec. 22 (1992). The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo . Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co,, 151 Il1.2d 142, 601 N.E.2d 720, 176 Ill.Dec. 22 (1992); Citizens Utilities Co. of Ill. v. O'Connor, 116 Ill.App.3d 369, 451 N.E.2d 946, 71 Ill.Dec. 792 (2nd Dist. 1983). "Status quo" is defined as the "last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy." Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill.2d 391, 626 N.E.2d 199, 202, 193 I1l.Dec. 166 (1993).

Another expressed purpose of an interlocutory injunction is the prevention of a threatened wrong or further perpetration of injury until the merits of the case can be decided. People v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 142 Ill.App.3d 1104, 492 N.E.2d 1003, 97 H.Dec. 344 (2nd Dist. 1986). The prevention of the dissipation or destruction of property is an additional ground cited for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction. In re Marriage of Joerger, 221 Ill.App.3d 400, 581 N.E.2d 1219, 163 Ill.Dec. 796 (4th Dist. 1991). See also Save the Prairie Socy. v. Greene Dev. Group, Inc., 323 I1l.App.3d 862, 752 N.E.2d 523, 256 Ill.Dec. 643 (1st Dist. 2001).

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Illinois courts consider four factors before an injunction will be granted: (1) that the plaintiff possesses a clearly ascertained right in need of protection; (2) that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) that there is no adequate remedy at law for the plaintiffs injury; and (4) that the plaintiff is likely to be successful on the merits of its action. People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d 164, 781 N.E.2d 223, 269 Ill. Dec. 426 (2002); Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P. C. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365, 748 N.E.2d 153, 254 Ill. Dec. 707 (2001).

II Comcast's' Conduct Meets The Legal Standard For Granting A Preliminary Injunction.

A. Plaintiffs Rights in Need of Protection.

The standard for establishing a sufficient legal right requires only that the party seeking relief raise a fair question as to the existence of the right claimed. Baal v. McDonald's Corp., 97 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500, 422 N.E. 2d 1166, 1171, 52 Ill. Dec. 957 (1st Dist. 1981); In re Marriage of Estelle Weber, 182 Ill. App. 3d 212, 219, 537 N.E. 2d 1024, 1029, 130 Ill. Dec. 695 (1st Dist. 1989). The right to conduct a business may be sufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction. Conti. Cablevision of Cook County, Inc. v. Miller, 238 Ill. App. 3d 774, 606 N.E.2d 587, 179 Ill. Dec. 755 (1st Dist. 1992); Morrison Metalweld Process Corp. v. Valent, 97 Ill. App. 3d 373, 422 N.E. 2d 1034, 52 Ill. Dec. 825 (1st Dist. 1981). Moreover, threatened interests in business goodwill are valid business interests in need of protection. Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill. App. 3d 844, 577 N.E.2d 1323, 160Ill. Dec. 752 (1st Dist. 1991) (citing U-Haul Co. of C. Ill. v. Hindahl, 90 Ill. App. 3d 572, 577 (3rd Dist. 1980).

Here, e360 has clearly established legal rights that need protecting under the circumstances brought on by Comcast's conduct. e360 has lost its right to conduct its business as a result of Comcast's unilateral decision to (1) block e-mail sent by e360 to e360's customers

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who happen to use Comcast as their ISP and e-mail host based on various criteria; including (2) impermissibly blocking e-mail based on content in direct violation of e360's constitutional right of free speech.; (3) transmitting inaccurate response data in an attempt to significantly delay e360's connections in order to virtually incapacitate e360's computer mail servers; and, (4) transmitting inaccurate bounce data regarding the status of e-mail accounts managed by Comcast.

This is not a case where an injunction is being sought "on a mere suspicion of an intended wrong, or upon speculation or conjecture, or because there is a mere possibility or apprehension on part of the plaintiff that some illegal act will be done." See Callis v. Norfolk, 195 Ill. 2d 356, 366, 748 N.E. 2d 153, 159, 254 Ill. Dec. 707 (2001); Smith Oil Corp. v. Viking Chem. Corp., 127 Ill. App. 3d 423, 468 N.E. 2d 797, 82 Ill. Dec. 250 (2nd Dist. 1984). Here, improper acts have already occurred and continue to occur. There is no reason to suspect that additional improper acts will not occur in the future absent this Court enjoining Comcast's actions.

B. Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Harm

Under Illinois law, "an injury is `irreparable' when it is of such a nature that the injured party cannot be adequately compensated or when damages cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard." Falcon Ltd. v. Corr's Natl. Bevs., h7C, 165 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821, 520 N.E.2d 831, 117 Ill. Dec. 480 (1st Dist. 1987) "Irreparable harm" does not necessarily mean injury that is beyond repair. "Irreparable harm" can also mean harm of a continuing nature. Lucas v. Peters, 318 I l1.App.3d 1, 741 N.E.2d 313, 251 Ill.Dec. 719 (1st Dist. 2000). Here, Comcast's continued improper conduct will cause significant injury to e360, not only in loss of business due to its inability to deliver commercial e-mail, but also to its reputation of having a highly accurate and

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valid list of e-mail recipients that have opted in to receive commercial e-mail messages. This is harm that is clearly irreparable.

To put a monetary value on the investment of time in building e360 is incalculable. Injury to goodwill and reputation contributes to a loss of competitive position, which ultimately results in the loss of future customers and revenues. Goodwill and reputation are intangible and incapable of being measured. Wilson v. Wilson, 217 Ill. App. 3d 844, 577 N.E. 2d 1323, 160 Ill. Dec. 752 (1st Dist. 1991); A-Tech Computer Servs., Inc. v. Wayne Soo Hoo, 254 Ill. App. 3d 392, 627 N.E. 2d 21, 193 Ill. Dec. 862 (1st Dist. 1991). Courts have held that even if immediate damages could be calculated, injury to reputation, goodwill and potential loss is incapable of adequate compensation. U-Haul Co. of C Ill. v. Hindahl, 90 Ill. App. 3d 572, 577, 413 N.E.2d 187, 45 Ill. Dec. 854 (3rd Dist. 1980). The amount of damage is manifested as a loss of customers, goodwill and future profits. These are so variable in nature that damages are hard to assess with any degree of accuracy. A-Tech Computer Services, Inc., 254 Ill. App. 3d at 401.

Moreover, "a showing of irreparable injury is related to the proof of a legitimate business interest. Once a protectible interest has been established, injury to plaintiff will presumably follow if that interest is not protected." Donald McElroy, Inc. v. Delaney, 72 Ill. App. 3d 285, 294, 389 N.E.2d 1300, 27Ill. Dec. 892 (1st Dist. 1979).

Irreparable harm would occur absent an injunction because nothing could be done to restore the status quo should the Comcast be allowed to continue to draw into question the quality of e360's e-mail list.

C. There is No Adequate Remedy at Law
An adequate remedy at law is a remedy that is clear and complete and that would provide the same practical and efficient resolution as an injunction would provide. Tainalunis v. Georgetown 134 Ill.Dec. 223 (4th Dist. 1989). Money
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damages may not be an adequate remedy if the potential loss of future revenues is incapable of adequate computation or damages are difficult to quantify at the time of hearing. Eagle Books, Inc. v. Jones, 130 I1l.App.3d 407, 474 N.E.2d 444, 85 Il1.Dec. 716 (4th Dist.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 249 (1985).

In this case, it is impossible to calculate the damages associated with the damaged reputation with e360's current business partners and future prospects or the value of e360's very existence. Money damages here cannot adequately compensate e360 for the wrongful destruction of an otherwise viable business whose goodwill can never be recaptured. Nor can e360's reputation be adequately remedied by monetary damages.

Courts have held that even if immediate damages could be calculated, injury to reputation, goodwill and potential loss is incapable of adequate compensation. U-Haul Co. of C. Ill. v. Hindahl, 90 Ill. App. 3d 572, 577, 413 N.E.2d 187, 45 Ill. Dec. 854 (3rd Dist. 1980). The amount of damage is manifested as a loss of customers, goodwill and future profits. These are so variable in nature that damages are hard to assess with any degree of accuracy. A-Tech Computer Services, Inc., 254 Ill. App. 3d at 401.

D. Plaintiff is Likely to Succeed on the Merits

To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a party "is not required to make out a case which will in all events warrant relief at a final hearing." All Seasons Excavating Co. v. Bluthardt, 229 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26, 593 N.E. 2d 679, 682, 170 Ill. Dec. 790 (1st Dist. 1992); Tie Sys ,Inc. v. Telcom Midwest, Inc., 203 I11.App.3d 142, 560 N.E.2d 1080, 148 Ill.Dec. 483 (1st Dist. 1990). Rather, a party needs only raise a "fair question as to the existence of the rights claimed, [and] lead the court to believe that it will probably be entitled to the relief sought if the proof sustains the obligations." Buzz Barton & Assocs, Inc. v. Giannone, 108 Il1.2d 373, 382,
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483 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 91 Ill. Dec. 636 (1985); Keefe-Shea Jt. Venture v. Evanston, 332 Ill. App. 3d 163, 174, 773 N.E. 2d 1155, 1164, 266Ill. Dec. 85 (1st Dist. 2002).

Here Comcast's blocking of e360's e-mail and Comcast's continued transmission of inaccurate response data clearly gives rise to viable claims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; violation of computer fraud and abuse act; violation of e360's right to free speech; and, unfair competition and business practices. e360 has clearly raised a fair question as to the existence of the rights it claims -- an interest in the viabIllty of the business of e360 as a going concern. e360 has also presented a fair question that it will likely succeed on the merits, given the nature of Comcast's conduct, Comcast's refusal to cease its blocking of e360's e-mail, Comcast's refusal to follow the rules it promulgates and the direct and dire consequences this conduct undeniably has had on e360's ability to conduct its business.

Comcast's behavior threatens the very existence of e360 and is systematically decreasing the value of e360's e-mail database. e360 has no other alternative than to pursue the protection of its rights through injunctive relief.

E. The Equities Balance In Plaintiffs' Favor

In addition to consideration of the above criteria, a fifth factor frequently considered by courts is that the benefits of granting the injunction outweigh the possible harm that defendant might suffer as a result. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 284 Ill.App.3d 848, 672 N.E.2d 763, 219 I11.Dec. 910 (1st Dist. 1996); Gold v. ZiComnnn. Co., 196 Ill.App.3d 425, 553 N.E.2d 404, 142 Il1.Dec. 890 (1st Dist. 1989).

Under the circumstances of this case, the benefit of granting an injunction clearly outweighs any possible harm to Comcast. While the harm to e360 resulting from Comcast's conduct is undeniable, it is difficult to imagine what harm might possibly befall Comcast should it be required to permit the transmission of e-mail from e360 to individuals who have already
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requested that they receive said e-mail. Comcast suffers no material harm whatsoever as a result of this Court granting the preliminary injunction e360 seeks.

CONCLUSION

e360 cannot await a trial to obtain the permanent injunction it seeks in this matter. By then, Comcast could succeed in putting e360 out of business or, at a minimum, destroying its reputation to the point that it can never recover. e360 has clearly established all of the elements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction and have further established that Comcast will suffer no material harm by the injunction issuing and pending through the remainder of this litigation.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, e3601nsight, LLC, respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order granting this motion and entering an order:

a. Requiring Comcast to allow the transmission of e-mail from e360 to Comcast customers;

b. requiring Comcast to cease and desist from the transmission of bogus response data; and

c. granting any further relief the court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,
e360Insight, LLC.,
By: /s/ Joseph L. Kish
One of Its Attorneys
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Synergy Law Group, LLC
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotPrelimInj.pdf06/28/09 1:05 pm2.63 MB

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

This suit was destined to be quick. Thus, the theme for this filing and it's supporting memorandum is: "e360Insight's Case Constitutes an EPIC FAIL".

This is Comcast's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. That means that Comcast feels that discovery is completely unnecessary because the suit is frivolous and so they're asking the judge to not waste any more time, look at the existing pleadings, and just go ahead and rule, before discovery even gets started.

If Comcast wins this one, look for them to possibly file for sanctions and for e360 to pay their attorneys' fees and costs.

===================================
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) respectfully moves the Court for entry of judgment in Comcast’s favor on each of Plaintiff’s causes of action. Judgment is appropriate here since Comcast is immune from each of Plaintiff’s claims under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and various state law statutes immunizing actions of e-mail service providers taken to filter or block spam and other objectionable e-mails.

In addition, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim on which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s first cause of action, for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s pleadings do not establish any cognizable relationship with which Comcast improperly interfered.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action, for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii) fails because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Comcast improperly accessed any of its computers with respect to the allegedly damaging activities of which Plaintiff complains.

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Plaintiff’s third cause of action, for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, fails because Plaintiff has not and cannot allege that Comcast is a state actor, that its action constitute state action, or that it is acting under color of state law.

Plaintiff’s fourth and final cause of action, for unfair competition and business practices under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, fails because Plaintiff has not identified any deceptive trade practice or practice that can be deemed unfair as defined under the law, which requires an action that offends public policy, that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, or that causes substantial injury to consumers. Moreover, Plaintiff is not a consumer and thus, to maintain a claim under the ICFA, must demonstrate a nexus between Comcast’s complained-of behavior and harm to consumers. Plaintiff does not identify any consumer harm, and clearly seeks to recover for alleged harm to itself, which is not proper under the ICFA.

For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Comcast’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Comcast respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor.

Dated: March 4, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

/s/ Douglas N. Masters
Douglas N. Masters (6199010)
Nathan J. Hole (6283099)
321 N Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60610
Phone: (312) 464-3144
Fax: (312) 464-3111
[Email address redacted]
Attorneys for Defendant
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotJudgmentPleadings.pdf06/28/09 1:05 pm33.26 KB

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

In keeping with the "EPIC FAIL" theme of the day, Comcast has also filed this memorandum of law.

Footnote 5 mentions another court decision that is attached. I didn't attach that decision. It is available online

UPDATE: Fun quotes for any reporters wanting a synopsis:

"Plaintiff is a spammer who refers to itself as a “internet marketing company”"

"Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to hold Comcast liable for legally and effectively managing the amount of spam and junk mail received by its subscribers."

"Indeed, in a nearly identical case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an ISP in a suit brought by a bulk commercial e-mailer who sent allegedly lawful e-mails that were blocked by the ISP. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at Austin ... (CAN-SPAM “does not preclude [defendant] from using technological devices [such as] spam filters to conserve server space and safeguard [its] time and resources.”). Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claim of CAN-SPAM compliance do not require Comcast to pass Plaintiff’s e-mails through without scrutiny."

"By way of analogy, Plaintiff’s allegations can be compared to a telemarketer who calls a phone number and receives no answer. Instead of hanging up, however, the telemarketer stays on the line and allows the phone to ring and ring, then claims that the owner of the telephone number has damaged the telemarketer because he or she was unable to make any other calls during the time the phone continued to ring."

"It is well-established that Comcast, as a private entity, cannot not be liable for violations of the First Amendment."
=====================================
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF COMCAST CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Defendant, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”), through its subsidiaries, is an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).1 Plaintiff is a spammer who refers to itself as a “internet marketing company,” and is in the business of sending email solicitations and advertisements to millions of Internet users, including many of Comcast’s subscribers.

[1 In its Complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that Defendant Comcast Corporation is an ISP. Thus, for purposes of this motion, Comcast will take Plaintiff’s allegations as true and ignore any technical inaccuracies as to Comcast’s corporate form in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Moreover, any inaccuracy is immaterial in that any Comcast entity that Plaintiff could allege has taken any action with respect to its e-mails would qualify as a provider of an “interactive computer service” that is entitled to immunity under the Communications Decency Act and other relevant laws, which are discussed fully below.]

Plaintiff’s business practices clog Comcast’s network and its subscribers’ inboxes. Comcast, like other ISPs, filters email flowing through its servers to manage the resources of its network and prevent objectionable emails from reaching its subscribers.

Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks to hold Comcast liable for legally and effectively managing the amount of spam and junk mail received by its subscribers. Plaintiff advances four theories of liability for Comcast’s alleged blocking of Plaintiff’s emails: (1) tortious interference
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with prospective economic advantage under Illinois common law; (2) violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”); (3) infringement of Plaintiff’s free speech rights in violation of the First Amendment; and (4) deceptive or unfair practices under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (“ICFA”).

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by federal law which preempts such attempts to put spammers’ pecuniary interests above those of consumers and the ISPs who endeavor to protect them while effectively manage their networks. Under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, Comcast is immune from liability for its actions to block objectionable material like Plaintiff’s mass e-mails. Also, all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.

FACTS

Comcast, through its subsidiaries, is the country’s largest cable-based ISP. Comcast operates tens of millions of unique e-mail addresses on its e-mail servers. As is commonly known, a significant percentage of the e-mails sent to its subscribers are spam or otherwise objectionable.

Providing ISPs with legal tools to control the proliferation of unsolicited email has long been a federal legislative concern. Congress recognized the growing extent of the unsolicited e-mail problem in 2003, finding that “[u]nsolicited commercial electronic mail is currently estimated to account for over half of all electronic mail traffic … and the volume continues to rise.” 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(2). Moreover, Congress recognized that “[t]he growth in unsolicited commercial electronic mail imposes significant monetary costs on providers of Internet access services, businesses, and educational and nonprofit institutions that carry and receive such mail,
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as there is a finite volume of mail that such providers, businesses, and institutions can handle without further investment in infrastructure.” 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(6).

Congress has also acknowledged that “[t]he problems associated with the rapid growth and abuse of unsolicited commercial electronic mail cannot be solved by Federal legislation alone. The development and adoption of technological approaches … will be necessary as well.” 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(12). To maintain the stability and reliability of its network, and to limit the amount of spam and otherwise objectionable e-mail messages that reach its customers’ mailboxes, Comcast has developed a proprietary and highly confidential system of software and programs that identify, filter, and block e-mail messages that have the characteristics of inappropriate or unsolicited commercial e-mails, or spam.

Federal law protects Comcast’s use of these technological tools to filter out objectionable emails like those sent by Plaintiff. Congress enacted the CDA “to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), and “to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).

In furtherance of those goals, the so-called Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), protect ISPs like Comcast for actions taken to prevent access to objectionable content. Indeed, courts interpret the CDA’s immunity provision broadly, and have dismissed claims brought in “attempts to hold [d]efendants liable for decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from their network.” See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) (granting motion to dismiss under Section 230).

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ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiff is Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings

This Court can dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and is often used as appropriate means of dismissing a case based on an affirmative defense. See Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (granting Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings based on defendant’s Section 230 immunity) (citing McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F. 3d 882 (7th Cir. 2006)). In addition, as discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 Fed. Appx. 833 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of state law claims based on defendant’s Section 230 immunity); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (dismissing claims against ISP under Section 230).

This Court should dismiss each of Plaintiff’s claims since the factual allegations are not sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1960 (May 21, 2007). Moreover, as noted by the Seventh Circuit, “if a plaintiff pleads facts which show he has no claim, then he has pled himself out of court.” McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006) citing Jefferson v. Ambroz, 90 F.3d 1291, 1296 (7th Cir.1996). Here, not only has Plaintiff alleged causes of action that are deficient as a matter of law, Plaintiff has pleaded the very facts that demonstrate that Comcast is immune from Plaintiff’s claims.

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II. Comcast is Immune From Liability Under the Communications Decency Act

Plaintiff’s Complaint repeatedly (and correctly) asserts that Comcast is an ISP. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 11.)2 Section 230 immunizes an ISP for blocking objectionable material like Plaintiff’s mass e-mails, and pre-empts all state law causes of action that are inconsistent with its provisions. Section 230(c) of the CDA, entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material,” provides in pertinent part:

no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of – (A) any action taken voluntarily in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be … objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable … the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1) [sic].

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).3

[2 It is beyond question that, as an ISP, Comcast qualifies as an “interactive computer service” under the CDA. The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access to multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).

3 The original text of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) refers to “paragraph (1),” but it appears that the reference should instead be to subparagraph (A).]

The CDA also states that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this Section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).4 Thus, it is clear that Comcast is immune under Section 230 and that Plaintiff cannot maintain its state law claims arising out of Comcast’s actions to identify and filter Plaintiff’s e-mails that Comcast has deemed objectionable.

[4 In addition to the CDA’s immunity provisions, various state statutes immunize ISPs for filtering and blocking objectionable e-mails. See, e.g., the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILCS 511/10(f) (“An electronic mail service provider may, upon its own initiative, block the receipt or transmission through its service of any unsolicited electronic mail advertisement that it reasonably believes is, or will be, sent in violation of this Section”); 815 ILCS 511/10(g) (“No electronic mail service provider may be held liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to block the receipt or transmission through its service of any unsolicited electronic mail advertisement which it reasonably believes is, or will be, sent in violation of this Section”).]

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The Seventh Circuit, in addressing an ISP’s liability for allowing content to be posted on its network, recognized in dicta that “[a] web host that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer.” Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal based on Section 230).

A. Plaintiff’s Mass Emails Are “Objectionable” under the CDA

Given explicit Congressional intent, it is clear that spam or unsolicited or bulk e-mails may be deemed “objectionable” by an ISP. Indeed, numerous courts have found immunity for entities who provide products or services intended to identify or block bulk unauthorized commercial or otherwise objectionable e-mails. For example, in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., a highly analogous case, a district court granted summary judgment for a defendant software provider against claims that it inappropriately designated plaintiff’s software as potentially malicious, basing its ruling on the provider’s immunity under Section 230. No. C07-0807-JCC, (W.D. Wash. Order Aug. 28, 2007).5 Importantly, in its order dismissing plaintiff’s claims, the Court noted that Section 230(c)(2) “does not require that the material actually be objectionable; rather it affords protection for blocking material ‘that the provider or user considers to be’ objectionable.” Zango at pp. 6-7. See also, Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that operator of SpamCop service, which collected and sent user complaints regarding spam e-mails to ISPs, was protected by Section 230 in action by bulk e-mail company); Pallorium v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 80995 at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2007) (affirming Section 230 immunity for user who created filters to prevent objectionable e-mails from reaching his own servers and distributed block lists to others;
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“whether [defendant’s] filter was over-inclusive is irrelevant so long as he deemed the material to be … otherwise objectionable”).

[5 A copy of the court’s order is attached as Exhibit 1.]

Here, Comcast performs the exact function contemplated by the CDA – restricting access to material it deems objectionable – and uses technical means very similar to those for which defendants have been immunized in the above-cited cases. Comcast uses numerous programs, software, and technologies to identify and filter e-mails that its highly developed systems deem objectionable. It is immaterial whether Comcast’s systems are over-inclusive or under-inclusive; by enacting the Good Samaritan provisions of the CDA, Congress sought to immunize ISPs for any technical measure adopted to filter or block content that is deemed objectionable.

B. Plaintiff’s Alleged CAN-SPAM Compliance is a Red Herring

In the Complaint, Plaintiff touts its alleged compliance with the Controlling the Assault of Non Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 4.) CAN-SPAM is another tool available to ISPs to curb mass emailing, but it is not a shield to prevent the use of technologies to block emails deemed objectionable. The CAN-SPAM Act expressly provides that it has no effect on ISP policies to filter or block objectionable e-mails. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 7707 states that:

[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to have any effect on the lawfulness or unlawfulness, under any other provision of law, of the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle, or store certain types of electronic mail messages.

Thus, Plaintiff’s CAN-SPAM compliance is immaterial to Plaintiff’s claims.

Indeed, in a nearly identical case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an ISP in a suit brought by a bulk commercial e-mailer who sent allegedly lawful e-mails that were blocked by the ISP. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at Austin, 420 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2005) (CAN-SPAM “does not preclude [defendant] from using technological
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devices [such as] spam filters to conserve server space and safeguard [its] time and resources.”). Thus, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claim of CAN-SPAM compliance do not require Comcast to pass Plaintiff’s e-mails through without scrutiny.

III. Even if Comcast is Not Immune Under the CDA, Each Count Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Could Be Granted

A. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Claim for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count I)

Plaintiff’s first claim, for “Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,” must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to identify a single business relationship with which Comcast allegedly interfered. The elements of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage are: (1) plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of a valid business relationship with a third party; (2) defendant must know of the prospective business relationship; (3) defendant must intentionally interfere with the prospective business relationship such that the prospective business relationship never materializes; and (4) the interference must damage the plaintiff. Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 957 F. Supp. 142, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Langlands v. De La Rue Sec. Print, Inc., No. 00 C 2913, 2000 WL 1141574, * 2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2000) (dismissing claim for interference with prospective economic advantage because the business relationship was between the defendant and a third party, not plaintiff and a third party). As noted by the Court in Lynch Ford, which Plaintiff cites in Paragraph 26 of the Complaint, a plaintiff “must specifically identify a third party to which it had a potential business relationship.” 957 F. Supp. at 146 (dismissing claim and noting that allegations that defendant “interfered with [Plaintiff’s] ‘customers’ will not suffice, absent the specific identification of one of those customers.”).

Plaintiff variously refers to its business clients and Comcast’s subscribers as the interfered-with customers. In truth, Plaintiff does not allege that it is paid by Comcast
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subscribers to send them emails. Plaintiff’s customers are the “companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) Any alleged “prospective business relationships” with Comcast’s subscribers are non-existent, or far too tenuous to be considered a “reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship.” Langlands, 2000 WL 11141574, at * 2. As the Langlands court noted, “[plaintiff] did not have a contractual or business relationship with [the third party]; only Defendant had a relationship with [the third party], who contracted to purchase goods from Defendant.” Id. at *3. Because Plaintiff cannot actually identify any customers, it necessarily fails to allege, as required, that Comcast knew of any of these prospective business relationships, or that Comcast intentionally interfered with such relationships. The Complaint also is void of any allegation that Comcast’s activities damaged Plaintiff’s relationship with its real customers, that is the “companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet.”

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Count II)

Plaintiff alleges that Comcast has violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii). Subsection (i) applies to whoever “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer.” Subsection (iii) applies to anyone who “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage.”

Plaintiff’s allegations are, essentially, that (a) Comcast has delayed the processing or transmittal of Plaintiff’s e-mails sent to Comcast subscribers, which it improperly characterizes as a “denial of service attack,” and (b) as a result of information provided by Comcast through its filtering and blocking of Plaintiff’s e-mails, Plaintiff chooses to delete entries from its database
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of e-mail addresses. It is clear from Plaintiff’s pleadings that Plaintiff cannot establish either that Comcast has intentionally caused damage to Plaintiff’s computers or database, or that Comcast accessed any of Plaintiff’s allegedly protected computers.

Plaintiff’s first allegation that Comcast violated the CFAA is essentially that Comcast, by “slowing process times of [Plaintiff’s] e-mails by hours,” or by delaying e-mails sent by Plaintiff, engaged in a “denial of service attack” on Plaintiff’s computers. (Compl. ¶¶ 18, 40.) Plaintiff’s self-serving characterization grossly misdescribes the operation of e-mail servers. It is obvious from the facts in the Complaint that, in sending e-mails to Comcast users, Plaintiff initiates contact with Comcast’s servers, not vice versa. Comcast’s servers merely respond to Plaintiff’s requests. That Comcast, pursuant to its filtering technologies, has refused to process Plaintiff’s e-mails, or that Plaintiff has not configured its servers to disconnect after periods of unsuccessful attempts to transmit, does not mean that Comcast has “accessed” Plaintiff’s computers.

By way of analogy, Plaintiff’s allegations can be compared to a telemarketer who calls a phone number and receives no answer. Instead of hanging up, however, the telemarketer stays on the line and allows the phone to ring and ring, then claims that the owner of the telephone number has damaged the telemarketer because he or she was unable to make any other calls during the time the phone continued to ring.

Plaintiff’s second CFAA allegation is that it removes addresses from its database based on information received from Comcast in the course of Comcast’s filtering activities. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Taking this to be true, it is clear that Plaintiff, not Comcast, has caused the alleged damage to Plaintiff’s alleged databases of customer information because it, not Comcast, deletes entries from its own database. (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 43.) Nowhere does Plaintiff allege, as required, that Comcast accesses any of Plaintiff’s alleged protected computers with respect to the maintenance
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of its database. Moreover, given its claims that Comcast transmits “fraudulent” or “false” bounce data regarding inactive or non-existent accounts, (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 42), it is nonsensical that Plaintiff relies on such “fraudulent” information to irretrievably delete the e-mail addresses in question. In short, Plaintiff seeks to hold Comcast liable for Plaintiff’s actions taken in reliance (and, from its pleadings, continued reliance) on information it thinks is inaccurate.

C. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim (Count III) Fails as a Matter of Law

It is well-established that Comcast, as a private entity, cannot not be liable for violations of the First Amendment. The First Amendment does not provide a cause of action against private actors like Comcast; rather, the First Amendment is “a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976). As the Supreme Court has held, “the guarantees of free speech ... guard only against encroachment by the government and ‘erec[t] no shield against merely private conduct.’” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege, nor could it, that Comcast is a state actor, that Comcast’s actions constitute state action, or that any of Comcast’s policies with respect to its email filtering and blocking are the result of any government involvement. Courts have repeatedly acknowledged that ISPs and search engines are not state actors. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (dismissing First Amendment claim on basis that ISP was not state actor); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (ISP was not a state actor); Langdon v. Google Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Del. 2007) (internet search engine that refused to carry plaintiff’s advertisements is not a state actor). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim must be dismissed.

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D. Plaintiff’s Claim for “Unfair Competition and Business Practices” (Count IV) Fails as a Matter of Law

Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion that Comcast somehow violated section 815 ILCS 505/2, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (the “ICFA”). (Compl. ¶¶ 55-62.) Plaintiff’s allegations are vague, but appear to be that Comcast engaged in some form of “deceptive” or “unfair” trade practice by refusing its e-mails, but transmitting others’ e-mails. (Compl. ¶¶ 58-59.)6 Plaintiff also alleges that Comcast violated its own policies by not delivering Plaintiff’s mass e-mails to Comcast subscribers and that Comcast entered into agreements with other marketers permitting them to send similar e-mails. (Compl. ¶¶ 56-60.) Neither allegation, even if true, could be considered “deceptive” or “unfair” under Illinois law. Further, the ICFA only allows claims by non-consumers where there is a nexus between the Defendant’s conduct and an injury to consumers. Consumer injury is entirely absent here, and Plaintiff cannot, therefore, bring a claim under the ICFA.

[6 815 ILCS 505/2 provides in pertinent part:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact … in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.]

1. Plaintiff Does Not Allege a Deceptive Practice or Act by Comcast that Comcast Intended for Plaintiff to Rely On

To adequately plead a claim based on a deceptive practice or act under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Plaintiff must allege “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.” Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403, 417, 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002) (affirming dismissal of claims
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under the ICFA where plaintiff cannot identify an unfair or deceptive act); see also Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt, 238 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (dismissing claims brought by debtor under the ICFA); Garett v. RentGrow, Inc., No. 04 C 8309, 2005 WL 1563162 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005) (granting motion to dismiss claims under the ICFA and applying Robinson). As discussed below, Plaintiff utterly fails to identify a deceptive act or practice by Comcast or allege that Comcast intended for Plaintiff to rely on such deception. (Compl. ¶¶ 55-62.)7 Plaintiff does not allege that he is a customer of Comcast’s, nor a party to any contract with Comcast for any services. Therefore, Comcast owed absolutely no duty to Plaintiff, and Comcast made no representations to Plaintiff that could give rise to liability under the ICFA.

[7 Claims of fraud arising under the ICFA must meet the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) which requires Plaintiff plead “the who, what, when, where, and how; the first paragraph of any newspaper story.” Conditioned Ocular Enhancement, Inc. v. Bonaventura, 458 F. Supp. 2d 704, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Plaintiff’s claim is that Comcast employed a “false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation” in connection with its business practices – claims that clearly sound in fraud. (Compl. ¶ 55.) Accordingly, the Complaint “must be pled with the same particularity and specificity as that required under common law fraud.” Neff, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 994; Robinson, 201 Ill.2d at 419, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (“The complaint must state with particularity and specificity the deceptive manner of defendant’s acts or practices, and failure to make such averments requires the dismissal of the complaint.”).]

Plaintiff cannot turn its alleged compliance with Comcast’s online policies into an unfair competition claim. To the contrary, the policies Plaintiff attached to the Complaint, and on which Plaintiff ostensibly relied, specifically permit Comcast to undertake the filtering of which Plaintiff complains and to refuse to transmit material it deems objectionable. For instance, the Comcast High-Speed Internet Acceptable Use Policy (“AUP”) attached to the Complaint by Plaintiff states that “Comcast reserves the right, but not the obligation, to refuse to transmit or post and to remove or block any information or materials, in whole or in part, that it, in its sole discretion, deems to be offensive, indecent, or otherwise inappropriate, regardless of whether
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this material or its dissemination is unlawful.” (Ex. A, pp. 22-23) (emphasis added).8 Thus, Plaintiff’s pleading establishes that Comcast complied with its own policies in filtering or blocking Plaintiff’s e-mails.

[8 The version of Comcast’s AUP attached by Plaintiff does not contain the date on which the policy was retrieved, and does not appear to be the most current version of Comcast’s policy. While Comcast’s current AUP contains highly similar provisions and language, for purposes of this motion, Comcast refers to the language that appears in the version of the AUP attached to the Complaint.]

2. Plaintiff Does Not Identify Any “Unfair” Conduct under the ICFA

Further, Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by Comcast that would be considered “unfair” under the ICFA. An activity or practice is “unfair” under the ICFA only if it “offends public policy,” is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous,” or it “causes substantial injury to consumers.” Robinson, 201 Ill.2d at 418-19, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 92 S.Ct. 898 (1972). None of Comcast’s activities as alleged in the Complaint could be considered “unfair” under Robinson.

The only practices Plaintiff claims to be unfair are that Comcast allegedly refused to “deliver email sent by e360 while allowing its competitors to freely transmit email [to Comcast’s customers]” and that Comcast has allegedly made agreements with other email marketers to send or transmit email without interruption. (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 60.) Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations to be true, there is nothing unfair about choosing not to do business with a particular company, let alone that it “offend(s) public policy,” is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous,” or causes “substantial injury to consumers”; as such, Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed.

3. Plaintiff is Not a Consumer and Has Not Alleged Consumer Injury

Plaintiff does not seek redress as a consumer of Comcast’s services. Because Plaintiff does not fall within the ICFA’s definition of “consumer,”9 its ability to maintain a claim turns on
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“whether plaintiff can plead and prove a nexus between the complained-of conduct and consumer protection; specifically, whether defendant's alleged wrongful [conduct was] addressed to the market generally or otherwise implicate[s] consumer protection concerns.” Pace American, Inc. v. Elixir Inds., No. 06 C 4661, 2007 WL 495302, *4 (N.D. Ill Feb. 13, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss ICFA claim where complaint specifically sought recovery for injury to non-consumer plaintiff, not to consumers). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged injury to consumers; it seeks to recover for its own financial losses. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain its claim under the ICFA.

[9 815 ILCS 505/1(e) defines a consumer as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.”]

CONCLUSION

For all of the above mentioned reasons, Comcast respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety.

Dated: March 4, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

/s/ Douglas N. Masters
Douglas N. Masters (6199010)
Nathan J. Hole (6283099)
321 N Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60610
Phone: (312) 464-3144
Fax: (312) 464-3111
[email address redacted]
Attorneys for Defendant
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotJudgmentPleadingsMemoSupport.pdf06/28/09 1:05 pm108.02 KB

e360Insight Response Due

03/20/2008 17:00
America/Chicago

MOTION by Defendant Comcast Corporation for judgment on the pleadings response due by 3/20/2008.

e360's Response to Comcast's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Here's e360's attempt to KEEP HOPE ALIVE! It's full of misdirection and sleight of hand.

They first try to do away with the CDA Section 230 defense by citing the 7th Circuit's decision last week in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. March 14, 2008). I'm not sure how they want to make this case work for them because about all that helps them are a couple of pages of dicta dealing with how Judge Easterbrook just isn't sure if Section 230 is a grant of immunity. And you know you're dealing with dicta when you see such wonderful phrases as "We have questioned whether..." and then quotes dicta from an earlier case with the equally fantastic phrase "If this reading is sound..." Besides, Chicago Lawyers' Committee is a 230(c)(1) case and Comcast is talking about 230(c)(2).

Then they turn to a technical wonderland. Email servers that don't know how to drop connections when attacked. Only they're not really attacked so much as never replied to. But, hey, sometimes ignoring someone is the same as attacking them, right?

Then there's the ever popular "CAN-SPAM defines what spam is and isn't. And we don't violate CAN-SPAM, so we don't send spam." Uh, yeah. That's not what the statute does. That's like saying that the Mann Act makes it okay to transport women for "immoral purposes" just as long as you don't take them across state lines.

They wrap up by wrapping themselves up... in the flag! Those big meanies at Comcast are violating the FIRST AMENDMENT!!!!!eleventy-one!!1! YES!!! YES THEY ARE!! DON'T YOU DARE CLAIM OTHERWISE OR YOU'RE A PINKO!!!! Er, sorry. I was just getting into the spirit of this piece of work. The problem with this is that there is an entire body of law, all of which was quoted by Comcast in its motion, which holds to the contrary.

======================================
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS,
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC, by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman, Bartly Loethen and Joseph Kish, and for its Response to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

E360Insight, LLC (hereafter “e360”) is an email and internet marketing company founded by David Linhardt.1 E360 does not engaging in “spamming” as Defendant alleges in its Motion. In fact, e360 only sends email to persons who first sign-up or “opt-in” to receive its or its partners emails and e360 has a common practice of sending emails that request a person to “double-confirm” that they would like to receive the emails sent by e360. As a matter of practice and business model, e360 does not send unsolicited email and has always complied with or exceeded all federal and state requirements, laws and standards pertaining to the sending of commercial email, including the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 USC § 7701 (CAN-SPAM).

[1 Mr. Linhardt has over twelve years of experience in internet marketing including excutive-level management positions at large Fortune 100 companies. Ironically, Mr. Linhardt while working as Vice President of Marketing of the Telecommunications, Energy & Cable division of Experian worked closely with Defendant Comcast in developing its direct marketing solutions to help Comcast acquire and manage its customers more efficiently.]

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Electronic mail, commonly referred to as email, is an extremely important and popular means of communication, relied on my millions of Americans everyday for personal and commercial purposes. 15 USC §7701(a)(1). E360, as well as Comcast, recognizes that unsolicited email, commonly called “spam,” is a serious problem that inhibits the flow of email communication. This is precisely the reason e360 never sends unsolicited email.

E360 is required to use internet service providers (“ISPs”) such as Comcast to deliver its emails to the persons who have signed up to receive such emails. Comcast is an ISP that provides email service to its customers and who has agreed to act as an intermediary in delivering and receiving emails on behalf of its customers.

In its zeal to control spam, Comcast has taken draconian steps to prevent e360 from being able to send any email to its subscribers despite being repeatedly told by e360 that it only sends email to Comcast subscribers who have requested, and in some cases double-confirmed, that they wish to receive e360 or its partner’s emails. As early as 2005, Comcast began indiscriminately blocking e360’s emails but would release such block after being advised by e360 of the nature of its emails to Comcast subscribers. However, by 2007, Comcast would no longer release the block on e360’s emails and in fact, all but refused to communicate with e360.

Comcast has also engaged in ‘denial-of-service’ attacks on e360’s network and computer system. Such attacks overwhelm and disable e360’s network and prevent them from sending or receiving emails from e360’s consumers in an attempt to halt e360’s business. Comcast has transmitted fraudulent bounce information to e360’s email servers specific to email addresses contained on e360’s opt-in marketing list. Such conduct causes significant damage to e360’s business.

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Comcast’s unilateral and unreasonable blocking of all of e360’s email messages has nearly cost e360 its business, good will and reputation and millions of dollars in revenue. Thereby, leaving e360 with no recourse but to file this proceeding before the Court. Comcast’s response to e360’s complaint is simply that “Plaintiff is a spammer.” Comcast then goes on to incorrectly claim immunity under Communications Decency Act. Similarly, as a last ditch effort, Comcast then seeks to dismiss the counts of the complaint as having failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such defenses utterly fail when the actions of the Defendant are examined.

ARGUMENT

I. Standard of Review

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under FRCP Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, a court must view the facts of the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and cannot grant the motion unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief. Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1989). All that is required under Rule 8(a) is that Plaintiff set forth factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). E360 has clearly set forth factual allegations in every count of its complaint sufficient to give notice of its claim to relief and to support such claims to relief.

II. Comcast Not Entitled to Immunity under The Communications Decency Act

Comcast’s reliance on the Communications Decency Act for immunity is misplaced. The Communications Decency Act (hereafter “CDA”) and its Good Samaritan provision were
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enacted by Congress with the specific purpose of overruling Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (NY Sup. Ct. 1995). Stratton-Oakmont had held that an internet access provider that used filtering technology could be held liable for libelous thirdparty statements. Id. Congress did not intend to grant a “vast, limitless immunity” to internet providers. Chicago Lawyers’ Committee, 461 F. Supp.2d 681 (N.D.Ill. 2006) affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Case No. 07-1101 decided 3-14-08.

The Court in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee relied on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. GTE Corp, 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) in holding that previously court opinions that held that Section 230 (c)(1) provided ICSs with broad, robust immunity as Comcast relies on in this case were incorrect. Instead, the Seventh Circuit in Doe, called into question such immunity. Id. at 659-60. The Seventh Circuit held that if there was immunity under Section 230(c)(1) it likely depended on the ISP acting a publisher. “Limiting the immunity afforded under Section 230 to those claims that require “publishing” as an essential element—as opposed to any cause of action—gives effect to the” entire statute. Chicago Lawyers’ Committee at 697. This is consistent with both the intent of statute and other court’s holding that ISPs could not be held liable for third-party content placed on message boards or other forums provided by the ISP. It was not meant to cover the actions of an ISP such as blocking of emails.

The Seventh Circuit recently restated it objections to various courts interpretations of immunity in affirming Judge St. Eve’s holding in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee. Case no. 07-1101 decided March 14, 2008.

While Plaintiff was unable to find a case on point with equivalent facts to the case at hand, Comcast’s actions in blocking e360’s emails can in no way be considered equal to that of a publisher. Similarly, e360 is not seeking to hold Comcast liable for the actions or statements of a
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third-party, rather e360 is seeking to hold Comcast liable for its own actions: Comcast’s indiscriminate and improper blocking of e360’s emails.

Additionally, Defendant’s caselaw is either irrelevant or has been called into question by courts in this circuit. Several of Defendant’s cited cases and their reliance on the CDA were specifically rejected by a Court in this Circuit. See Chicago Lawyers’ Committee, at 694. (Judge St. Eve rejected Noah and Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) progeny). Others are simply irrelevant. For example, all of Comcast’s caselaw regarding emailers involve unsolicited email or spam.2 As noted numerous times both in e360’s complaint and Dave Linhardt’s affidavit attached to e360’s Motion for Preliminary injunction, e360 does not and has never sent unsolicited email. Thus, Comcast’s caselaw is irrelevant.

[2 Many of Defendant’s cited cases do require the ICS to be acting as publisher to be granted immunity under the CDA even for cases involving spam.]

Even if Comcast is correct in its belief that it has the ability, with immunity, to block spam, which it deems objectionable, it does Comcast no good in this case. This case does not involve spam. E360 does not send unsolicited emails to anyone. E360 has information including opt-in dates as well as names and other information on all of the people to whom it send email. Comcast has been notified of this important piece of information on numerous occasions. In fact, until 2007, Comcast usually removed the block on e360’s emails based on this fact.

The fact that all of Comcast’s caselaw involves spam implies that like Plaintiff, Comcast could find no caselaw that would allow it to block solicited and in many cases double-confirmed solicited emails with immunity. The case is truly one of first impression. To allow Comcast to dictate and in fact overrule the decision of its subscribers it simply unfair both to Comcast’s subscribers and to e360.

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Comcast’s statements that e360’s compliance with CAN-SPAM is a red herring is not only incorrect it is a red herring in itself. E360’s compliance with the Controlling the Assault on Non Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,[3] 15 USC §7701, is material to showing that e360 does not send spam and follows all laws regarding the sending of email. Comcast’s disregard for e360’s compliance shows that Comcast’s indiscriminate blocking of e360’s emails has little to do with controlling spam and more to do with Comcast’s belief that it knows better than its subscribers what its subscribers want to receive in their inboxes.

[3 CAN-SPAM effectively provides guidelines for email marketing and what must be contained in emails to ensure that customers and subscribers are only receiving emails that they want in their inboxes.]

Finally, exemption for the CDA requires Comcast to act in good faith, and as Plaintiff has alleged in its Complaint, Comcast has not acted in good faith. Comcast allows numerous other companies to send bulk emails in greater volume and with greater frequency. Comcast has not acted in good faith by singling out Plaintiff when others behaving in a like manner are not treated in a like fashion. Plaintiff’s complaint, which is to be taken as true, alleges the action to be contrary to a good faith action, thus the exemption cannot apply.

III. Plaintiff Has Plead Each Count of Its Complaint Properly

A. Plaintiff Has Properly Plead Its Claim for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Plaintiff has properly pled its claim for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. Under Illinois law, “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage has four elements: (1) plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of a valid business relationship with a third party; (2) defendant must know of the prospective business relationship; (3) defendant must intentionally interfere with the prospective business relationship such that the prospective business relationship never materializes; and (4) the interference must damage the
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plaintiff. Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998). Here, Plaintiff has properly alleged each of these elements sufficiently to meet Rule 8 notice pleading requirements.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff must allege a specific third party with which Comcast interfered. This is incorrect. “The Federal Rules do not require that [a] complaint allege [a] specific third party.” Id. at 328. Rather, Plaintiff can simply allege a “class” of third-parties with whom it had a business expectancy. Id. citing River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154 (Ill.App. 1996). See also, Celex Group, Inc. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 1114 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (Ct recognized that a showing of a class of prospective customers might be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Thus, Plaintiff must only identify a class of prospective business customers.

However, Defendant is also incorrect when it argues that Plaintiff failed to “identify a single business relationship with which Comcast interfered.” D. memo p. 8. Plaintiff stated in Complaint that it “only sends emails to consumers who: a) purchase goods and services from its proprietary company owned website; or b) sign-up to receive emails either through E360 or through one of its marketing partners.” Comp. ¶27. While Plaintiff did not identify each individual customer that had purchased from its websites or signed up to receive its emails, the Plaintiff did sufficiently identify such individuals.4

[4 As Plaintiff has almost 843,597 customers and individuals who have signed up to receive their emails that utilize Comcast, it would be burdensome and wasteful to require Plaintiff to specifically identify each individual as Comcast demands.]

Defendant’s argument that it didn’t know of e360’s prospective business relationship with anyone and that it never intentionally interfered with any such relationship is outrageous and completely false. First, e360 has notified Comcast of its business relationships with its subscribers on numerous occasions for multiple years since Comcast starting blocking e360’s
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emails. Secondly, as Comcast blocks e360’s emails from reaching Comcast subscribers it seems obvious that Comcast would know exactly who e360 was trying to contact. Finally, as Comcast states that it uses various filters to filter emails and screens based on content, it is also obvious that Comcast knew exactly what was in each email it was blocking. Comcast knew exactly whom e360 was attempting to contact and exactly why e360 was attempting to contact such people. To argue otherwise is absurd and flies in the face of Comcast’s own statements.

Finally, Comcast states that the Complaint is void of allegation of damage caused by their actions. Comcast apparently failed to read paragraphs 31, 32 and 34 of the Complaint, all of which specifically allege damages caused by Comcast’s unreasonable behavior. Plaintiff has properly pled its allegations of tortious interference with economic advantage.

B. E360 Has Properly Pled Its Claims for Violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

E360 has properly pled allegations of violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (hereafter “Act”). 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii). Plaintiff alleges that Comcast violated the Act by 1) engaging in denial of service attacks against e360 that cause tremendous damage to e360’s servers and 2) providing false information regarding active and inactive email accounts.

Defendant argues that it: 1) it did not access e360’s computers or servers and did not intentionally cause damage; and 2) that it is e360’s fault for believing and relying on Comcast to provide accurate data regarding its subscribers’ active email accounts. Defendant’s argument fails not only because they are misguided but because they show Comcast’s willful disregard for e360 and their subscriber’s right to transact business.

Comcast states that e360 has improperly characterized Comcast’s actions as a “denial of service attack.” According to Carnegie Mellon University’s Cert Coordination Center (hereafter “Cert”), a “denial of service attack” is characterized by an explicit attempt by someone to
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prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service. Further, the type of attack committed by Comcast is specifically detailed by Cert as a “consumption of scarce resources” attack. Such attacks work by using up all available resources of an entity by establishing a connection with a victim’s server and preventing the victim from breaking the connection; thereby using up all the victim’s bandwidth, memory, CPU time and other resources and preventing the victim from operating. This is exactly what e360 alleged in its Complaint.

Further, Comcast’s statements and analogy that e360 could simply drop the connection or disconnect after a period of time is blatantly false. E360 and the email software it uses follow standard protocols that do not allow a connection to be dropped or disconnected when the servers are communicating like they are when a “denial of service attack” is underway. Comcast knows this and this is why it engages in such attacks.

Plaintiff also alleges that Comcast provides it false bounce data regarding the activity of subscribers accounts, essentially that Comcast lies about whether an account is actually active when it responds to e360’s email requests. Comcast’s argument is that it is e360’s fault that it believes Comcast or relies on the information Comcast provides regarding its subscribers and deletes entries to database based on such information. This is absurd. E360 must rely on Comcast for accurate information regarding its subscribers. It has no other source to get such information. Further, under its operating guidelines and in accordance with industry standard, it must delete entries from its database when informed that they are no longer active. Additionally, because high bounce rates are an indication of “spammer” activity, e360 always deletes emails when told they are no longer active. As e360 must delete emails from its database, Comcast should be liable for providing false information.

C. E360’s Emails Are Entitled to First Amendment Protection
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Whether they admit it or not, Comcast and other ISPs are conduits for the communication between 21st century Americans. Although Comcast is not a traditional “state actor”, its private conduct can, and in this case does, constitute “state action” which makes Comcast accountable for violating citizens’ constitutional rights. See e.g. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 389 U.S. 144, 224 (1970). In this case, Comcast’s refusal to deliver messages intentionally sent from one citizen to another citizen who requested the message be sent deprives both actors of their First Amendment rights and falls outside of Comcast’s traditional private actor protections.

Delivering mail is traditionally a state action carried out by a quasi-governmental agency, the United States Postal Service. Currently, however, more mail is sent to American citizens through ISPs to Internet addresses than is sent through the U.S. mail.5 American citizens have turned to the digital world to receive information previously obtained through the U.S. mail service. In situations like this, courts have found that private parties can be state actors. See Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Center, 809 F. Supp. 1343, 1346-47 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that private conduct can constitute state action where the state and the private party maintain a sufficiently interdependent or symbiotic relationship; where the state requires, encourages, or is otherwise significantly involved in nominally private conduct; and where the private person or entity exercises a traditional state function).

Comcast’s conduct in this case constitutes state action. Comcast’s conduct in this case is unconstitutional because Comcast is blocking emails that senders want to send and receivers want to receive. This case is clearly distinguishable from cases that have held that non-solicited emails are not entitled to unfettered First Amendment protection. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. 5 (See http://www.usps.com/communications/newsroom/postalfacts.htm stating that the United States Postal Services processes and delivers approximately 703 million pieces of mail everyday; compare to http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/execs... citing the International Data Corporation’s 2003 report stating that approximately 31 billion emails were being sent a day and that number was expected to double by 2006).
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American Online Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.P.A. 1996). Unlike in Cyber Promotions, where the emails were unsolicited, here, Comcast is blocking emails requested by the Comcast customer. No court has held that requested emails are not entitled to First Amendment protection where the information carrier is an ISP, who is only authorized to act as the mail carrier because of power bestowed upon it by the United States government, and where the ISP is acting in the traditional state role of a United States postal carrier. These emails are entitled to First Amendment protection.

The special treatment awarded ISPs and the exception made for ISPs from certain US laws is a result of the lawmakers understanding that an ISP is a conduit for information, and not the originator of such information. ISPs have been given special treatment in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”, as referenced in Defendant’s motion pleadings), and CAN-SPAM to name but a few. See 17 U.S.C. §512 et seq.; 47 U.S.C. §230(c); and 15 U.S.C. §7701 respectfully; see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). The protection by the government of ISPs is a benefit conferred by the government with the assumption that requested information would flow freely through ISPs and that the Internet is a place where free speech remains unfettered. In the instant case, Comcast has acted through its own accord and has made an overt decision to not allow the free flow of information but rather to censor the communication sent from one citizen of the United States to another. As an integral part of the mechanism by which most Americans communicate, and as recognized by the United States Government, Comcast must adhere to the Constitutional principles inherent in the First Amendment in order to treat all parties in a manner that is fair and consistent with those Constitutional principles.

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In summary, Comcast, as an ISP exempted from litigation pertaining to various laws regarding communication over the Internet, is a state actor as a result of the protection and benefit conferred on Comcast by the government for its role as a conduit for the free flow of information. The government has recognized that any non-objectionable information is to flow freely and Comcast has decided, on its own accord, to intercept the mail sent from one citizen to another. This is not acceptable behavior for a state sanctioned conduit of public communication over a state owned series of internet protocol addresses and this censorship should not be tolerated. Plaintiff should have its opportunity to further prove the state action component and to show the improper censorship and the damage caused Plaintiff by such action of Comcast.

D. E360 Has Properly Pled Unfair Competition and Business Practices

E360 has properly pled claims of unfair competition and business practices based on Comcast’s misfeasant behavior. In Illinois, it is unlawful for any business to use unfair methods of competition and business practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, in the conduct of trade or business. 815 ILCS 505/2. The elements of a claim are: 1) deceptive act or practice by defendant; 2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on such act or practice; and 3) the occurrence of the act or practice during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce. Cripe v. Leiter, 184 Ill.2d 185, 191 (1998). Recovery may be had for unfair as well as deceptive conduct. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403 (2002).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Comcast engaged in deceptive and unfair practices in acting as an intermediary delivering email to its subscribers from e360. Comcast clearly posts their email deliver policies on its websites. See Exhibit A to the Complaint. Comcast by posting such policies clearly expects both its subscribers and persons or entities emailing its subscribers
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to follow the policies set forth. It is also reasonable for one to expect that if such policies are complied with that Comcast will act accordingly as a non-bias intermediary. However, Comcast not only fails to follow its own policies, it discriminately targets entities without cause, blocks emails and causes significant damage. Comcast does not seem to contest that such conduct occurs within the course of trade or business. Thus, Comcast’s conduct fails squarely under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (hereafter “ICFA”).

1. Comcast Did Expect E360 to Rely On Their Unfair and Deceptive Conduct and Plaintiff Has So Alleged.

E360 relied on Comcast’s posted policies to be a fair and accurate statement of its operating procedure and expected Comcast to act in an unbiased manner as an intermediary delivering email to its subscribers. Comcast publishes, and according to Defendant’s brief frequently updates, its policies because it expects people to rely on them. D. memo p. 14. This is simply common sense. If Comcast did not expect anyone to rely on their policies, why post them and why update them?

E360 has also alleged, despite Defendant’s claims, that Comcast acted in an unfair and deceptive manner by 1) not delivering emails in accordance with its own policies and 2) by discriminately allowing other companies, whom Plaintiff alleges have agreements with Comcast, to send emails to Comcast subscribers. Comp. ¶ 57-60.

Comcast’s claim that it owed no duty to Plaintiff is meritless. As an intermediary, Comcast owes a duty not only to its subscribers but also to individuals communicating with subscribers. Comcast has voluntarily and for profit taken on this duty by assuming the job of an intermediary. This is especially true because entities, such as e360, have no other means of communication with subscribers. Comcast simply should not be allowed to disrupt the only means of communication between two parties based on its own biased opinions or actions.

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Comcast’s argument that its Acceptable Use Policy gives it the right to “refuse to transmit or post and to remove or block any information or materials, in whole or in part, that it, in its sole discretion, deems to be offensive, indecent, or otherwise inappropriate, regardless of whether this material or its dissemination is unlawful” is a red herring. Def. memo p.14. Defendant neglects to inform the Court of the title of the section the quote came from, namely “Inappropriate Content and Transmissions.” Such statement of disclaimer is intended to allow Comcast to delete inappropriate content or block inappropriate emails. This has no relevance to e360’s emails that are completely proper. Nor can Comcast use this statement as a blanket disclaimer that it can simply hide behind to allow it act in any manner it chooses.

2. Defendant’s Conduct Relating to E360 is Unfair under the ICFA

Plaintiff’s allegations that Comcast conduct in refusing to allow its email to be transmitted to Comcast subscribers while allowing other companies exactly like e360 to conduct business using its systems is patently unfair under the ICFA. Factors in determining whether an activity is unfair include: 1) whether the practice offends public policy; 2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers. Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403 (2002). Here, Defendant’s conduct offends public policy and causes substantial injury to consumers by preventing them from freely conducting business with whomever they choose.

The court in Robinson upheld the dismissal of the ICFA claims based on the plaintiff’s ability to contract with other companies and its knowledge of the contract it signed. Here, e360 has no ability to deal with any other company other than Comcast when its customers are
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Comcast subscribers. Further, e360’s customers are completely unaware of the failure of e360 to be able to communicate with them regarding orders or other advertising. Clearly, Comcast’s conduct in failing to allow parties to freely transact business and communicate causes substantial injury, especially in light of the fact that consumers are completely unaware of the harm perpetrated against them. Such conduct and Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint fall squarely within the parameters of the ICFA.

3. Plaintiff Need Not Be A Consumer to Allege Violations of the ICFA

As Plaintiff’s allegations directly relate to its and consumers ability to communicate and transact business, Plaintiff claims are within the ICFA. “The Consumer Fraud Act is a regulatory and remedial statute intended to protect consumers, borrowers, and business persons against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices. It is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” Robinson at 416 citing Cripe v. Leiter, 184 Ill.2d 185, 191 (1998). Defendant states that e360’s ability to maintain this action “turns on ‘whether plaintiff can plead and prove a nexus between the complained-of conduct and consumer protection.” D. memo pg. 15. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations directly relate to its and consumer’s ability to freely communicate and transact business. Electronic mail, commonly referred to as email, is an extremely important and popular means of communication, relied on my millions of Americans everyday for personal and commercial purposes. 15 USC §7701(a)(1). This important component of business and communication must be afforded the protection that allows the parties to be free of unfair practices such as Defendant’s. Thus, Defendant should not be allowed to practice unfair and deceptive business practices as those alleged by Plaintiff in its Complaint.

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CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, E360Insight, LLC respectfully requests this Court deny Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, enter a preliminary injunction, as requested by e360 in its motion, prohibiting Comcast from engaging in behavior such as indiscriminately blocking e360’s emails and engaging in ‘denial of service’ attacks against e360, and require Comcast to answer the Complaint filed in this case.

Date: March 20, 2008

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Carla E. Buterman
One of the attorneys for Plaintiff

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotJudgmentPleadingsResponse.pdf03/20/08 3:54 pm220.07 KB

Comcast Reply Due

03/27/2008 17:00
America/Chicago

MOTION by Defendant Comcast Corporation for judgment on the pleadings response due by 3/20/2008. Reply due by 3/27/2008.

Comcast's Reply to e360's Response to Comcast's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC
d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
and
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMCAST’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Comcast’'s Motion relies chiefly on a straightforward application of Section 230(c)(2) of
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. It is remarkable, then, that e360
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never even mentions that relevant section of the CDA in its six page discussion of the statute.
Nor can e360 “find a case on point.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 4).

The law is clear Comcast is not liable for filtering any of e360’'s e-mail solicitations, regardless of their content, why they are sent, or their alleged compliance with CAN-SPAM. Congress has rejected the notion that an ISP such as Comcast is required by law to facilitate email solicitations like e360’'s. This Court, following the plain language of the CDA, should enter judgment on the pleadings for Comcast.

I. COMCAST IS IMMUNE UNDER 230(C)(2).

The CDA contains two provisions applicable to Internet Service Providers such as Comcast, namely:

Section 230(c)(1): “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider;” and

Section 230(c)(2): “no ... provider of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of ... any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider ... considers to be ... objectionable.”

47 U.S.C. § 230. e360 focuses entirely on Section 230(c)(1), inapplicable here, and completely disregards Section 230(c)(2), which is applicable and which is discussed at length in Comcast’s Memorandum (Def.’s Mem. pp. 5-8).

Ignoring both the plain text of 230(c)(2) and numerous cases applying it, e360 inexplicably argues that the CDA “was not meant to cover the actions of an ISP such as blocking of e-mails.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 4). To the contrary, in discussing Section 230(c)(2), the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[a] web host that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer.” Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit affirmed this view in its recent opinion in Chicago Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under
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the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., Case No. 07-1101 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2008), confirming the clear
meaning of the statute’'s plain text.

e360'’s only argument is that, because it has informed Comcast that it is legally compliant with CAN-SPAM, Comcast cannot rely on CDA immunity in filtering e-mails using Comcast’'s independent technologies and criteria.1 As discussed in Comcast’'s Memorandum, CAN-SPAM, by its own terms, has no effect on an ISP’'s policy of declining to transmit certain categories of messages; it cannot be used as a sword as e360 seeks to do. Moreover, e360’'s argument turns the CDA on its head. Accepting e360’s arguments, an ISP is immune under the CDA only for filtering out e-mails it correctly identifies as unlawful under CAN-SPAM. Such immunity is no immunity at all. Forcing an ISP to litigate each instance where it filters an e-mail to determine immunity would provide enormous disincentives for an ISP to filter or block objectionable content. Likewise, allowing a speculative and implausible allegation of bad faith to eviscerate an ISP'’s Congressionally granted immunity would provide the same disincentives. Either result would be not only contrary to stated public policy and Congressional intent, it is not the law. In a world where 90% of e-mails sent to consumers are spam, Congress has stepped in to ensure the viability of ISPs as “conduits for the communication between 21st century Americans” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 10), to ensure that ISPs can, without fear of litigation, develop and implement technological measures that help protect their subscribers and their inboxes.

[1 Throughout its Response, e360 implies that the CAN-SPAM Act provides the sole litmus test for whether an e-mail is objectionable. Contrary to e360’'s characterizations, e-mails that violate CAN-SPAM are only a subset of what consumers reasonably consider objectionable.]

II. EVEN IF COMCAST IS NOT IMMUNE UNDER THE CDA, E360’S CLAIMS FAIL.

Even if the Court finds that Comcast is not immune under Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA, e360 has failed to allege any claim on which it is entitled to relief.

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A. e360 Fails to Plead Tortious Interference.

e360 claims that it “can simply allege a ‘class’ of third-parties with whom it had a business expectancy.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 7). Yet, e360 has not alleged any existing business relationships with Comcast’'s subscribers. e360’'s Complaint states that it is an “email marketing company” (Compl. ¶ 4) who “is hired by and partners with companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet.” (Compl. ¶ 7). Thus, the relationships with which e360 alleges Comcast has interfered are those with e360’'s marketing clients and partners, not Comcast’'s customers. Further, Comcast’'s Memorandum clearly demonstrates that any alleged relationships between e360 and Comcast’'s subscribers are far too attenuated to be viewed as reasonable” to support a claim.2

[2 While some courts in the Seventh Circuit have recognized that alleging a “class” of prospective
customers is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss a tortious interference claim under Rule 12(b)(6), none involved a class of potential customers as tenuous as that alleged here. See generally Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff’s allegation that defendant interfered with certain third parties interested in purchasing the rights to publication of his experiences was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where defendant’s actions were directed at those third parties); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 667 N.E. 2d 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d. Dist. 1996) (noting that plaintiff’s expectation of a business relationship was “reasonable” where plaintiff alleged the existence of some contracts and an expectation of entering into more); Celex Group, Inc. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to identify a specific third party with whom it had a reasonable expectation of entering into a business relationship).]

e360'’s argument is the equivalent of holding a newspaper liable for refusing to run an offensive advertisement because the newspaper “interfered” with a prospective business relationship with its own subscribers. Such an argument is not supported by law or reason.

B. e360 Fails to Plead a Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Comcast'’s filtering technologies do nothing more than react, in accordance with industry standards, to objectionable e-mails sent to its network. Mislabeling Comcast’'s responses to e360’'s bulk e-mails as a “denial of service attack” does not turn Comcast’'s reaction into the type
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of “access” to a protected computer system required to establish a violation of the CFAA. e360 claims a “denial of service attack” involves “establishing a connection with a victim'’s server and preventing the victim from breaking the connection.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 9). Yet, in reacting to e360'’s e-mail solicitations, Comcast’'s filtering technologies neither establish the connection with e360 nor prevent e360 from breaking the connection. By e360’'s own description, it is e360'’s systems not Comcast’'s that prevent any servers or connections from disengaging. (Pl.’s Resp. p. 9).

With respect to the allegedly false bounce information, e360 admits that it is complaining about how it chooses to react to information generated by Comcast’'s servers in response to e360’'s e-mails. Apparently, even though e360 believes the bounce notifications to be false, e360 irretrievably deletes allegedly valid and valuable e-mail addresses in response to such notifications (as opposed to, say, putting the entries in a separate database until it can independently confirm the accuracy of the information). (Pl.’s Resp., p. 9). It is clear from the complaint that Comcast does not, as required to trigger liability under the CFAA, access e360’'s computers.

C. Comcast Is Not A State Actor.

Because it is not a state actor, Comcast cannot violate e360’'s First Amendment rights, and e360 cites no case finding an ISP to be a state actor for purposes of the First Amendment.

Both of the theories e360 advances for finding Comcast to be a state actor fail. First, the “public function” test is applied narrowly by the courts: only when an entity performs an activity or function that is traditionally and exclusively performed by the government, such as governing a city, managing an election, or eminent domain, does it constitute state action. See e.g. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (providing electric utility power services not reserved exclusively to the state).

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Internet and e-mail services have always been provided primarily by non-governmental entities, including private corporations, educational institutions, and non-profit organizations. e360’'s argument that e-mail is akin to “snail mail” by virtue of the government’s operation of the United States Postal Service is not the law.3 Just as courts have found that America Online, CompuServe, Google, and other ISPs do not engage in a traditionally exclusive public function, neither does Comcast. See, e.g., CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“AOL is merely one of many private online companies which allow its members access to the Internet....The State has absolutely no interest in, and does not regulate, this exchange of information between people, institutions, corporations and governments around the world.”).4

[3 Notably, the only case e360 cites for this proposition found no state action because a privately held hospital did not operate a traditionally exclusive public function. See Ridlen v. Four County Counseling Center, 809 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D. Ind. 1992).

4 In any event, the government is not the exclusive provider of mail delivery services as many private entities, such as UPS or Federal Express, also provide such services. By e360'’s rationale, these private entities’ services would also constitute state action since they provide a service that the U.S. government also provides.]

e360 further misses the point with its attempt to distinguish the instant case from Cyber Promotions by arguing that, unlike the sender in Cyber Promotions, its e-mails are solicited. Neither the Cyber Promotions court, nor any other court, has relied on the fact that the senders’ communications were unsolicited in holding that an ISP was not a state actor. See Cyber Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 445; see also Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Del. 2007); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003); CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015. Whether an e-mail that Comcast filters is solicited or unsolicited has absolutely no bearing on whether Comcast is a state actor.

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e360 also argues that Comcast is a state actor by virtue of the “special treatment” afforded to it under federal law, namely, that it is immune from liability for certain of its activities. By this logic, any entity that receives a government subsidy, license, immunity, or other benefit is a state actor. This is not the law. As the Second Circuit, among other courts, has held: “a finding of state action may not be premised on the private entity’'s creation, funding, licensing, or regulation by the government.” Loce v. Time Warner Entm’t Advance/Newhouse P’ship, 191 F.3d 256, 266 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2007).

Privately owned television and radio stations, as well as cable providers, are not state actors because the federal government grants them a license to use the public airways, nor because state law allows them to implement and enforce policies banning programs they deem obscene or otherwise objectionable; thus, they can refuse to air certain programs or advertisements in their discretion. See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973) (radio station’s refusal to air antiwar group’s messages not state action); Loce, 191 F.3d at 267-8 (Time Warner’s refusal to air programming it deemed indecent not state action). Likewise, Comcast is not a state actor because the government has provided it immunity to filter out e-mails it deems objectionable; like television and radio stations as well as cable providers, Comcast can refuse to “air” certain advertisements (in the form of commercial e-mails its filtering technologies deem objectionable) in accordance with its policies.5

[5 Although Comcast is not a state actor subject to the restraints of the First Amendment, Comcast supports the free speech principles of the First Amendment and believes in the free flow of information. Comcast believes this interest is served by protecting the integrity of its ISP and e-mail services through filtering out commercial solicitations that are a nuisance or degrade the services offered to its subscribers.]

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D. e360 Fails to Identify Any Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Conducted By Comcast.

e360'’s arguments that Comcast violated its own policies or delivered e-mail from other companies do not support a claim under the ICFA.6

[6 Plaintiff ignores the numerous cases cited by Comcast requiring dismissal of its ICFA claim. (Mov. Br. 12-13.) Plaintiff only cites Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 775 N.E. 2d 951 (Ill. 2002), a case affirming dismissal of a complaint where the plaintiff could not identify an unfair or deceptive act under the ICFA.]

The plain language of Comcast’'s AUP could not be clearer – Comcast may “refuse to transmit or post and to remove or block any information or materials, in whole or in part, that it in its sole discretion, deems to be offensive, indecent, or otherwise inappropriate, regardless of whether this material or its dissemination is unlawful.” (Def’s. Mem. p. 13-14). e360 alleges that the “posting” of its “e-mail deliver [sic] policies” amounted to an agreement that if e360 followed such policies, its “completely proper” e-mail would be delivered to Comcast’s subscribers.7 Such an interpretation of the AUP is at odds with the very provisions e360 cites. Accordingly, the AUP (and Comcast’s compliance with it) cannot support a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices.

[7 e360 does not address its failure to plead its claims sounding in fraud (Comcast’s alleged misrepresentations of its policies) with particularity under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). (Def.’ Mem. p. 13.) Thus, Comcast and the Court can assume that e360 has conceded the failure.]

e360 cites absolutely no authority for its claim that “as an intermediary, Comcast owes a duty not only to its subscribers but also to individuals communicating with its subscribers.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 13). Comcast’'s AUP and related policies provide guidance as to what is considered an acceptable use of Comcast’'s network, but nowhere do they create an obligation on behalf of Comcast to “deliver” e360’'s e-mail to its subscribers. The fact that Comcast permits, either through agreements or otherwise, certain e-mail to reach its consumers is irrelevant.

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Congress has expressly recognized the important public policy behind controlling the massive amounts of junk e-mail received by consumers. The extensive legislative and judicial history addressing this problem confirm that, far from “offending” public policy, Comcast’'s conduct is manifestly consistent with it.

Under well-established Illinois and Seventh Circuit law, because e360 is not a “consumer” as defined by the ICFA, it must “plead and prove a nexus between the complained-of conduct and consumer protection....” Pace American, Inc. v. Elixir Inds., No. 06 C 4661, 2007 WL 495302, * 4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007), citing Athey Products Corp. v. Harris Bank Roselle, 89 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 1996); see also New Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. C& R Mortgage Corp., No. 03 C 3027, 2004 WL 783206 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2004) (granting motion to dismiss where the complaint did not allege any public injury or injury to consumers). Tellingly, here, as in Pace American, e360 seeks no relief on behalf of consumers, but rather solely damages payable to it and injunctive relief permitting it to send e-mail solicitations. (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 46, 53, 62).

Ignoring the long line of cases in this court addressing this issue, e360 states in a conclusory manner that “e360'’s allegations directly relate to its and consumer’s ability to freely communicate and transact business.” (Pl.’s Resp. p. 15).8 e360 can cite no law or set of facts supporting its position. Try as it may, e360 cannot cloak its own financial interest in sending email solicitations as a public-spirited act of consumer protection. Indeed, the Complaint speaks only of harm to e360 and its business, not to consumers. (Compl. ¶¶ 54-62). Notably, e360
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makes no allegations of consumer complaints, and, still further, e360 concedes that its intended recipients, who allegedly have “opted-in” to receive e360’'s solicitations, never even notice they are not receiving them.

[8 Throughout its Response, e360 suggests that “e360'’s customers are completely unaware of the
failure of e360 to be able to communicate with them regarding orders or other advertising.” (Pl.’s Resp., p. 15). e360 does not allege to have “orders” from any of Comcast’s subscribers and is merely trying to avoid the inevitable dismissal. As discussed in Comcast’'s Memorandum, e360’s customers are the companies it is sending e-mail on behalf of, not Comcast’'s subscribers.]

Dated: March 27, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

/s/ Douglas N. Masters
Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 N Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60610
Phone: (312) 464-3144
Fax: (312) 464-3111
dmasters@loeb.com
Attorneys for Defendant
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotJudgmentPleadingsReply.pdf03/27/08 5:20 pm69.86 KB

Hearing on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

04/15/2008 12:30
America/Chicago

MOTION by Defendant Comcast Corporation for judgment on the pleadings response due by 3/20/2008. Reply due by 3/27/2008. Motion hearing set for 4/15/2008 at 12:30 PM

Memorandum Opinion and Order GRANTING Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Well, we predicted this would happen. And so it has. Comcast has § 230 immunity from liability on everything. Even if they didn't, e360 failed to file any CREDIBLE claims against Comcast. They've been pretty much laughed out of court.

The first paragraph sets the tone. If you were pulling for e360 on this one then it doesn't get any better from there.

Don't forget, though, that the Countersuit/3rd Party Complaint against Linhardt and his corporate sock puppets remain until or unless Comcast decides to dismiss. This case has suddenly transformed into Comcast v. e360Insight.

[UPDATE: I just noticed that the case is marked as "CLOSED" in PACER. I'll post more as I get more information, but if the whole case is closed then the Countersuit/3rd Party Complaint may not be moving forward either.

UPDATE 2: I found the following minute entry in PACER today (4/18/2008):

MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable James B. Zagel: Judgment entered on 4/10/2008 is hereby vacated. Entered in error. Case reopened as to the counterclaim and third party complaint.

Thus, the Counterclaim/3rd Party Complaint is ON and the matter is re-opened as to this part of the case ONLY.]

===============================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff e360Insight, LLC is a marketer. It refers to itself as an Internet marketing company. Some, perhaps even a majority of people in this country, would call it a spammer.

e360 sends e-mail solicitations and advertisements, for a fee, to millions of e-mail users. More than a few of those users are subscribers to Comcast, an Internet service provider. Many e-mail users do not want to see (or delete unread) the messages sent by e360. Even if every user wanted these e-mails, Comcast might well have its network overloaded by the mailings. Comcast, like the federal judiciary and other enterprises, uses filters to control the volume of its e-mail and to block e-mails its users don’t want to see.

It can fairly be said that there is a national discussion about blocking unwanted messages of all sorts. In 2004, Congress noted that unsolicited commercial e-mail is currently estimated to account for over half of all e-mail traffic and noted, too, that these e-mails imposed significant costs on those who carry and receive such e-mail. 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (a)(2), (6) (2004). This is the context of this case. There is a “do not call list” designed to stop unsolicited phone calls and faxes. Many, if not most, large companies, block messages to their own employees. On the other hand, there are no laws which facilitate the blocking of direct mail solicitations through the
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post office or package carriers, perhaps because the cost of physical delivery of a paper solicitation significantly limits its use. The idea of blocking seems at odds in some way with free speech protection, even though there are limits imposed on the free speech protection of commercial speech, which is, I infer, the principal, if not the only, business of e360. None of the larger policy issues, though, is particularly relevant to the decision of Comcast’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The claims here are four: (1) a federal law claim for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA); (2) a claim of infringement of free speech in violation of First Amendment rights; (3) a state law claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; and (4) a claim for deceptive or unfair practices barred by the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA). The motion for judgment on the pleadings argues that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) protects Comcast from these claims even if they would otherwise be valid.

It is clear that Congress understood that it would not be enough to pass a law against mass electronic mailings. It knew that servicers like Comcast would create software to identify, filter, and block e-mail messages that were unwanted. It knew, too, that the details of such software could not be publicly disclosed, so as to prevent them from being easily evaded. The policy was to make it easier for e-mail recipients to control the information they receive, particularly the material received by minors at home and in schools.

Congress, and, I think, everyone else who studied the issue understood that blocking software would probably block too much. To insure that you or your child will not receive unwanted or inappropriate e-mails, your Internet service may wind up preventing you from receiving some e-mails that are neither unwanted nor inappropriate. Such Internet service
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providers feared they might be held liable for blocking too much, or even too little, and this was, as Congress recognized, “[a] disincentive[ ] for the . . . utilization of blocking and filtering technologies.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (1998). So, Congress passed the so-called Good Samaritan provision of the CDA to protect providers who take actions to prevent access to objectionable content:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of –

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be . . . objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable . . . the technical means to restrict access.

§ 230(c)(2). The Act of Congress expressly pre-empted state or local laws inconsistent with its grant of immunity. § 230(e).1

[1 In this case, Congressional policy does not differ, much, if at all, from Illinois law. See 815 ILCS 511/10 (Electronic Mail Act) which permits providers to block receipt or transmission of unsolicited advertisements on their own initiative and states that providers shall not be held liable for such actions taken in good faith.]

The claim that a suit is barred by federal statute may be properly raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2006); Chicago Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d, 2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. 2008) (claim for failure to block).

The initial question is whether the kind of unsolicited and bulk e-mails (whether you call them spam or mass marketing mailings) are the sort of communications an entity like Comcast could deem to be objectionable. A few courts have addressed the issue and answered “yes.” See Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Systems, Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (company that forwarded spam complaints to ISPs entitled to immunity). Indeed, section 230
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imposes a subjective element into the determination of whether a provider or user is immune from liability. Zango, Inc. v Kaspersky Lab, Inc., No. 07-0807, slip. op. at 6-7 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007) (noting that section 203(c)(2) only requires that the provider subjectively deems the blocked material objectionable); Pallorium v. Jared, 2007 WL 80955, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 1, 2007) (same). This standard furthers one of section 230's goals “to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services.” § 230(b)(3). Here, there is no question that Comcast, through the use of its numerous programs, software, and technologies, considers the material sent by e360 via e-mail objectionable.

e360 argues that § 230(c) has a narrower ambit than the one claimed by Comcast. e360 insists that a broad immunity was enacted, but not so broad as to protect Comcast. It relies on Chicago Lawyers’ Committee, but it is difficult to determine what language in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee favors e360. 461 F.Supp.2d 681. The problem the Court of Appeals confronted in that case and in Doe v. GTE, 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003), was the problem of the service provider who did not block anything, or anything much. The question before the Courts there was how to read a statute which seemed to offer protection to providers who did block, a protection which was intended to be an incentive to block. Should the statute be extended to protect those who choose to do nothing? Implicit in both decisions is the conclusion that the statute does provide fairly absolute protection to those who choose to block. This was the choice Comcast made.

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The validity of that choice is attacked by the claim, presumed true, that e360 is in compliance with another federal act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2004) (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003) (CAN-SPAM).

e360 rejects the spammer characterization, saying that it sends e-mails only to persons who opt-in with e360 (or its partners) to receive e-mails. It has a common practice of sending emails to request a second confirmation of willingness to receive e-mails. Beginning in 2005, Comcast began a program of indiscriminate blocking of e360 e-mails, which is a significant problem for e360 because, for the majority of its addressees, it has no other way to deliver its goods. e360 protested and, sometimes, Comcast would release a block after hearing from e360 that it was mailing to people who were willing recipients. By 2007, Comcast refused any further releases and showed little interest in discussing the matter with e360.2

[2 e360 says, in its brief, that Comcast has also engaged in “denial of service” attacks on
their system which acts overwhelm e360's system and prevent it from sending or receiving emails. e360 also claims that Comcast sends incorrect bounce information to their system with respect to e-mail addresses of those on e360's opt-in list. I do not understand what is being alleged. If e360 means that Comcast is refusing to transmit the e-mails and communicates this fact to e360 by bouncing them back, then it is e360's choice to submit very large numbers of emails for transmission which, after the first Comcast block, it should have known of this possibility and been prepared for it (perhaps by altering its protocols to allow for a connection to be disconnected). It is hard to see that sending e-mails back, in this context, is a denial of service “attack” when it is designed to prevent legitimate users of a service from using the service. It is not an “attack” to prevent users not believed to be legitimate from using a service. It is also impossible to see the allegations here as stating that Comcast intentionally accesses a computer without authorization. Unless these computers operate in non-standard ways, the initiation of access is laid at e360's door, not at Comcast's.]

But compliance with CAN-SPAM, Congress decreed, does not evict the right of the provider to make its own good faith judgment to block mailings. Section 7707 of the Act says that nothing in the Act shall “have any effect on the lawfulness . . . under any other provision of
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law, of the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle or store certain types of electronic mail messages.” See White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas, 420 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2005); § 7707(c).

Under the law, a mistaken choice to block, if made in good faith, cannot be the basis for liability under federal or state law. To force a provider like Comcast to litigate the question of whether what it blocked was or was not spam would render § 230(c)(2) nearly meaningless.

What is left for e360 is to claim that Comcast has not acted in good faith. It argues that claim in this way: “Comcast has not acted in good faith. Comcast allows numerous other companies to send bulk emails in greater volume and with greater frequency . . . singling out Plaintiff when others behaving in a like manner are not treated in a like fashion.” Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings.3

[3 Comcast argues that, absent its statutory protection, e360 has failed to state claims on all of its Counts.

(A) I agree that the Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Count is difficult to understand. I have found no cases in which refusal to allow a plaintiff to run an advertisement in a medium with wide circulation (and thus reducing sales) of plaintiff’s products or those from whom he is selling constitutes such tortious interference. Usually the prospective economic advantage is far more concrete than selling to public which consists of people on a very, very long opt-in list. It is illegal to interfere with a fair number of prospects, but usually they are a class of easily identified individuals and usually the interference is that of the defendant interacting directly with the prospective buyers.

(B) The claim under CFAA under the “denial of service” theory fails for the reasons stated above.

(C) Comcast is a private enterprise and has no obligation to honor the free speech rights of e360. C.B.S. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Comcast provides services traditionally performed by private enterprises, not the government. The government does not, with very few exceptions, connect people with one another through the Internet. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (publicly regulated utility). The fact that an enterprise is regulated, licensed, or funded by the government does not make the enterprise part of the state. Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2007).

(D) The state law claim for unfair competition is weightless. Comcast did not deceive e360 since Comcast told e360 that Comcast reserved the right to refuse service, besides which e360 is not a consumer under Illinois law.]

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The issue is whether e360 has pled an absence of good faith. Under the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), e360 has not done so. The affidavit of the President of e360 does not attest to Comcast’s alleged policy of allowing others to do what it denies e360. And Comcast does not claim that the reason it refuses to transmit e360's electronic mails is their volume and their frequency. The absence of good faith is not adequately pled.

I grant judgment on the pleadings with respect to the complaint as a whole on the grounds that § 230(c) precludes proceeding on any of the claims. Alternatively, I dismiss the remainder of the claims for the reasons stated above.

ENTER:
James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: April 10, 2008

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotJudgmentPleadingsOrder.pdf04/11/08 9:31 am69.85 KB

MOTION to Reconsider

05/01/2008 10:15
America/Chicago

When a federal district court judge says that a bunch of people might call you a spammer, then your honor must be defended!

And so e360Insight, LLC, is asking the judge to pretty please take that back and let them have a case and discovery.

In answer to the question that I know most of you are asking, I've never actually seen a judge say "Oops! You're right! My bad!" in response to one of these. Now, that's not to say that it doesn't happen, but instead that it's really, really, really rare. This is really just a prelude to an appeal.
=============================================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.
________________________________________
COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING, LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER PURSUANT TO F. R. C. P. 59(E)

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC (“e360”) and by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Bartly J. Loethen of Synergy
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Law Group, LLC, and for its Motion to Reconsider pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 59(e), states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs move to reconsider the ruling for Defendant of Judgment on the Pleadings for the simple reason that it appears Plaintiff’s assertions in its complaint, including the assertion that it was not and is not a “spammer” were wholly disregarded in rendering the opinion. The second line of the Opinion and Order states “Some, perhaps even a majority of people in this country would call it a spammer” is indicative of this bias and erroneous assumption made in this case. In the complaint, e360 states that it is not a spammer and states that all email messages are requested by its customers. These statements must be taken as true by the court in this motion, and clearly it has not been, as the statement above indicates. This is merely one statement that was not taken as true and is indicative of the erroneous ruling based on improper factual assumptions in this case.

ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standard.

A motion for reconsideration filed within ten1 days following the entry of an order is governed by Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e). The grounds for a Rule 59(e) motion include “newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in the controlling law, and manifest error of law [or fact]." Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). It is the duty of the moving party to “clearly establish” the aforementioned grounds. Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433
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F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006). A party is not entitled to “to undo its own procedural failures or present new evidence or arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.” Woolner v. Flair Comm'cns Agency, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42489, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2005). The Rule is designed to enable “a district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings." Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995).

[1 Rule 59(e) requires that motions to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 10 days. Pursuant to Rule 6(a), when computing time, the day of the entry of the judgment is not included and when the amount of time proscribed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays and Sundays shall be excluded. The Judgment on the Pleadings was granted on April 10, 2008 (Docket No. 44) and thus, ten days later not including intermediate Saturdays and Sundays is April 24, 2008.]

B. Comcast is not immune under the Communications Decency Act.

E360 has pled the absence of good faith in Comcast’s action toward it and thus Comcast is not entitled to the exemption offered under the Communications Decency Act in any reading of the statute. see 47 USCS § 230(c)(2)(A). In its Complaint, e360 states: (i) it has complied with Comcast’s Acceptable Use Policy (paragraph 13 of Complaint), (ii) Comcast refuses to provide e360 with any information as to how e360 could modify its email messages to avoid triggering the block of its rightfully sent email messages (Complaint p. 16); (iii) Comcast blocks based on content such as the use of the word “free” (see generally p. 19 Plaintiff’s Complaint) (iv) Comcast has regularly blocked double-confirmed emails (Complaint p. 19); (v) Comcast arbitrarily censors e360’s email (Complaint p. 19); (vi) Comcast has transmitted fraudulent “bounce data” making it impossible for Plaintiff to reasonably ascertain how or why the emails are being blocked (p. 24 of Complaint); and (vii) that Comcast is blocking e360’s email messages that are compliant with Comcast’s policies and allowing other email marketers with substantially similar business practices as those employed by e360 to send messages to Comcast’s customers (Complaint p. 58). These paragraphs detail Plaintiff’s allegations that Comcast is acting arbitrarily in blocking email sent by e360 to its customers who wish to receive the email. Assuming Plaintiff’s Complaint to be true, this is a sufficient allegation of bad faith
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on the part of Comcast, and should be sufficient to allow the case to move forward and additional discovery to be undertaken to determine the full extent of Defendant’s bad faith. see Gillman v. Burlington N. R. Co., 878 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1989) (when ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, district court is required to accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and to draw all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party).

C. e360 Has Plead Each Count of Its Complaint Properly.

1. Plaintiff has properly pled its claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

The ruling of the court dismisses this count with a footnote stating the count is difficult to understand and the Court seems to characterize Plaintiff’s business as mere advertisement, with the inability to send the advertisement being the sole source of the potential damage. This statement is clearly in error as it seems to focus on potential damages which could be proven in the course of a trial rather than proper pleading.

In addition, the Court made a fundamental error of fact when it falsely assumed that every message e360 sends is perceived to be spam by “perhaps even a majority of people in this country.” As stated in its complaint, Plaintiff states “e360...sends emails to consumers who...purchase goods and services from its proprietary company owned website.” (Complaint p. 27). E360 sends different types of email messages to its customers, including signup confirmation messages, order confirmation messages, back-order notification messages and order shipping notices. These messages are sent in e360’s normal course of business as an e-commerce service provider. The vast majority, if not nearly all e-commerce websites send these types of transactional messages and consumers have come to expect to receive them. E360 is unaware of any organization or individual, including Comcast who believes an order confirmation message is spam. Nevertheless, Comcast blocks all of these messages, advertising
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messages and transactional messages, and does so without explanation or justification and with intent to cause e360 harm.

Plaintiff has alleged each and every element of the tort. Plaintiff had a expectancy of a valid business relationship with those who had signed up to receive email offers from Plaintiff; defendant clearly knew of this relationship, as it was aware of the offers and blocked the delivery of the offers, thus such interference was intentional, and the failure of such delivery has damaged Plaintiff, as is alleged in the complaint and must be taken as true. Cook v. Winfrey, 141 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1998) (identifying elements necessary to state a cause of action for tortious interference). Plaintiff will be able to prove those damages at trial. Plaintiff has a vast amount of empirical evidence that directly links its ability to deliver email messages to a direct and substantial affect on Plaintiff’s revenue and Plaintiff should be allowed to prove its adequately pled case.

2. e360 has properly pled its claims for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).
Although difficult to understand, and also in a footnote, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the CFAA is dismissed for (evidently) the reason that any initiation of computer to computer contact is at the door of e360 and not Comcast. The Court clearly misconstrues the action alleged in this claim. Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that Comcast has engaged in “denial-of-service” attacks, which must be accepted as true at this stage of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii). It is incorrect to assume that because e360 is sending email to a client who has an expectation of receiving such email that the intended recipient’s email service provider should be entitled to tie up the sender’s computer for hours for a message that should take seconds to deliver merely due to the fact that there are several more emails to others originating from the same computer. This type of attack is initiated by Comcast, draws the e360 5
computers into a slow dialogue, and denies e360 computers the ability to continue at proper speed. This is the equivalent of bombarding a computer with information causing the computer to be unable to function properly (akin to many of the computer worms and viruses that gave rise to this law). Plaintiff has alleged such attacks have occurred and should be allowed to prove its case.

The Court misconstrues Plaintiff’s claim that “Comcast frequently transmits false bounce information to e360’s mail servers.” (Complaint p. 42). As stated in its complaint, Plaintiff defines false bounce information as “false information on the status of an email account.” e360’s customers have signed up using email addresses managed by Comcast, including those addresses containing a “@comcast.net” address. In these instances Comcast is the sole authority as to the status of these email addresses and whether the email addresses are in an active status and able to receive email messages. Plaintiff has pled that Comcast intentionally sends false information to e360 about the status of Comcast email addresses provided to e360 by e360 customers. For example, if e360 sends an email message to JohnSmith@comcast.net, Comcast sends a message back to e360 stating: JohnSmith@comcast.net is “not our customer” or “account is no longer active” or “mailbox is currently unavailable.” Plaintiff has properly pled that these statements made by Comcast are false statements and thus in bad faith. In addition, since Comcast is the sole authority on the status of a comcast.net email account and e360 has no other way to confirm or verify the status of its customers’ email addresses, and Plaintiff has pled that “....Comcast’s actions have directly resulted in the destruction of e360’s proprietary data and asset, its database.” (Complaint p. 43). The Court improperly dismisses Plaintiff’s claim, again in a footnote and states, “I do not understand what is being alleged.” Clearly, the Court simply
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dismissed Plaintiff’s claim based on a lack of understanding even though Plaintiff clearly stated and defined the terms used in its claim.

3. e360 has properly pled unfair competition and business practices.

Again in a footnote, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for unfair business practices. The Court is clearly in error to determine factually, without presentment of any evidence, that Comcast did not deceive e360. E360 has pled Comcast did deceive it and that fact must be accepted as true at this stage of the pleadings. Further, the Court has stated e360 is not a consumer, but this is a clear error of law, as Roche v. Country Mut. Ins. Co. sets forth that a party need not be a consumer itself to bring a claim under this act so long as there is a “consumer nexus”. Roche v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48921 *25 (S.D. Ill 2007). When, as is the case here, both entities are commercial entities, “the test for standing is whether the alleged conduct invokes trade practices addressed to the market generally or otherwise implicates consumer protection concerns.” Stepan Co. v. Winter Panel Corp., 948 F.Supp. 802, 805-06 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Here, consumer protection is clearly implicated as Comcast’s actions are directly impacting consumers (Comcast customers) that have requested to receive e-mail from e360 and are being denied access to e360’s e-mail through the arbitrary actions of Comcast. Moreover, e360 has adequately pled its cause of action and should be allowed to discover the facts necessary to prove its case, not be cut off by a premature determination that no deception has taken place.

D. Conclusion.

In summary, this Court must overturn its ruling in favor of Defendants on this matter, as there is a manifest error in law and fact. The Court has improperly assumed certain facts that must be taken as true as alleged by Plaintiff. It is improper to make assumptions of facts such as whether Plaintiff is a spammer and whether Comcast has deceived Plaintiff. It is improper to
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base a ruling at this stage of the case on what the Court deems of its own accord to be an absence of damages. It is improper to dismiss a claim based on an exemption that is not available when the Defendant shows bad faith and when Defendant’s bad faith is pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court reconsider its prior ruling and deny Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for the reasons set forth herein.

Respectfully submitted,

Plaintiff

By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys
Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotReconsiderJotP.pdf04/25/08 9:02 am54.15 KB

Minute Entry DENYING Motion to Reconsider

Raise your hand if you're shocked by this one, but the Judge has denied e360Insight's Motion to Reconsider.

========================
MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable James B. Zagel: Motion to reconsider is denied.

Comcast's ANSWER and Affirmative Defenses

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST’S ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendant, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”), answers the complaint of Plaintiff, e360insight, LLC (“e360”), as follows:

1. e360insight, LLC (hereafter “e360”) is an Illinois limited liability corporation located in Wheeling, Illinois. e360 is an internet marketing company.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that e360 is an Illinois limited liability corporation located in Wheeling, Illinois. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of paragraph 1, and therefore denies these allegations.

2. Comcast Corporation (hereafter “Comcast”) is a Pennsylvania corporation principally located in Philadelphia Pennsylvania. Comcast is an internet service provider.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that it is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Comcast admits that, by and through its subsidiaries, is an internet service provider (“Comcast’s ISP Services”).

3. Jurisdiction is proper and based on 28 USC § 1332 as the parties are citizens of and principally located in separate states and the amount in controversy exceeds seventy-five
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thousand dollars. Jurisdiction is also proper based on 28 USC § 1331 as this action arises under 18 USC § 1030, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that the dispute involves citizens of different states. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to e360’s allegations as to the amount in controversy with respect to its claims, and therefore denies those allegations. Comcast admits that e360 has made allegations arising under 18 USC § 1030, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

4. e360 is an email marketing company whose business practices have, at all times relevant to the allegations in this Complaint, complied with, and continue to comply, with all federal and state requirements, laws and standards pertaining to the sending of commercial email, including the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 USC § 7701 (“CAN-SPAM”).

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 4, and therefore denies these allegations.

5. e360 delivers its messages to its customers at addresses provided by said customers. The customers thus require e360 to use Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), such as Comcast. At all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint, e360 has complied, and continues to comply, with all Accepted Use Policies and Terms Of Service agreements stated by Comcast.

ANSWER: Because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are readily identifiable as coming from e360, Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to
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form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 5, and therefore denies these allegations.

6. e360 has at all times relevant to the claims asserted in this Complaint, complied, and continues to comply, with all Accepted Use Policies and Terms Of Service agreements stated by Comcast.

ANSWER: Because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are identifiable as coming from e360, Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 6, and therefore denies these allegations.

7. e360 is hired by and partners with companies that wish to market their products or services using the internet. This marketing is targeted to persons “opting in” to a list whereby they agree to accept email announcements and/or advertisements. These persons sign up at websites owned by e360 or at websites owned by e360’s marketing partners. e360 then may attempt to verify the desire to receive emails utilizing a “double opt-in” process, which involves sending a confirmatory email allowing the customer to affirm or terminate its decision to receive marketing emails. Those customers who affirm their interest in receiving email messages are included in subsequent email messages until they unsubscribe at a later date or until e360 receives bounce information (showing the email account in question is closed) from Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of the allegations of this paragraph 7, and therefore denies these allegations.

8. e360 provides the consumer the ability to “opt-out” of receiving emails in every email sent and promptly complies with every request made by a consumer.

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ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 8, and therefore denies these allegations.

9. e360 does not engage in “spamming,” which is essentially the digital equivalent of sending junk mail that is not requested. e360 only sends email messages to persons who first sign up or opt-in and provide their email address to e360 or to one of e360’s marketing partners. e360 employs a variety of permission processes that it controls and that its marketing partners use to obtain permission from and provide notice to the consumer that received the email.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 9, and therefore denies these allegations.

10. e360 has been approved by ReturnPath, a leading provider of reputation monitoring services to the ISP community, including Microsoft/Hotmail. In an independent audit of e360’s mailing practices, ReturnPath approved e360 for the SenderScore Certification Program, which is Return Path’s highest level of certification among legitimate email marketers.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 10, and therefore denies these allegations.

11. Comcast is an internet service provider (“ISP”) that provides email service to its customers and who has agreed to act as an intermediary in delivering and receiving emails on behalf of its customers.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that, by and through its subsidiaries, it provides ISP and e-mail services to its subscribers, but denies e360’s characterization of its obligations to subscribers. CH40480.7

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12. Comcast provides to its customers and the public on its website Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services, attached and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit A.

ANSWER: Comcast admits its subscribers and the public may access the current Comcast Acceptable Use Policy for High-Speed Internet Services, the Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, and a link to Report Abuse at www.comcast.net/terms/, but denies the allegations of this paragraph 12, as the documents available on the website speak for themselves.

13. At all relevant times, e360 has complied with Comcast’s Acceptable Use and Abuse Policies.

ANSWER: Because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are readily identifiable as coming from e360, Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 13, and therefore denies these allegations.

14. At all relevant times, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast regularly blocked emails e360 has repeatedly attempted to send to emails [sic] to Comcast customers (who have signed up to receive such emails,) including some of who have double-confirmed their wish to receive the emails. Such blocking by Comcast interferes with e360’s ability to do business and interferes with e360’s business relationship with its customers who use Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that some of e360’s emails directed to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by a highly proprietary and confidential filtering technology operated in accordance with industry standards (“Comcast’s Filtering System”), but
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is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 14, and therefore denies these allegations.

15. All instances where Comcast has blocked e360 email addresses are too voluminous to mention in this complaint. As a recent example, Comcast blocked virtually all of e360’s email messages on August 23, 2007. e360 attempted to send email messages to its customers, including those who have “double-confirmed” their interest in receiving e360’s email messages. e360 used IP address 63.210.103.209 to connect to Comcast’s mail servers. e360 received the following error message from Comcast for all of the messages e360 attempted to send.

“550 5.2.0 63 .210.103.209 blocked by ldap:ou=rblmx,dc=comcast,dc=net -> BL004 Blocked for spam. Please see http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/index.jsp?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18628”

By following the link provided in the Comcast error message, e360 was directed to the following information on Comcast’s website:

“Mail to Comcast is rejected and is returned with an error message containing the code BL004. What does this mean? Our filters have determined that email from your mail server has been sent in patterns which are characteristic of spam. In an effort to protect subscribers, your mail server has been blocked from sending email to the Comcast network. Mail servers are typically shared by many users so it may be the case that another party using your mail server has sent spam, even if you have not.”

ANSWER: Comcast admits that some e-mails of e360’s directed to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering System, but because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are readily identifiable as coming from e360, it is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 15, and therefore denies these allegations.

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16. e360 cannot reasonably ascertain how its messages may have been sent “in patterns which are characteristic of spam.” Comcast refuses to provide e360 with any information as to how e360 could modify its email messages to avoid triggering the block of its rightfully sent email messages or the delivery of this error message.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that it has refused to provide e360 with highly proprietary, confidential and sensitive information relating to Comcast’s Filtering System, but denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph 16.

17. e360 has on numerous occasions contacted Comcast in attempts to get Comcast to allow e360’s email to get through to its customers. Comcast has refused to allow such emails.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that e360 has contacted Comcast, or one of its subsidiaries, regarding its emails, but denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph 17.

18. At all relevant times, and possibly commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly held or severely and significantly delayed emails e360 has attempted to send to Comcast customers who have signed up to receive such emails, and refused to release such emails, a practice commonly known as “tar-pitting” and is [a] type of “denial of service attack” on e360’s mail servers. Comcast regularly transmits bogus response data in an attempt to lock up e360’s connections in order to slow or incapacitate e360’s mail servers. e360’s sending mail servers track and report average response time for each recipient domain. The average response time is defined as the time it takes for the recipient domain to process a message; to receive the message and to acknowledge receipt. As recently as December 11, 2007, e360 recorded an average response time of 18,433 seconds or 5.1 hours to process a single email message. During this time, Comcast’s mail servers transmit bogus response information to keep the connective active and to erode e360’s system capacity. In doing so, Comcast has interfered with e360’s
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ability to send email, not just to Comcast customers who are also e360 customers, but to all e360 customers by shutting down e360’s servers.

ANSWER: Comcast denies that it, or any of its subsidiaries, have engaged in “tar-pitting” or “denial-of-service attacks.” Because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are readily identifiable as coming from e360, Comcast is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 18, and therefore denies the allegations.

19. At all times relevant hereto, and commencing as early as 2005, Comcast has regularly blocked emails e360 has attempted to send to Comcast customers who have signed up to receive such emails, some of who have double-confirmed that they wish to receive the emails on the grounds that such emails contain specific words or phrases, such as “free”. Such arbitrary censorship by Comcast violates e360’s First Amendment rights and is an unacceptable infringement of e360’s commercial speech based on content.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that some e-mails e360 has attempted to send to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether such subscribers have consented to receiving e-mails from e360, and therefore denies these allegations. Comcast denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 19.

20. Comcast uses multiple email filters, including third-party companies and internal blacklists, to filter and block emails. Comcast uses Spamhaus SBL/XBL/ZEN, a London based self-appointed internet “watch dog” company to monitor and screen emails on its systems. Comcast’s use of the Spamhaus blacklists is documented on Comcast’s website
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(http://www.comcast.net/help/faq/index.jsp?faq=SecurityMail_Policy18627). Spamhaus mistakenly listed e360 as a spammer on its ROKSO list, SBL blocklist and Zen blocklist despite being repeatedly told of its error. Spamhaus has since removed e360 from its lists per a Court Order but occasionally violates the Order. On March 5, 2007, e360 notified Comcast that Comcast’s use of the Spamhaus blacklist was improperly blocking e360’s email messages and was improperly interfering with e360’s legitimate business. e360 provided copies of the judgment and permanent injunction against Spamhaus from United States District Court case number 06 C 3958. Notification was sent to Comcast legal counsel via FedEx tracking number 798120681231. e360 did not receive a response from Comcast. Attached and incorporated into this Complaint as Exhibit B is a copy of the March 5, 2007 letter.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that Comcast’s ISP Services use email filters to filter emails and admits that such services have used lists obtained from Spamhaus for such purposes. Comcast admits that on March 5, 2007, e360 notified Comcast, or one if its subsidiaries, that it believed Spamhaus had mistakenly listed e360 as a spammer on its block lists and sent a copy of a default judgment against Spamhaus (which has since been vacated) from United States District Court case number 06 C 3958. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the remaining allegations of this paragraph 20, and therefore denies these allegations.

21. Comcast has blocked and continues to block emails sent by e360 to its customers based on the Spamhaus listing above even after being told of the error. As of the date of this filing, the most recent incidence of improper blocking by Comcast via the Spamhaus blacklist was December 9, 2007.

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ANSWER: Comcast admits that some emails sent by e360 to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering System. Because Comcast believes that e360 is responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers, not all of which are readily identifiable as coming from e360, Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 21, and therefore denies these allegations.

22. Comcast has blocked and continues to block emails sent by e360 to its customers based on third-party and internal blacklists and other software filters supplied by third-parties. Some of the known blocking technologies used by Comcast include MAPS by TrendMicro and Brightmail by Symantec.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that some emails sent by e360 to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology. Comcast admits that Comcast’s ISP Services have used filtering technologies including MAPS by TrendMicro and Brightmail by Symantec.

23. Comcast has engaged in ‘denial-of-service’ attacks on e360’s network and computer system by consuming, destroying, altering or withholding emails sent by e360 to its customers. Such attacks overwhelm and disable e360’s network and prevent them from sending or receiving emails from e360’s consumers in an attempt to halt e360’s business.

ANSWER: Comcast denies that Comcast’s ISP Services have engaged in ‘denial-of-service’ attacks as set forth in paragraph 23. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of the remaining allegations of paragraph 23, and therefore denies these allegations.

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24. Comcast has transmitted fraudulent bounce information to e360’s mail servers specific to email addresses contained on e360’s opt-in marketing list. The responses sent by Comcast mail servers to e360 are fraudulent because they contain information indicating that the email address is invalid and not active. As an email marketer, e360 relies on bounce information from Comcast’s mail servers to determine whether e360’s customer email addresses are still active and deliverable. e360 has information and reason to believe Comcast is intentionally transmitting fraudulent bounce information to e360 in an attempt to discourage e360 from sending additional email messages. By transmitting fraudulent bounce information, Comcast is effectively destroying e360’s proprietary assets and the value contained in e360’s opt-in database of email addresses. Such statements are made on information and belief as only Comcast has access to and knowledge of the accounts it has and will not allow e360’s emails to be delivered regardless of account activity.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 24.

COUNT I (Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage)

25. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

ANSWER: Comcast realleges its answers to the allegations in paragraphs 1 to 24 as though fully set forth herein.

26. Under Illinois law, “the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage has four elements: (1) plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of a valid business relationship with a third party; (2) defendant must know of the prospective business relationship;
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(3) defendant must intentionally interfere with the prospective business relationship such that the prospective business relationship never materializes; and (4) the interference must damage the plaintiff. Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 957 F. Supp. 142, 145-146 (N.D.Ill 1997).

ANSWER: Comcast admits that paragraph 26 contains an accurate quote from Lynch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 957 F.Supp. 142, 145-146 (N.D.Ill. 1997).

27. e360 only sends emails to consumers who: a) purchase goods and services from its proprietary company owned website; or b) sign-up to receive emails either through e360 or through one of its marketing partners. As such, e360 only sends emails to individuals who have done business with e360 or who have expressed an interest in doing business with e360 or its marketing partners. Thus, e360 has a reasonable expectation of valid business relationship with the consumers it emails.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 27, and therefore denies these allegations.

28. Comcast, an internet service provider, has agreed to act and is compensated for acting as an intermediary in delivering the email sent by and to its customers. Comcast has no right to interfere in the business relationship between e360 and its clients or potential clients.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that, by and through its subsidiaries, it provides ISP services which involve, inter alia, providing subscribers with e-mail addresses and access to e-mail, but denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph 28.

29. Comcast has knowledge of the [sic] e360’s prospective business relationships with Comcast users. Indeed, Comcast has been notified numerous times by e360 of e360’s attempts to contact e360’s customers and potential customers.

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ANSWER: Comcast admits that e360 has contacted Comcast, or one of its subsidiaries, regarding its attempt to email Comcast’s subscribers. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 29, and therefore denies these allegations.

30. Comcast has intentionally interfered with e360’s prospective business relationships by blocking the emails e360 has sent or tried to send to its customers. Despite being notified on numerous occasions by e360 of such interference, Comcast has refused to stop interfering in e360’s prospective business relationships.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that some emails sent by e360 to subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology and that e360 has contacted Comcast, or one of its subsidiaries, regarding its attempt to email subscribers, but denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph 30.

31. Comcast’s ‘denial of service’ attacks interfere with e360’s ability to send emails to any of its clients or potential clients thereby interfering with e360’s business relationship with its clients. Such attacks cause significant damage to e360 by preventing it from communicating with its clients or potential clients.

ANSWER: Comcast denies that it, or any of its subsidiaries, have engaged in ‘denial of service’ attacks as set forth in this paragraph 31. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 31, and therefore denies these allegations.

32. Comcast blocking e360’s emails to its clients and potential clients interferes with e360’s prospective business relationships with its clients and potential clients such that those relationships never materialize.

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ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 32, and therefore denies these allegations.

33. Comcast’s refusal to allow e360 to communicate with any [sic] its clients and potential clients interferes with e360’s business relationship with its clients and potential clients.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of the allegations of this paragraph 33, and therefore denies these allegations.

34. Comcast’s interference with e360’s business relationships causes e360 significant damage. e360 estimates the damage to exceed $4.5 million per year from 2005 through 2007.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of the allegations of this paragraph 34, and therefore denies these allegations.

35. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 35.

COUNT II (Violation of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act)

36. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

ANSWER: Comcast realleges its answers to the allegations in paragraphs 1 to 24 as though fully set forth herein.

37. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (hereafter “Act”) prohibits anyone from: (i)”knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a protected
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computer….or…(iii)intentionally access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii).

ANSWER: Comcast admits that this paragraph 37 quotes prohibitions contained in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii).

38. The Act also requires that the “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period…aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).

ANSWER: Comcast admits that this paragraph 38 is an excerpted quote from the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i).

39. Under the Act, any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of the Act may obtain compensatory damages, economic damages and injunctive relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).

ANSWER: Comcast admits that 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) provides that one who suffers damage or loss from a violation of the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act may recover certain damages, including compensatory, economic, or injunctive relief, but denies the allegations of this paragraph 39 as the statute speaks for itself.

40. Comcast intentionally and knowingly engaged in denial of service attacks upon e360’s system by slowing process times of its emails by hours. Such delay slowed and all but stopped e360’s systems from being able to function. This intentional damage to e360 prevented e360 from being able to do business and cost e360 in terms of lost business along with excessive wear and tear on e360’s systems and incremental infrastructure costs to overcome the system load created by Comcast’s denial of service attacks.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 40.

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41. e360 relies on Comcast to provide accurate and truthful information regarding the deliverability of mail and the activity status of email addresses of Comcast customers on e360’s emailing list. In fact, e360 has no other resource available to it to obtain this accurate information and thus requires Comcast’s cooperation in providing reliable, accurate information.

ANSWER: Comcast is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to truth of the allegations of paragraph 41, and therefore denies these allegations.

42. Comcast frequently transmits false bounce information to e360’s mail servers. When Comcast transmits false information on the status of an email account, e360’s removes the address from its mailing and updates its database to reflect that the email is no longer valid.

ANSWER: Comcast denies that Comcast’s ISP Services transmit false bounce information to e360’s mail servers. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of paragraph 42, and therefore denies these allegations.

43. When Comcast provides false information regarding an email account to e360 and causes e360 to remove an active email address from its database, Comcast’s actions have directly resulted in the destruction of e360’s proprietary data and asset, its database.

ANSWER: Comcast denies that Comcast’s ISP Services provide false information to e360. Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 43, and therefore denies these allegations.

44. e360 estimates that such denial of service attacks upon its systems have cost it five hundred ninety-one thousand two hundred ($591,200.00) dollars.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 44, and therefore denies these allegations.

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45. e360 estimates that Comcast false bounce information and destruction of its email database has caused it $2,498,924.00 dollars.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 45, and therefore denies these allegations.

46. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 46.

COUNT III (Violation of First Amendment Rights)

47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

ANSWER: Comcast realleges its answers to the allegations in paragraphs 1 to 24 as though fully set forth herein.

48. Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection as long as it concerns lawful activity and it not misleading. Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). “Indeed, we recognized that a “particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information…may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” Id. at 763.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that the court in Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) held that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection and that the court made the statements quoted in this paragraph 48.

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49. It is also recognized that commercial communication “that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).

ANSWER: Comcast admits that this paragraph 49 contains an accurate quote from Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).

50. e360 has the right to send commercial emails to its consumers and consumers who have asked or agreed to receive its emails. e360’s emails concern only lawful activity and are not misleading.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 50, and therefore denies these allegations.

51. Comcast’s arbitrary and capricious use of its network to systematically deny e360 the ability to send commercial emails to its customers and consumers who have asked to or agreed to receive such emails is a violation of e360’s First Amendment rights.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 51.

52. Comcast’s actions have caused significant damage to e360’s ability to communicate and do business with its customers. Specifically, since e360 is an email marketer, e360 has no other way to communicate to its customers who subscribe to or have their email through Comcast. This loss of communication in the marketplace harms not only e360 but also all of its customers.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 52, and therefore denies these allegations.

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53. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 53.

COUNT IV (Unfair Competition and Business Practices)

54. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 to 24 as if fully stated herein.

ANSWER: Comcast realleges its answers to the allegations in paragraphs 1 to 24 as though fully set forth herein.

55. In Illinois, it is unlawful for any business to use unfair methods of competition and business practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any false pretense, false promise or misrepresentation, in the conduct of trade or business. 815 ILCS 505/2.

ANSWER: Comcast denies e360’s characterization of the provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2, in that the statute speaks for itself.

56. Comcast provides to its customers and the public on its website Acceptable Use Policy, Abuse Policy and Agreement for Services. Implicit in these policies is the understanding that if one complies with the Comcast’s policies, the mail sent will be delivered.

ANSWER: Comcast admits that the Comcast Acceptable Use Policy for High-Speed Internet Services, the Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, and a link to Report Abuse are provided on its website at www.comcast.net/terms/ for subscribers of Comcast’s ISP Services. Comcast is without information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remaining allegations of this paragraph 56, and therefore denies these allegations.

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57. Although e360 has complied with Comcast’s polices at all times, Comcast has refused to comply with their own policies and deliver the mail sent by e360.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 57.

58. At the same time that Comcast is blocking e360’s email messages that are compliant with Comcast’s polices, Comcast is allowing other email marketers with substantially similar business practices as those employed by e360 to send email messages to Comcast’s customers.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 58, and therefore denies these allegations.

59. Comcast’s refusal to deliver email sent by e360 while allowing its competitors to freely transmit email puts e360 at a disadvantage and creates an un-level playing field on which e360 must compete.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as the truth of the allegations set forth in this paragraph 59, and therefore denies these allegations.

60. Upon information and belief, Comcast has made agreements, either written or verbal, to allow certain email marketers to send or transmit email without interruption regardless of whether such email meets Comcast’s Acceptable Use policy. Based on these agreements, Comcast has applied its policies with certain email marketers in a way that is materially different than Comcast’s application of its policies to e360’s email messages. Such statement is made upon information and belief because only Comcast can verify with whom they have agreements with to allow mail to be sent to their customers.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of this paragraph 60.

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61. Comcast’s refusal to create a fair playing field for legitimate email marketers to compete has caused serious damage to e360’s business and damaged its reputation.

ANSWER: Comcast is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of this paragraph 61, and therefore denies these allegations.

62. The acts complained of were and continue to be done willfully or with such gross negligence as indicate Comcast’s reckless disregard of e360’s rights. e360 is therefore entitled to punitive damages from Comcast.

ANSWER: Comcast denies the allegations of paragraph 62.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

63. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I, II, and IV, Comcast alleges that it is immune from liability in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Communications Decency Act.

64. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I, II, and IV, Comcast alleges that it is immune from liability in accordance with the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et. seq. (the “CAN-SPAM Act”).

65. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I, II, and IV, Comcast alleges that it is immune from liability in accordance with the anti-spam laws of the various states, including the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILCS 511/10(g) and the Pennsylvania Unsolicited Telecommunications Advertisement Act, 73 PS § 2250 et. seq.

66. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I to IV, Comcast alleges that e360 comes to court with unclean hands based on the fact that it has, among other things, violated the CAN-SPAM Act, violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
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1030(a)(5)(A)(i) and (iii), violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 805 ILCS 505/2, violated anti-spam laws of the various states, including the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILCS 511/10 and the Pennsylvania Telecommunications Advertisement Act, 73 PS § 2250 et. seq., sent Comcast subscribers fraudulent and misleading e-mails, including e-mails advertising counterfeit or unauthorized goods, and made fraudulent statements about its services to Comcast and in its pleadings in this case.

67. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I to IV, Comcast alleges that e360 has unreasonably delayed in bringing these claims to the detriment of Comcast, and therefore these claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

68. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts I to IV, Comcast alleges that e360 has failed to mitigate its damages, if any.

69. As a complete and affirmative defense to Counts II to IV, Comcast alleges that e360’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON COMPLAINT

WHEREFORE, Comcast prays for judgment with respect to e360’s complaint as follows:

70. Judgment be entered in favor of Comcast on each and every cause of action.

71. Comcast be awarded its attorneys’ fees and costs.

72. The Court declare that e360 has unclean hands because (i) it violated the CAN-SPAM Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the anti-spam laws of the various states including Illinois and Pennsylvania; (ii) it has sent Comcast ISP Services subscribers fraudulent and misleading e-
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mails, and (iii) it has made fraudulent statements about its services to Comcast and in its pleadings in this case.

73. Comcast be awarded such other and further relief as may be just or equitable.

Date: March 4, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By:__/s/ Douglas N. Masters_________________
Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark St., Ste. 2300
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 464-3100
Fax: (312) 464-3111
[email address redacted]
Attorneys for Defendant,
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] Answer.pdf06/28/09 1:05 pm136.88 KB

MOTION for Leave to File

03/20/2008 10:15
America/Chicago

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS TO ADD COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

In accordance with Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) moves for leave to amend its pleading to file the attached Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Plaintiff-Counterdefendant, e360insight, LLC (“e360”), and Third-Party Defendants David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, and John Does 1-50 (collectively referred to as the “Third- Party Defendants”).

On January 15, 2008, e360 filed suit against Comcast alleging various state and federal law claims arising out of Comcast’s practice of filtering out some of e360’s commercial e-mails sent to Comcast’s subscribers. e360 subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery on February 21, 2008. Comcast filed an answer to e360’s complaint on March 4, 2008, denying the salient allegations of the complaint, and asserting several affirmative defenses. On that same day, Comcast filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Comcast now seeks leave to amend its pleadings to file the attached Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. Each of these claims arises from the same conduct underlying e360’s
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complaint – the sending of massive amounts of unsolicited commercial e-mails to comcast.net subscribers. Through a variety of coordinated unlawful and fraudulent activities, e360 and Third-Party Defendants facilitate the ongoing e-mailing of spam to Comcast’s subscribers. In furtherance of these activities, e360 and Third-Party Defendants seek to circumvent Comcast’'s proprietary filtering technologies designed to protect subscribers from receiving such unwanted spam e-mails. e360’s and Third-Party Defendant’s actions violate federal and state law enacted to prevent the sending of spam (Counts I and II – CAN-SPAM Act; Count III – Illinois Electronic Mail Act); and federal and common law that protect Comcast’s computers and related hardware and software from abusive e-mailing practices (Count IV – Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; Count V – Trespass to Channels). The pleading also alleges that e360 and Third-Party Defendants have been unjustly enriched (Count VI); and that they have abused the Court’s process through litigation tactics employed for improper purposes (Count VI).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend its pleading by leave of court and that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Absent “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment,” a request to amend should be permitted. See Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 706 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

This motion is being brought promptly; discovery has not yet commenced. Furthermore, granting this motion is in the interest of justice, as Comcast alleges meritorious claims arising from e360’s and the Third-Party Defendants’ widespread spam activities, activities that offend public policy and the law.

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WHEREFORE, Comcast respectfully requests leave to amend its pleadings to file the attached Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.

Dated: March 18, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP
/s/ Douglas N. Masters
Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 N Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60610
Phone: (312) 464-3144
Fax: (312) 464-3111
[redacted]
Attorneys for Defendant
Comcast Corporation

Proposed Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC
d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) brings this counterclaim and third-party complaint against e360insight, LLC, David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain
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Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, and John Does 1-50 (collectively, the “Defendants”).

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Defendants operate a business designed to facilitate the e-mail marketing of products and services through, among other things, the sending of unwanted, unauthorized, unlawful and/or otherwise objectionable commercial e-mail messages (generally referred to as spam”).

2. Internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as Comcast, with the assistance of others, filter e-mail messages to prevent spam from reaching consumers. It is essential to the operation of its ISP services that Comcast utilize the tools at its disposal, tools sanctioned by federal and state law, to protect its subscribers from receiving spam. About 90% of all e-mail sent to Comcast’s subscribers is spam. Comcast filters about 500,000,000 spam e-mails per day.

3. Spammers, on the other hand, try to mask their identities, the origins of their emails, and the nature of their services in order to deliver spam to consumers and to remain profitable. Defendants here utilize a variety of illegal and fraudulent activities to pursue their objectives, and have undertaken various efforts to obscure the nature, scope, and participants in their activities. Indeed, the filing of this action and pursuit of a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery are part of Defendants’ attempts to pressure and harass those who protect consumers from Defendants’ objectionable e-mails.

4. Comcast brings this counterclaim and third-party complaint to prevent Defendants’ ongoing assault on Comcast’s business and to hold Defendant liable for its unlawful acts.

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II. JURISDICTION

5. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. The Court also has federal question jurisdiction over the claims arising under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (“CAN-SPAM”) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”), jurisdiction being conferred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

III. PARTIES

6. Counterclaimant, Comcast, is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business located at One Comcast Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

7. Counterdefendant, e360insight, LLC (“e360”), is an Illinois limited liability company with a principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090.

8. Third-party Defendant, David Linhardt (“Linhardt”), is an individual residing at 500 Sumac Road, Highland Park, Illinois 60035. On information and belief, Linhardt is the president and founder of e360, the majority and only shareholder of Maverick, the owner of Ravinia Hosting, the president of Northshore Hosting (as these entities are defined below), and directs and controls the complained of activities of each of the named Defendants.

9. Third-party Defendant, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot and Northshore Hosting.

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10. Third-party Defendant, Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“Bargain Depot”), d/b/a bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com, is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Bargain Depot is a division of e360 and is wholly owned by Maverick.

11. Third-party Defendant, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC d/b/a Rocky Mountain Internet Services, LLC and Bay City Hosting, LLC (“Northshore Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is wholly owned by Maverick.

12. Third-party Defendant, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A. Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is owned and controlled by Linhardt.

13. Third-party Defendant, Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is an affiliate of e360.

14. Third-party Defendants, John Does 1-50, are companies or individuals with unknown identities and addresses that are business partners or affiliates of the other Defendants or provide services or assistance to, or facilitate the complained of activities of, the Defendants.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Comcast’s Cable and Internet Services.

15. Comcast, by or through its subsidiaries, is one of the leading cable and internet service providers in the country with over thirteen million high-speed internet subscribers.

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16. Consumers subscribe to Comcast High-Speed Internet services, in part, because of the stability, security and reliability of its network. Comcast’s network remains secure and reliable in part because the system is maintained by filtering out spam and preventing it from reaching subscribers’ inboxes. Comcast, using a proprietary and highly confidential system in accordance with industry standards, filters and otherwise limits spam from reaching subscribers’ inboxes (“Comcast’s Filtering System”).

17. Comcast’s Filtering System is a continually evolving system that relies on a variety of resources to determine whether an incoming e-mail is spam. These resources include third-party software, lists generated by anti-spam organizations, subscriber complaints, the sender’s reputation, and other highly proprietary and confidential systems and methods.

18. If an e-mail is filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering System, the sender receives an error message with a code and links to follow for instructions on why the e-mail was filtered out and how to address the issue that caused the e-mail to be filtered out.

B. Defendants’ Unlawful Activities.

19. Defendants market products and services using spam directed at hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of consumers, including Comcast’s subscribers.

20. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot, and Northshore, and directs and controls the sending of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails by Defendants.

21. On information and belief, Bargain Depot, among other things, provides knockoff, counterfeit or otherwise unauthorized goods marketed through mass e-mails sent by Defendants.

22. On information and belief, Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, Northgate, and John Does 1-50 (“Third-Party Marketers”) are in the business of registering domain names and
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IP addresses and sending spam on behalf of Defendants. On information and belief, the Third-Party Marketers also register IP and domain name addresses in their own name, often with private registry services, for the purposes of masking the true identity of the owners of the IP addresses and domain names, and the true parties responsible for sending spam.

C. Defendants’ Email Practices.

23. Defendants, acting together, have engaged in a concerted scheme to send millions of unsolicited commercial e-mails for their own commercial benefit, including to many thousands of Comcast subscribers.

24. Defendants have used numerous domain names and IP addresses to conceal their identities and scheme and to facilitate the sending of the unsolicited e-mails.

25. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails contain misleading or false header or subject line information.

26. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise, promote, and sell counterfeit or unauthorized goods supplied by Bargain Depot.

27. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise free” promotions when the goods or services are not, in fact, free.

28. On information and belief, not all of the intended recipients of Defendants’ commercial e-mails have opted in to receive such e-mail messages.

29. On information and belief, Defendants fabricate opt-in records of intended e-mail recipients.

30. On information and belief, Defendants have attempted to send hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers since as early as 2005, including e-mails advertising Bargain Depot’s counterfeit or unauthorized goods.
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31. Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out spam sent by Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers. On information and belief, Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out Defendant’s spam since as early as 2005.

32. On information and belief, when Defendants’ commercial e-mails have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology, Defendants have received an error message and link to follow to learn why their e-mails were filtered out and how to revise their e-mail practices so that Defendants’ e-mails may reach the intended Comcast subscribers.

33. To facilitate the business of the Defendants, Linhardt has made fraudulent misrepresentations to Comcast about the commercial e-mails sent by or through Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers.

34. For example, on January 6, 2006, Linhardt telephoned Comcast and falsely and fraudulently represented to a Comcast employee that all of the intended recipients of e360’s email messages have opted-in to receive such messages. Additionally, on March 4, 2007, Linhardt sent a letter to Arthur J. Block of Comcast making the following fraudulent representations: “All of the individuals requesting emails from us have signed up with us through web sites operated by us or by our partners. Our customers have all been through an opt-in process that exceeds all requirements in the provisions of CAN-SPAM.” The letter went on to notify Comcast of a default judgment obtained in this Court against a United Kingdom-based anti-spam operation, seeking to use that default judgment to coerce Comcast into allowing Defendants’ unsolicited e-mails through Comcast’s Filtering Technology. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

35. After e360 commenced this litigation, Comcast offered to work with e360 to review e360’s e-mail practices in order to evaluate the e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers and the
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reasons they have been filtered out. e360 refused the offer, asserting that it would learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System through discovery.

D. Defendants’ Abuse Of The Legal Process To Circumvent Anti-Spam Initiatives.

36. Spamhaus Project (“Spamhaus”), a non-profit Internet watchdog group located in the United Kingdom, generates and maintains the Register of Known Spam Operations (“ROKSO”) which is a collation of information and evidence on known professional spam operations that have been terminated by a minimum of three ISPs for spam offenses. Spamhaus also offers the Spamhaus Block List (“SBL”), which is a database of IP addresses that have been identified as the source of spam.

37. ISPs, such as Comcast, rely on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists as part of the process of filtering e-mails.

38. As early as 2006, e360 discovered that it was listed on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists and, as a result, numerous ISPs were blocking Defendants’ spam.

39. On June 21, 2006, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Skokie, Illinois, asserting claims arising from Spamhaus’ listing of e360 on its ROKSO and/or SBL lists. On information and belief, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in Illinois knowing that the Illinois courts did not have jurisdiction over Spamhaus for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam activities.

40. Spamhaus did not contest the action. As a result, the Northern District of Illinois (upon removal of the case) granted a default judgment and entered an order drafted by e360 requiring Spamhaus to “not take any action to cause email sent by [e360] or their affiliates, subsidiaries, or related companies ... to be blocked, delayed, altered or interrupted in any way ...
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unless Spamhaus can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff’s have violated relevant United States law” (the “Court Order”).

41. After the Court Order was entered, Defendants’ began marketing a new service called “IP Protection Services” to unrelated third-party e-mail marketers whose e-mail marketing messages were blocked by various ISPs, so that Spamhaus would be required to de-list those marketers from its lists.

42. The IP Protection Service entails modifying the third-party marketers’ IP addresses to appear as if they are e360’s IP addresses, or providing the third-party internet marketers access to e360’s servers for use in sending mass e-mail marketing messages through e360’s servers that have been de-listed with Spamhaus pursuant to the Court Order. e360 describes how it plans to use the Court Order to mislead Spamhaus:
“
As you know, the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN) assigns all IP address in the U.S. ARIN maintains a registry of all IP addresses on www.arin.net which acts as a kind of phone book for the Internet. When Spamhaus investigates the originating IP address for an email message, they rely heavily on the information provided by ARIN. E360’s IP Identity Management Solution effectively modifies the ARIN listing for your existing ip addresses and points them to one of our legally-protected entities. The result is immediate protection against Spamhaus listings as provided by the federal injunction. This solution protects against future listings, and also forces Spamhaus to remove any existing SBL listings.” [Emphasis Supplied]

Attached as Exhibit B are marketing materials issued by e360 advertising the IP Protection Service.

43. Once the third-party e-mail marketer enrolls in the IP Protection Services, Defendants use the Court Order to request that Spamhaus de-list the third-party marketers’ IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that the third party is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

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44. On information and belief, some third-party internet marketers who have enrolled in the IP Protection Service are purveyors of dpam.

45. On information and belief, a purpose of the IP Protection Services is to launder third-party spam that would otherwise be blocked through e360’s de-listed IP addresses and servers.

46. For example, e360 entered into an agreement with Virtumundo, Inc. (“Virtumundo”) on June 6, 2007, to provide the IP Protection Service. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Services Agreement entered into between e360 and Virtumundo.

47. On information and belief, Virtumundo sends spam.

48. After entering into the Services Agreement with Virtumundo, e360 demanded that Spamhaus de-list Virtumundo’s IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that Virtumundo is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

49. e360 and Linhardt have filed and threatened to file lawsuits in the Illinois courts against parties who call e360 and/or Linhardt a “spammer” or block e360’s e-mails. e360 and Linhardt routinely file, drop, and re-file these actions against the same parties. For example, e360 and Linhardt sued Mark Ferguson for defamation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in March 2007; voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice in May 2007; filed a similar lawsuit against Mark Ferguson in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, later in May 2007, dismissed it without prejudice in August 2007; and then refiled an action against Mark Ferguson in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in January 2008.

50. On information and belief, these litigation tactics are pursued for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam
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activities and to disrupt the ability of ISPs, such as Comcast, to rely on anti-spam data generated by Spamhaus and other anti-spam entities.

COUNT I
VIOLATION OF THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED PORNOGRAPHY AND MARKETING ACT (“CAN-SPAM”) OF 2003 – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)

51. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

52. Defendants regularly initiate the transmission of e-mails to Comcast subscribers and other consumers that contain false and misleading information about the origin of the e-mail, the author of the e-mail, and the IP address of the sender of the e-mail in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1).

53. Defendants regularly send e-mail messages that include originating e-mail addresses, domain names, and IP addresses that were obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations that are materially misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1).

54. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $100 for each violation in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(i).

55. Each of these violations of this section was committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

COUNT II
VIOLATION OF CAN-SPAM – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2)

56. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

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57. Defendants knowingly send and/or attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain subject headings that mislead the recipient, including, but not limited to statements regarding “free” consumer merchandise and the origin of designer or luxury goods, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a).

58. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages that violate § 7704(a) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $25 for each violation of this section in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(ii).

59. Each violation of this section has been committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

COUNT III
VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS ELECTRONIC MAIL ACT – 815 ILCS 511/10

60. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

61. Defendants send and attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain false or misleading information in the subject line, in violation of Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and the laws of various states.

62. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages violating the laws of various states, including 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and, therefore, Comcast is at least entitled to statutory damages of the lesser of $10 per e-mail message or $25,000 per day, in accordance with 805 ILCS 511/10(d).

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COUNT IV
VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT – 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)

63. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

64. Computers used by Comcast in its role as an ISP constitute “protected computers” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

65. Defendants have knowingly bombarded Comcast’s network and servers with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mails, causing Comcast’s network to operate more slowly, and reducing the service provided to Comcast’s subscribers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5) and 1030(g).

66. The damages suffered by Comcast as a result of e360’s conduct include the impairment of the integrity and/or availability of data, programs, systems, and/or information on Comcast’s protected computers. Comcast’s damages aggregate at least $5,000 in value in the year preceding the date of filing of this counterclaim and third-party complaint.

COUNT V
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

67. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

68. The computers, servers, and networks that support Comcast’s ISP services are the personal property of Comcast.

69. Defendants have intentionally and repeatedly obtained access to, and made use of, Comcast'’s computers, servers, and networks for their own economic benefit.

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70. Even after knowledge that e-mails were blocked by Comcast’s Filtering System, Defendants continued to bombard Comcast’s servers and networks with massive amounts of emails. This practice of repeatedly transmitting e-mail messages through Comcast’s network and servers constitutes a wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’s network and services in denial of Comcast’s rights to that property. Such wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’'s network and servers has deprived Comcast and its subscribers of the legitimate use of the network and servers.

71. Under the common law of the various states, including the State of Illinois, Defendants’ conduct constitutes trespass to Comcast’s chattels.

COUNT VI
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

72. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

73. By transmitting spam through Comcast’s servers and networks and to Comcast’s subscribers, Defendants have knowingly obtained, conferred, or retained economic benefits acquired at Comcast’s expense. This knowing acquisition of these benefits has occurred under circumstances that render it inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefits.

74. As a result of the Defendants’ unjust enrichment, Defendants should be ordered to compensate Comcast for the value of the wrongfully obtained benefits and ordered to disgorge all profits derived from the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers.

A constructive trust should also be imposed in favor of Comcast on all monies received by Defendants and on all profits generated by the Defendants’ illegal activities as a result of sending
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Spam, and on all real property, motor vehicles, and other personal property purchased with monies received by Defendants as a result of their illegal activities.

COUNT VII
ABUSE OF PROCESS

75. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

76. On information and belief, e360 knew when it filed the complaint in this action that Comcast is immune from Plaintiff’s claims under the Communications Decency Act, CANSPAM, and the laws of the various states including Illinois and Pennsylvania, and that Comcast is not a state actor subject to liability under the First Amendment.

77. On information and belief, e360 is pursuing this meritless legal attack for the improper purposes of: a) learning how to circumvent the lawful Comcast Filtering System; b) obtaining discovery, the purpose of which is to undermine the viability of filtering systems used by ISPs, including Comcast’s Filtering Systems, and to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

78. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, e360 knew of its claims as early as 2005, three years prior to the commencement of this litigation. e360’s Motion for Expedited Discovery is not proper in the regular prosecution of this proceeding. The discovery sought is not needed in an expedited manner, and the scope of the discovery evidences e360’s improper motivation to learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System.

79. e360’s misuse of the Court Order in the Spamhaus matter is an attempt to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

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80. e360’s threats to sue, and the multitude of suits already brought (and routinely dropped and re-filed) in Illinois, against those who have identified e360 and Linhardt, as a “spammer” or blocked Defendants’ commercial e-mails, have been pursued for the improper purpose of undermining the ability of Spamhaus and ISPs, such as Comcast, from legally identifying and filtering out spam.

81. As a result of e360’s abuse of process, Comcast has incurred significant expenses and damages, including but not limited to its attorneys’ fees and costs.

V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Comcast requests entry of judgment in its favor and against the Defendants as follows:

1. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and any persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them, from:

a. directly or indirectly sending unsolicited or unauthorized commercial emails, including but not limited to any such e-mails that reference or use in any way Comcast’s property, computers, domains, servers, networks, or users;

b. directly or indirectly circumventing Comcast’s Filtering System for the purposes of sending commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers;

c. directly or indirectly sending any commercial e-mail messages, whether or not lawful, unless and until each Defendant has certified to the Court and Comcast, and confirmed the certification at periodic intervals, that it and all their affiliates and business partners comply with the best practices set forth by the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (“MAAWG”) Sender Best Communications Practices, attached hereto as Exhibit D, or such other practices as this Court may deem appropriate to order; and

d. directly or indirectly profiting from any of the acts prohibited by paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c).

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2. Within ten (10) days of entry of any injunctive order, Defendants be required to file and serve an affidavit detailing the form and manner in which each has complied with the terms of the injunction;

3. An award of statutory, compensatory, and aggravated damages to Comcast;

4. Disgorgement of the Defendants’ profits and imposition of a constructive trust on all moneys received and all profits generated by Defendants’ illegal activities;

5. An award of Comcast’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and

6. An award of such other and further relief as may be just or equitable.

Date: March 18, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By: ___/s/ Douglas N. Masters___________________
Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark St., Ste. 2300
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 464-3100
Fax: (312) 464-3111
E-mail: [redacted]
Attorneys for Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Comcast respectfully demands a trial by jury of all issues in its counterclaim and third-party complaint that are triable by a jury.

Date: March 18, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By: ___/s/ Douglas N. Masters___________________

Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark St., Ste. 2300
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 464-3100
Fax: (312) 464-3111
E-mail: [redacted]
Attorneys for Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] Counterclaim.pdf03/20/08 12:01 am74.58 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhA.pdf03/20/08 12:01 am901.21 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhB.pdf03/20/08 12:02 am774.73 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhC.pdf03/20/08 12:03 am2.37 MB
[file] CounterclaimExhD.pdf03/20/08 12:05 am5 MB

ORDER on MOTION for Leave to File

MINUTE entry before Judge Honorable James B. Zagel:Motion for leave to amend pleadings and to add counterclaim and third party complaint 28 is granted.Mailed notice (drw, ) (Entered: 03/24/2008)

COUNTERCLAIM filed by Comcast Corporation against E360Insight, LLC.

THIRD party complaint by Comcast Corporation against David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, John Does 1-50.

THIRD PARTY SUMMONS Issued as to Third Party Defendants David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC.

Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint

The bar for this was pretty low, and so, to no one's surprise, it was granted. Thus, we have a repeat document. The Counterclaim and 3rd Party Complaint is no longer a proposed document. Comcast is now officially counter-suing e360Insight as well as David Linhardt and all of the socks in his drawers.

===============================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC
d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) brings this counterclaim and third-party complaint against e360insight, LLC, David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain
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Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, and John Does 1-50 (collectively, the “Defendants”).

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Defendants operate a business designed to facilitate the e-mail marketing of products and services through, among other things, the sending of unwanted, unauthorized, unlawful and/or otherwise objectionable commercial e-mail messages (generally referred to as spam”).

2. Internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as Comcast, with the assistance of others, filter e-mail messages to prevent spam from reaching consumers. It is essential to the operation of its ISP services that Comcast utilize the tools at its disposal, tools sanctioned by federal and state law, to protect its subscribers from receiving spam. About 90% of all e-mail sent to Comcast’s subscribers is spam. Comcast filters about 500,000,000 spam e-mails per day.

3. Spammers, on the other hand, try to mask their identities, the origins of their emails, and the nature of their services in order to deliver spam to consumers and to remain profitable. Defendants here utilize a variety of illegal and fraudulent activities to pursue their objectives, and have undertaken various efforts to obscure the nature, scope, and participants in their activities. Indeed, the filing of this action and pursuit of a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery are part of Defendants’ attempts to pressure and harass those who protect consumers from Defendants’ objectionable e-mails.

4. Comcast brings this counterclaim and third-party complaint to prevent Defendants’ ongoing assault on Comcast’s business and to hold Defendant liable for its unlawful acts.

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II. JURISDICTION

5. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. The Court also has federal question jurisdiction over the claims arising under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (“CAN-SPAM”) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”), jurisdiction being conferred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

III. PARTIES

6. Counterclaimant, Comcast, is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business located at One Comcast Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

7. Counterdefendant, e360insight, LLC (“e360”), is an Illinois limited liability company with a principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090.

8. Third-party Defendant, David Linhardt (“Linhardt”), is an individual residing at 500 Sumac Road, Highland Park, Illinois 60035. On information and belief, Linhardt is the president and founder of e360, the majority and only shareholder of Maverick, the owner of Ravinia Hosting, the president of Northshore Hosting (as these entities are defined below), and directs and controls the complained of activities of each of the named Defendants.

9. Third-party Defendant, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot and Northshore Hosting.

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10. Third-party Defendant, Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“Bargain Depot”), d/b/a bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com, is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Bargain Depot is a division of e360 and is wholly owned by Maverick.

11. Third-party Defendant, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC d/b/a Rocky Mountain Internet Services, LLC and Bay City Hosting, LLC (“Northshore Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is wholly owned by Maverick.

12. Third-party Defendant, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A. Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is owned and controlled by Linhardt.

13. Third-party Defendant, Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is an affiliate of e360.

14. Third-party Defendants, John Does 1-50, are companies or individuals with unknown identities and addresses that are business partners or affiliates of the other Defendants or provide services or assistance to, or facilitate the complained of activities of, the Defendants.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Comcast’s Cable and Internet Services.

15. Comcast, by or through its subsidiaries, is one of the leading cable and internet service providers in the country with over thirteen million high-speed internet subscribers.

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16. Consumers subscribe to Comcast High-Speed Internet services, in part, because of the stability, security and reliability of its network. Comcast’s network remains secure and reliable in part because the system is maintained by filtering out spam and preventing it from reaching subscribers’ inboxes. Comcast, using a proprietary and highly confidential system in accordance with industry standards, filters and otherwise limits spam from reaching subscribers’ inboxes (“Comcast’s Filtering System”).

17. Comcast’s Filtering System is a continually evolving system that relies on a variety of resources to determine whether an incoming e-mail is spam. These resources include third-party software, lists generated by anti-spam organizations, subscriber complaints, the sender’s reputation, and other highly proprietary and confidential systems and methods.

18. If an e-mail is filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering System, the sender receives an error message with a code and links to follow for instructions on why the e-mail was filtered out and how to address the issue that caused the e-mail to be filtered out.

B. Defendants’ Unlawful Activities.

19. Defendants market products and services using spam directed at hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of consumers, including Comcast’s subscribers.

20. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot, and Northshore, and directs and controls the sending of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails by Defendants.

21. On information and belief, Bargain Depot, among other things, provides knockoff, counterfeit or otherwise unauthorized goods marketed through mass e-mails sent by Defendants.

22. On information and belief, Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, Northgate, and John Does 1-50 (“Third-Party Marketers”) are in the business of registering domain names and
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IP addresses and sending spam on behalf of Defendants. On information and belief, the Third-Party Marketers also register IP and domain name addresses in their own name, often with private registry services, for the purposes of masking the true identity of the owners of the IP addresses and domain names, and the true parties responsible for sending spam.

C. Defendants’ Email Practices.

23. Defendants, acting together, have engaged in a concerted scheme to send millions of unsolicited commercial e-mails for their own commercial benefit, including to many thousands of Comcast subscribers.

24. Defendants have used numerous domain names and IP addresses to conceal their identities and scheme and to facilitate the sending of the unsolicited e-mails.

25. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails contain misleading or false header or subject line information.

26. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise, promote, and sell counterfeit or unauthorized goods supplied by Bargain Depot.

27. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise free” promotions when the goods or services are not, in fact, free.

28. On information and belief, not all of the intended recipients of Defendants’ commercial e-mails have opted in to receive such e-mail messages.

29. On information and belief, Defendants fabricate opt-in records of intended e-mail recipients.

30. On information and belief, Defendants have attempted to send hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers since as early as 2005, including e-mails advertising Bargain Depot’s counterfeit or unauthorized goods.
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31. Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out spam sent by Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers. On information and belief, Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out Defendant’s spam since as early as 2005.

32. On information and belief, when Defendants’ commercial e-mails have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology, Defendants have received an error message and link to follow to learn why their e-mails were filtered out and how to revise their e-mail practices so that Defendants’ e-mails may reach the intended Comcast subscribers.

33. To facilitate the business of the Defendants, Linhardt has made fraudulent misrepresentations to Comcast about the commercial e-mails sent by or through Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers.

34. For example, on January 6, 2006, Linhardt telephoned Comcast and falsely and fraudulently represented to a Comcast employee that all of the intended recipients of e360’s email messages have opted-in to receive such messages. Additionally, on March 4, 2007, Linhardt sent a letter to Arthur J. Block of Comcast making the following fraudulent representations: “All of the individuals requesting emails from us have signed up with us through web sites operated by us or by our partners. Our customers have all been through an opt-in process that exceeds all requirements in the provisions of CAN-SPAM.” The letter went on to notify Comcast of a default judgment obtained in this Court against a United Kingdom-based anti-spam operation, seeking to use that default judgment to coerce Comcast into allowing Defendants’ unsolicited e-mails through Comcast’s Filtering Technology. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

35. After e360 commenced this litigation, Comcast offered to work with e360 to review e360’s e-mail practices in order to evaluate the e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers and the
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reasons they have been filtered out. e360 refused the offer, asserting that it would learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System through discovery.

D. Defendants’ Abuse Of The Legal Process To Circumvent Anti-Spam Initiatives.

36. Spamhaus Project (“Spamhaus”), a non-profit Internet watchdog group located in the United Kingdom, generates and maintains the Register of Known Spam Operations (“ROKSO”) which is a collation of information and evidence on known professional spam operations that have been terminated by a minimum of three ISPs for spam offenses. Spamhaus also offers the Spamhaus Block List (“SBL”), which is a database of IP addresses that have been identified as the source of spam.

37. ISPs, such as Comcast, rely on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists as part of the process of filtering e-mails.

38. As early as 2006, e360 discovered that it was listed on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists and, as a result, numerous ISPs were blocking Defendants’ spam.

39. On June 21, 2006, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Skokie, Illinois, asserting claims arising from Spamhaus’ listing of e360 on its ROKSO and/or SBL lists. On information and belief, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in Illinois knowing that the Illinois courts did not have jurisdiction over Spamhaus for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam activities.

40. Spamhaus did not contest the action. As a result, the Northern District of Illinois (upon removal of the case) granted a default judgment and entered an order drafted by e360 requiring Spamhaus to “not take any action to cause email sent by [e360] or their affiliates, subsidiaries, or related companies ... to be blocked, delayed, altered or interrupted in any way ...
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unless Spamhaus can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff’s have violated relevant United States law” (the “Court Order”).

41. After the Court Order was entered, Defendants’ began marketing a new service called “IP Protection Services” to unrelated third-party e-mail marketers whose e-mail marketing messages were blocked by various ISPs, so that Spamhaus would be required to de-list those marketers from its lists.

42. The IP Protection Service entails modifying the third-party marketers’ IP addresses to appear as if they are e360’s IP addresses, or providing the third-party internet marketers access to e360’s servers for use in sending mass e-mail marketing messages through e360’s servers that have been de-listed with Spamhaus pursuant to the Court Order. e360 describes how it plans to use the Court Order to mislead Spamhaus:
“
As you know, the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN) assigns all IP address in the U.S. ARIN maintains a registry of all IP addresses on www.arin.net which acts as a kind of phone book for the Internet. When Spamhaus investigates the originating IP address for an email message, they rely heavily on the information provided by ARIN. E360’s IP Identity Management Solution effectively modifies the ARIN listing for your existing ip addresses and points them to one of our legally-protected entities. The result is immediate protection against Spamhaus listings as provided by the federal injunction. This solution protects against future listings, and also forces Spamhaus to remove any existing SBL listings.” [Emphasis Supplied]

Attached as Exhibit B are marketing materials issued by e360 advertising the IP Protection Service.

43. Once the third-party e-mail marketer enrolls in the IP Protection Services, Defendants use the Court Order to request that Spamhaus de-list the third-party marketers’ IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that the third party is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

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44. On information and belief, some third-party internet marketers who have enrolled in the IP Protection Service are purveyors of dpam.

45. On information and belief, a purpose of the IP Protection Services is to launder third-party spam that would otherwise be blocked through e360’s de-listed IP addresses and servers.

46. For example, e360 entered into an agreement with Virtumundo, Inc. (“Virtumundo”) on June 6, 2007, to provide the IP Protection Service. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Services Agreement entered into between e360 and Virtumundo.

47. On information and belief, Virtumundo sends spam.

48. After entering into the Services Agreement with Virtumundo, e360 demanded that Spamhaus de-list Virtumundo’s IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that Virtumundo is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

49. e360 and Linhardt have filed and threatened to file lawsuits in the Illinois courts against parties who call e360 and/or Linhardt a “spammer” or block e360’s e-mails. e360 and Linhardt routinely file, drop, and re-file these actions against the same parties. For example, e360 and Linhardt sued Mark Ferguson for defamation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in March 2007; voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice in May 2007; filed a similar lawsuit against Mark Ferguson in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, later in May 2007, dismissed it without prejudice in August 2007; and then refiled an action against Mark Ferguson in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in January 2008.

50. On information and belief, these litigation tactics are pursued for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam
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activities and to disrupt the ability of ISPs, such as Comcast, to rely on anti-spam data generated by Spamhaus and other anti-spam entities.

COUNT I
VIOLATION OF THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED PORNOGRAPHY AND MARKETING ACT (“CAN-SPAM”) OF 2003 – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)

51. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

52. Defendants regularly initiate the transmission of e-mails to Comcast subscribers and other consumers that contain false and misleading information about the origin of the e-mail, the author of the e-mail, and the IP address of the sender of the e-mail in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1).

53. Defendants regularly send e-mail messages that include originating e-mail addresses, domain names, and IP addresses that were obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations that are materially misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1).

54. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $100 for each violation in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(i).

55. Each of these violations of this section was committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

COUNT II
VIOLATION OF CAN-SPAM – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2)

56. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

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57. Defendants knowingly send and/or attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain subject headings that mislead the recipient, including, but not limited to statements regarding “free” consumer merchandise and the origin of designer or luxury goods, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a).

58. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages that violate § 7704(a) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $25 for each violation of this section in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(ii).

59. Each violation of this section has been committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

COUNT III
VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS ELECTRONIC MAIL ACT – 815 ILCS 511/10

60. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

61. Defendants send and attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain false or misleading information in the subject line, in violation of Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and the laws of various states.

62. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages violating the laws of various states, including 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and, therefore, Comcast is at least entitled to statutory damages of the lesser of $10 per e-mail message or $25,000 per day, in accordance with 805 ILCS 511/10(d).

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COUNT IV
VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT – 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)

63. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

64. Computers used by Comcast in its role as an ISP constitute “protected computers” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

65. Defendants have knowingly bombarded Comcast’s network and servers with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mails, causing Comcast’s network to operate more slowly, and reducing the service provided to Comcast’s subscribers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5) and 1030(g).

66. The damages suffered by Comcast as a result of e360’s conduct include the impairment of the integrity and/or availability of data, programs, systems, and/or information on Comcast’s protected computers. Comcast’s damages aggregate at least $5,000 in value in the year preceding the date of filing of this counterclaim and third-party complaint.

COUNT V
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS

67. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

68. The computers, servers, and networks that support Comcast’s ISP services are the personal property of Comcast.

69. Defendants have intentionally and repeatedly obtained access to, and made use of, Comcast'’s computers, servers, and networks for their own economic benefit.

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70. Even after knowledge that e-mails were blocked by Comcast’s Filtering System, Defendants continued to bombard Comcast’s servers and networks with massive amounts of emails. This practice of repeatedly transmitting e-mail messages through Comcast’s network and servers constitutes a wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’s network and services in denial of Comcast’s rights to that property. Such wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’'s network and servers has deprived Comcast and its subscribers of the legitimate use of the network and servers.

71. Under the common law of the various states, including the State of Illinois, Defendants’ conduct constitutes trespass to Comcast’s chattels.

COUNT VI
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

72. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

73. By transmitting spam through Comcast’s servers and networks and to Comcast’s subscribers, Defendants have knowingly obtained, conferred, or retained economic benefits acquired at Comcast’s expense. This knowing acquisition of these benefits has occurred under circumstances that render it inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefits.

74. As a result of the Defendants’ unjust enrichment, Defendants should be ordered to compensate Comcast for the value of the wrongfully obtained benefits and ordered to disgorge all profits derived from the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers.

A constructive trust should also be imposed in favor of Comcast on all monies received by Defendants and on all profits generated by the Defendants’ illegal activities as a result of sending
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Spam, and on all real property, motor vehicles, and other personal property purchased with monies received by Defendants as a result of their illegal activities.

COUNT VII
ABUSE OF PROCESS

75. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

76. On information and belief, e360 knew when it filed the complaint in this action that Comcast is immune from Plaintiff’s claims under the Communications Decency Act, CANSPAM, and the laws of the various states including Illinois and Pennsylvania, and that Comcast is not a state actor subject to liability under the First Amendment.

77. On information and belief, e360 is pursuing this meritless legal attack for the improper purposes of: a) learning how to circumvent the lawful Comcast Filtering System; b) obtaining discovery, the purpose of which is to undermine the viability of filtering systems used by ISPs, including Comcast’s Filtering Systems, and to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

78. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, e360 knew of its claims as early as 2005, three years prior to the commencement of this litigation. e360’s Motion for Expedited Discovery is not proper in the regular prosecution of this proceeding. The discovery sought is not needed in an expedited manner, and the scope of the discovery evidences e360’s improper motivation to learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System.

79. e360’s misuse of the Court Order in the Spamhaus matter is an attempt to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

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80. e360’s threats to sue, and the multitude of suits already brought (and routinely dropped and re-filed) in Illinois, against those who have identified e360 and Linhardt, as a “spammer” or blocked Defendants’ commercial e-mails, have been pursued for the improper purpose of undermining the ability of Spamhaus and ISPs, such as Comcast, from legally identifying and filtering out spam.

81. As a result of e360’s abuse of process, Comcast has incurred significant expenses and damages, including but not limited to its attorneys’ fees and costs.

V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Comcast requests entry of judgment in its favor and against the Defendants as follows:

1. A preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and any persons or entities in active concert or participation with any of them, from:

a. directly or indirectly sending unsolicited or unauthorized commercial emails, including but not limited to any such e-mails that reference or use in any way Comcast’s property, computers, domains, servers, networks, or users;

b. directly or indirectly circumventing Comcast’s Filtering System for the purposes of sending commercial e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers;

c. directly or indirectly sending any commercial e-mail messages, whether or not lawful, unless and until each Defendant has certified to the Court and Comcast, and confirmed the certification at periodic intervals, that it and all their affiliates and business partners comply with the best practices set forth by the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (“MAAWG”) Sender Best Communications Practices, attached hereto as Exhibit D, or such other practices as this Court may deem appropriate to order; and

d. directly or indirectly profiting from any of the acts prohibited by paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c).

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2. Within ten (10) days of entry of any injunctive order, Defendants be required to file and serve an affidavit detailing the form and manner in which each has complied with the terms of the injunction;

3. An award of statutory, compensatory, and aggravated damages to Comcast;

4. Disgorgement of the Defendants’ profits and imposition of a constructive trust on all moneys received and all profits generated by Defendants’ illegal activities;

5. An award of Comcast’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and

6. An award of such other and further relief as may be just or equitable.

Date: March 18, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By: ___/s/ Douglas N. Masters___________________
Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark St., Ste. 2300
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 464-3100
Fax: (312) 464-3111
E-mail: [redacted]
Attorneys for Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Comcast respectfully demands a trial by jury of all issues in its counterclaim and third-party complaint that are triable by a jury.

Date: March 18, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By: ___/s/ Douglas N. Masters___________________

Douglas N. Masters
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark St., Ste. 2300
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 464-3100
Fax: (312) 464-3111
E-mail: [redacted]
Attorneys for Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] Counterclaim.pdf03/20/08 12:01 am74.58 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhA.pdf03/20/08 12:01 am901.21 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhB.pdf03/20/08 12:02 am774.73 KB
[file] CounterclaimExhC.pdf03/20/08 12:03 am2.37 MB
[file] CounterclaimExhD.pdf03/20/08 12:05 am5 MB

MOTION to Dismiss

04/24/2008 10:15
America/Chicago

David Linhardt, and his various sock puppets, are now trying to dismiss Comcast's countersuit and 3rd party complaints. Among the complaints he makes is that Comcast did not attach even one single email to the complaint. That strikes me as a dangerous demand to make. I think that he could end up with reams of paper as a result. But, we'll have to wait and see.

There's also a claim about the statute of limitations because Comcast mentioned blocking email as far back as 2005. e360 claims that there is a two year statute of limitations. But, all Comcast has to do in order to avoid that is only continue with email that was sent within the last two years. That shouldn't be hard for them to find and weed out. My guess is, though, that they were only mentioning 2005 as the time period that the fly started buzzing around instead of all of e360's alleged spam being confined to 2005.

====================================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.
________________________________________
COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

MOTION TO DISMISS

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC (“e360”) and Third-Party Defendants David Linhardt (“Mr. Linhardt”), Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“BDE”), Northshore Hosting Company, LLC (“Northshore”), Ravinia
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Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia”) and Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”) (collectively “Defendants”) and by and through its attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Bartly J. Loethen of Synergy Law Group, LLC, and for their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), state as follows:

A. Introduction.

Counter-Plaintiff, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”), has filed a seven count counterclaim alleging causes of action based on multiple violations of 15 U.S.C. § 7704 et. seq., CAN-SPAM (Counts I and II), Violation of Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILCS 511/10 (Count III), Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (Count IV), Trespass to Chattels (Count V), Unjust Enrichment (Count VI) and Abuse of Process (Count VII).

The Counterclaim should be dismissed against Mr. Linhardt because it does not adequately identify the acts of Mr. Linhardt that give rise to finding personal liability for his actions as an officer or agent of the other Third-Party Defendants.

Counts I and II are premised on allegations that Defendants sent e-mail that contained false and misleading information about the origin of the e-mail, the author of the e-mail, and the IP address of the sender of the e-mail (Count I) and sent e-mails that contained subject headings that mislead the recipient (Count II). These Counts should be dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P 9(b) which requires that “all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” These Counts should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Count III, under the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, should be dismissed because for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 9(b) for the same reasons as Counts I and II should be
2
dismissed. Also, Count III should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Count IV should be dismissed because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitation proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) which requires any action brought under the act to be commenced within two (2) years of the date of the complained of act.

Count VI should be dismissed because Comcast has not adequately pled a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Comcast must allege that it is entitled to any monies earned by Defendants. Comcast’s failure to plead such facts renders Count VI fatally flawed.

To prevail on a claim of trespass to chattels, Counter-Plaintiff must allege and prove actual damages. Count V should be dismissed because Counter-Plaintiff cannot claim any actual damages arising from the alleged transmission of the e-mails at issue.

Count VII of the Counterclaim should be dismissed because the mere filing of a lawsuit, even with malicious intent is not a sufficient basis for the filing of a claim for abuse of process. Rather, Comcast would need to allege some actual misuse of the judicial process to state a claim for abuse of process.

B. Mr. Linhardt Should Be Dismissed Because He Is Not Liable For The Acts Of The Companies.

Under Illinois law, “corporate officers and directors are afforded a qualified privilege to use their business judgment and discretion on behalf of the corporation.” United Labs., Inc. v. Savaiano, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94034 *9 (N.D. Ill 2007); see also National Acceptance Co. of America v. Pintura Corp., 94 Ill. App. 3d 703, 706, 418 N.E.2d 1114, 50 Ill. Dec. 120 (Ill App. 2nd 1981) (corporate officers are generally not liable for the corporation’s torts). In cases, like this, where the director is acting “to further the corporation’s interest rather than his own” he is not liable. Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12665, *3 (N.D. Ill.
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1998). To overcome the qualified privilege, Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving “that the officer's conduct was unjustified or malicious, and therefore outside the scope of the privilege.” United Labs., Inc. v. Savaian, at *9; see also, Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 249, 552 N.E.2d 973, 987 (Ill. 1989) (corporate officers are not personally liable for the acts of the companies absent a showing that their actions as a corporate officer were done “without justification or maliciously.”) (disapproved on other grounds). Here, there are no allegations that Mr. Linhardt was acting in his own interests or that he acted without justification or maliciously. Mr. Linhardt is not personally liable for the actions of the Third-Party Defendant companies and he should be dismissed with prejudice from this litigation.

Mr. Linhardt recognizes that corporate officers are liable for fraudulent acts of the companies if they participated in the fraud. Allabastro v. Cummins, 90 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398, 413 N.E.2d 86, 45 Ill. Dec. 753 (Ill App. 1st 1980). The elements of common law fraud are: “(1) a false statement of material fact; (2) defendant's knowledge that the statement was false; (3) defendant's intent that the statement induce the plaintiff act; (4) plaintiff's reliance upon the truth of the statement; and (5) plaintiff's damages resulting from reliance on the statement.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 496, 675 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ill. 1996).

Here, Comcast has alleged none of the elements to support a fraud claim. While Comcast does make general accusations against Mr. Linhardt (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶¶ 33-34), the allegedly fraudulent statements made by Mr. Linhardt are not material to any of the causes of action alleged in the Counterclaim. Moreover, Comcast does not allege any reliance on the allegedly fraudulent statements nor does it claim any damages as a result of the allegedly fraudulent statements.

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Mr. Linhardt should be dismissed from the Counterclaim because the only acts alleged to have been undertaken by him were done within the scope of his employment as an officer of the company and any allegedly fraudulent statements made by Mr. Linhardt were not material to the causes of action asserted by Comcast.

C. All Third-Party Corporate Defendants should be Dismissed from this Action.

All third-party corporate defendants should be dismissed from this action. As with most of Comcast’s allegations in this Complaint, Comcast has asserted allegations only on “information and belief” regarding these entities and has done so only off of belief that such entities are in some way affiliated with e360. However, simply being a corporation that is affiliated or does business with e360 is insufficient to allow Comcast to maintain such frivolous accusations against these entities without any evidence of wrongdoing.

Each of these corporations are separate, individual corporations with separate business models and separate business functions. As such, they cannot be liable for the acts for other separate entities, even affiliated ones. A corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its corporate affiliates. Three Way Drywall, Inc. v. Spoons Restaurant, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2014, 1987 WL 8158 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (citing Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 86 Ill. 2d 188, 204, 427 N.E.2d 94, 101, 56 Ill. Dec. 14 (1981)). Thus, unless Comcast can show some action or wrongdoing in regards to each corporation beyond its “information and belief” pleading, all corporate defendants should be dismissed.

For example, Comcast merely alleges that Northgate is an affiliate of e360. Para. 13. Comcast makes no other allegations against Northgate. In fact, Northgate, as its name states, is an internet services provider that provides provide a full range of Internet services, including web hosting, bandwidth, co-location services, systems administration, application support and development, and IT consulting services. This has nothing more to do with sending of emails
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than Comcast has to do with the sending of emails by entities. This is essentially what Comcast has alleged with regards to all third-party corporate defendants and as such all should be dismissed.

D. Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting And Northgate Are Not Liable Under CAN-SPAM.

The third-party complaint alleges that Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, and Northgate are engaged in activities that make them Internet Service Providers. (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 22). The definitions of CAN-SPAM make clear that an Internet Service Provider enganged in the “routine conveyance” of allegedly offending e-mails is not deemed to have “initiated” the allegedly offending e-mail. see 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702 (9). Given that Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, and Northgate are internet service providers and there only involvement with the allegedly offending e-mails would have been the “routine conveyance”, the claims based on alleged violations of CAN-SPAM fail and must be dismissed with prejudice.

E. Comcast’s Allegations Under CAN-SPAM Fail as a Matter of Law.

Comcast’s counterclaim and third-party complaints are nothing more than a fishing expedition and should be dismissed. A party may not indulge in a fishing expedition or file a complaint on a rumor or a hunch. Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1992). This is exactly what Comcast has done. Comcast has filed complaints based on nothing more than suspicions and accusations without any evidence. This is clearly shown when the factual allegations are examined. Nearly fifty percent (50%) on the factual allegations alleged are upon “information and belief.”1

[1 Additionally, many of Comcast’s allegations stated within specific Counts are alleged on “information and belief.”]

Courts generally disfavor pleadings on “information and belief” because of Rule 11’s requirement that counsel make a reasonable inquiry before filing a complaint. Trans Union, LLC
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v. Credit Research Inc. et al., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7559 (N.D.Ill.) (J. Moran). Here, it appears that Comcast and its counsel have failed to make any attempt to support their frivolous allegations but rather pray that they will be allowed to fish for evidence long after the case has been filed in an effort to support their claims. Nor has Comcast provided any grounds for their suspicions. Rather, Comcast relies on mere speculation in their complaints. Such actions walk the line of Rule 11 and should not be tolerated.

Additionally, as Comcast’s CAN-SPAM allegations sound in fraud they are required to be pled under the heightened pleadings requirement of Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) applies to “averments of fraud,” not claims of fraud, so whether the rule applies will depend on the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Borsellino, et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F. 3d 502 (7th Cir. 2007). A claim that “sounds in fraud” – in other words, one that is premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct – can implicate Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. Id. Both of Comcast’s Counts under CAN-SPAM sound in fraud and should be held to Rule 9(b)’s heightened requirements.

Count I of Comcast’s Complaint is brought under 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1), which states:

ß 7704. Other protections for users of commercial electronic mail

(a) Requirements for transmission of messages.

(1) Prohibition of false or misleading transmission information. It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message, or a transactional or relationship message, that contains, or is accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. For purposes of this paragraph--

(A) header information that is technically accurate but includes an originating electronic mail address, domain name, or Internet Protocol address the access to which for purposes of initiating the message was obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations shall be considered materially misleading; (emphasis added).

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This language as well as Comcast’s factual allegations based on this language clearly sound in fraud as they require a violator of the statute to engage in fraudulent conduct designed to mislead or to obtain information through false or fraudulent pretenses. Hence, Comcast’s allegations based on “information and belief,” notably paragraph 25, must be plead under Rule 9(b).2

[2 Similarly, Comcast failed to plead any factual allegations in support of its claims under Paragraph 53 that accuses e360 of “regularly send[ing] messages that include originating e-mail address, domain names, and IP addresses that were obtained by means of false of fraudulent pretenses or representations that are materially misleading.” This Court need not accept blanket conclusory allegations stated without a shred of supporting evidence.]

Similarly, Comcast’s Count II is brought under CAN-SPAM, 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2), which states:

(a) Requirements for transmission of messages.

(2) Prohibition of deceptive subject headings. It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission to a protected computer of a commercial electronic mail message if such person has actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that a subject heading of the message would be likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message (consistent with the criteria used in enforcement of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45)). (emphasis added).

This language as well as Comcast’s factual allegations based on this language clearly sound in fraud as it requires a violator to have actual knowledge that the email they are sending will likely mislead its recipient. Hence, Comcast’s allegations must be pled under Rule 9(b). Comcast’s allegations, notably paragraph 26, is pled on “information and belief” and is insufficient under Rule 9(b).

While factual fraudulent allegations proffered on “information and belief” are not improper per se, they will only comport with Rule 9(b) if they are accompanied by an
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explanation as to why the facts are unavailable and a statement of the grounds for believing the existence of those facts. See, Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, Comcast has failed to state why they have pled on “information and belief”, why the facts alleged are unavailable or what grounds they have for believing their allegations to be true. Indeed, Comcast would have a hard time stating why they don’t have information related to their allegations or why the facts are unavailable to them considering Comcast claims both in its Motion to Dismiss and here that they filter emails based on content and have sophisticated means on identifying what is in emails so that they can block spam. If Comcast is so sure of the reasons they have blocked e360’s emails to its customers then why do they need to plead on “information and belief.” Why can’t Comcast provide the Court and Defendants with at least one email or shred of evidence to support their absurd claims?

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 9(b) imposes more stringent pleading requirements upon complaints charging fraud than on complaints charging other types of misconduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs must plead the circumstances constituting fraud in detail -- the "who, what, when, where, and how. .. ." DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941, 111 S. Ct. 347, 112 L. Ed. 2d 312 (1990). Comcast’s pleadings are essentially devoid of any detail. Thus, Comcast’s pleadings are insufficient as a matter of law and should be dismissed.

F. Comcast’s Allegations Under CAN-SPAM Fail to State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.

In Count I, Comcast alleges that Defendants violated CAN-SPAM’s requirements concerning the accuracy of header information. The Act provides “it is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message…that contains, or is accompanied by, header information that is materially false or
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materially misleading.” 15 U.S.C. 7740 (a)(1). Thus, Comcast must allege that Defendants have initiated and/or transmitted email messages to a protected computer with materially false or misleading header information.
Comcast has failed to so allege. Comcast’s allegations state only that “on information and belief, some of Defendant’s commercial emails contain misleading or false header or subject line information.” D. Comp. ¶ 25. There is no allegation that e360 materially mislead or used fraudulent means as required. Simple inaccuracies, if any existed at all, (which e360 denies) are insufficient to meet the CAN-SPAM. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc, 469 F.3d 348, 357 (4th Cir. 2006). Comcast’s failure to allege or attach even a single email to its Counterclaim and Compliant showing anything false or materially misleading regarding e360’s emails is indicative that this is nothing more than a fishing expedition.

Similarly, Comcast’s allegations that e360 has sent “hundreds or thousands, if not millions, of email messages” in violation of the Act while failing to provide even one single email showing a violation further shows that Comcast’s Counterclaim and Complaint is a fishing expedition meant only to intimidate and harass.

G. Comcast Fails to Properly Plead its Claim for Violation of the Illinois Electronic Mail Act and Fails to State A Claim Upon which Relief May be Granted.

Just as the CAN-SPAM Act is subject to Rule 9(b) pleading requirements so too should the Illinois Electronic Mail Act (hereafter “Illinois Act”), 815 ILCS 511/10. Under the Illinois Act, “No individual or entity may initiate or cause to be initiated an unsolicited electronic mail advertisement if the electronic mail advertisement…contains false or misleading information in the subject line.” 815 ILCS 511/10. Such language assumes violators will use knowingly false statements to induce recipients to act in reliance on such statements and that the recipients will
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thus be damaged. These are the exact requirements for Illinois common law fraud.3 Similarly, under 815 ILCS 511/15, the Illinois Legislature contemplated that a “violation of this Act constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.” Thus, Comcast’s allegations must be pled under Rule 9(b).
Comcast’s allegations are insufficient as a matter of law under Rule 9(b). Comcast pleadings are, as mentioned above, on “information and belief” without the proper statements as to why Comcast doesn’t have the information necessary to properly plead. This is especially troubling because Comcast throughout its own Motion to Dismiss claimed thorough knowledge of e360’s emails and their contents. Comcast’s Complaint of nearly fifty percent “on information and belief” pleading is nothing more than a fishing expedition and should be dismissed.
Comcast also failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Comcast is required to plead that e360 has sent or attempted to send unsolicited electronic mail advertisements that contain false or misleading information in the subject line. Comcast is also to plead that consumers relied on such statements to their detriment. Here, Comcast has pled “on information and belief” that “some of [e360’s] commercial emails contain misleading or false header or subject line information.” Para. 25 And that “on information and belief, not all of the intended recipients of [e360’s] commercial emails have opted in to receive such email messages.” Para. 28. So Comcast essentially pleads that “on information and belief” some of e360’s emails have been sent to consumers who didn’t want to receive them and some may have “on information and belief” contained false statements. Another way to view Comcast’s allegations is that e360 “on information and belief” sent emails with perfectly correct statements
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in the subject line to consumers who requested to receive them. Of course, since everything is on “information and belief” and Comcast offers nothing but conjecture it is hard to determine what is actually being plead.
Similarly, Comcast failed to plead that anyone relied on any statement made by e360 to its detriment. In fact, under Comcast’s statements no consumers have received e360’s commercial emails because Comcast has been blocking them since 2005. Para. 31. Comcast’s pleadings fail as a matter of law without such pleading. Comcast’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is grounds for dismissal of Count III.

[3 In Illinois, the elements of common law fraud are: (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) defendant's knowledge or belief that the statement was false; (3) defendant's intent to induce plaintiff to act; (4) plaintiff's reliance on the truth of the statement; and (5) plaintiff's damages resulting from that reliance. Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580, 591, 137 Ill. Dec. 635 (Ill. 1989).]

H. Count IV Should Be Dismissed As Barred By The Applicable Statute Of Limitations.

Count IV of the Counterclaims attempts to state a cause of action based on the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Comcast alleges: “Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out Defendant’s spam since as early as 2005.” (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 31). Comcast does not allege any subsequent wrongful acts.

§ 1030(g) states that “No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.” By Comcast’s own admission, it was aware of the allegedly harmful acts of Defendants as early as 2005. However, Comcast did not institute its claim based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 until March 18, 2008.

Comcast’s claim based on 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is barred by the statute of limitation imposed by § 1030(g) and should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. Count V Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State A Cause Of Action.

To prevail on a claim for Trespass to Chattels, Counter-Plaintiff must allege and prove actual damages. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 359 (4th Cir.
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2006). Nominal damages are insufficient to prevail on a claim for Trespass to Chattels. Id. see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P. 3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 cmt. e (1965)). Counter-Plaintiff’s Counterclaim makes clear that it suffered, at most, nominal damages and therefore Count V should be dismissed with prejudice.

Counter-Plaintiff alleges that it “filters about 500,000,000 spam e-mails per day”. (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 2). Counter-Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants “have attempted to send hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers since as early as 2005 …” Id at ¶ 30. Even assuming that Defendants sent 2,000,000 e-mail to Comcast’s subscribers, and assuming that all of the e-mail were sent on the same day, that would only account for .4% of all of the allegedly spam e-mail Comcast claims to receive on a given day. Accepting Comcast’s allegations as true demonstrates that the allegedly offending e-mails Comcast claims were sent by Defendants represent nothing more a nominal incursion and are therefore not actionable.

J. Count VI Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State A Cause Of Action.

Count VI of Comcast’s Counterclaim is based on the theory of unjust enrichment. In cases such as this, where the alleged unjust benefit flowed from a third-party, Comcast must allege “the benefit should have been given to [Comcast], but the third party mistakenly gave it to the defendant instead; (2) the defendant procured the benefit through the third party through some type of wrongful conduct; or (3) the plaintiff for some other reason had a better claim to the benefit than the defendant." HPI Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 131 Ill.2d 145, 160, 545 N.E.2d 672, 137 Ill. Dec. 19 (IL 1989).

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First, Comcast has failed to state a cause of action because it does not state what wrongful conduct, and by which parties, resulted in the acquisition of a benefit to which the Defendants are not entitled.

Assuming arguendo that Comcast did sufficiently identify the wrong, the claim still fails because a “defendant's ‘wrongful conduct’ alone will not support a claim for unjust enrichment under the second method if [Comcast] has no ‘claim' or ‘entitlement’ to the monies.” Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1234, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18877, *40 (N.D. IL 2005) See McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 210 F.R.D. 631, 642-43 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff did not allege that he paid any money to defendants). Here, Comcast does not make, and cannot make, a claim on any monies allegedly earned by Defendants through the allegedly harmful act of sending commercial e-mails to Comcast’s customers. For this reason, Comcast has failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and this Count VI should be dismissed with prejudice.

K. Count VII Should Be Dismissed Because The Mere Filing Of A Lawsuit Is Not Sufficient To Allege Abuse Of Process.

In order to state a cause of action for abuse of process, Comcast must allege “that defendants had an ulterior purpose for filing a lawsuit and that they acted in a way that was not proper in the regular prosecution of the suit.” Bonney v. King, 201 Ill. 47, 50-51, 66 N.E. 377, 378 (Ill. 1903). To satisfy the second element, the party asserting the cause of action “must allege that ‘process has been used to accomplish some result which is beyond the purview of the process or which compels the party against whom it is used to do some collateral thing which could not legally be compelled to do.’” Baldwin Piano, Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GMBH, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13425 *9 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (reversed on other grounds) quoting Doyle v. Shlensky, 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1128, 76 Ill. Dec. 466 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).

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“Illinois law unequivocally requires acts beyond the mere filing of a complaint to create a cause of action for abuse of process.” Marchese v. Dobry, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985 *5 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (emphasis added). Thus, the “mere institution of a legal proceeding, even without foundation and merely intended to harass the defendant, does not constitute abuse of process.” Wabash Publishing Co. v. Flanagan, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2102, 1990 WL 19977, *5 (N.D. Ill. 1990) see also Installation Servs. v. Elecs. Research, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29832 *21 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (The mere filing of a lawsuit [] is not enough to sustain a claim for abuse of process). An abuse of process claim “lies in the improper use of the legal process after it has been issued.” Wade v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15300 *7 (N.D. Ill. 2003). (emphasis in original). Finally, “Illinois courts have generally taken a very restrictive view of the tort of abuse of process [and] the word "process" has been given its literal meaning. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Plotkin, 255 Ill. App. 3d 870, 872, 627 N.E.2d 746, 748 (Ill. App. 3rd 1994). See also Doyle v. Shlensky 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 816, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1128, 76 Ill. Dec. 466 (Ill App. 1st1983), ("Process is issued by the court, under its official seal and must be distinguished from pleadings, which are created and filed by the litigants").

Comcast’s Counterclaim is void of any allegation that e360 has misused the legal process. Comcast’s only allegations relate to the allegedly ulterior purpose e360 had in filing the lawsuit. Nowhere does Comcast allege that e360 has done some act not proper in the regular prosecution of the suit.

Count VII of Comcast’s Counterclaim should be dismissed with prejudice because Comcast has not and cannot allege an improper act in the prosecution of its lawsuit against Comcast.

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WHEREFORE, Counter Defendant and Third-Party Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order dismissing David Linhardt from this action and dismissing all Counts with prejudice and any other relief this Court deems just.

Respectfully submitted,
Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants

By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys

Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotDismissCounterclaim.pdf04/18/08 11:13 am93.17 KB

RESPONSE to Motion to Dismiss

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,
DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC
d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
and
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMCAST’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Counterclaimant, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”), submits this memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Counterdefendant e360insight, and third-party defendants David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot
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Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC and Northgate Internet Services, LLC (collectively referred to as “Defendants”).

I. INTRODUCTION

Comcast’s claims address Defendants’ assault on Comcast’s subscribers, their inboxes, Comcast’s network, and the integrity and reliability of its Internet and e-mail services. Comcast’s Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint clearly alleges that Defendants are engaged in a scheme to market their products and services to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of consumers, through the sending of unsolicited, false, and/or misleading commercial e-mails, or spam. (See, e.g., Comcast’s Compl. ¶¶ 19, 23.) Comcast explicitly pleads that each Defendant participates in the scheme and sends spam on its own behalf as well as on behalf of and in concert with the other Defendants. (See generally Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 23-35.)

Comcast also alleges that, to facilitate their wrongful behavior, Defendants have taken extensive steps to hide their identities and the nature of their business activities and products. (Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 3, 22, 24, 42.) Naturally, since the purpose and result of Defendants’ conduct has been the concealment of their identities and involvement in the spam scheme, certain facts (and much of the evidence) showing the details of Defendants’ wrongful behavior are not presently within Comcast’s knowledge or control.

To distract the Court from Comcast’s well-pleaded allegations, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss urges incorrect legal standards, and mischaracterizes, ignores, and in some cases merely denies the clear allegations of Comcast’s Complaint.

Defendants are not entitled to dismissal simply by telling the Court that they have not done what Comcast alleges they have done, nor by pointing to the absence of certain magic words or labels in Comcast’s pleading. Comcast’s pleading complies with Rule 8, FED. R. CIV. P., and sufficiently states claims against each Defendant. For these reasons and the reasons discussed herein, Comcast respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants’ motion.

II. ARGUMENT

When deciding a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); McMillan v. Collection Professionals Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006). A court may dismiss a claim “only if the complaint fails to set forth ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)).

A. Comcast’s Pleading Complies With FED. R. CIV. P. 8

1. Comcast Need Not Plead Evidence in its Complaint

Ignoring federal pleading requirements, Defendants repeatedly fault Comcast for not presenting “evidence” to support its claims and suggest that failure to do so warrants dismissal. (See, e.g., Defs. Mot. pp. 5, 6, 9, 10.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Comcast: has no “evidence of wrongdoing” by the Third-Party Defendants (Defs. Mot. p. 5); filed its complaint “without any evidence” (Defs. Mot. p. 6), and that it failed to provide “a shred of evidence” to support its claims. (Defs. Mot. p. 9.)

Comcast is not required to plead evidentiary support in its complaint. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in setting forth the short and plain statement required by Rule 8(a), “specific facts are not necessary,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at ___, 127 S. Ct. at 2200, and this Court has stated that “a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.” Walker v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 491 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2007).

2. “Information and Belief” Allegations Are Proper and Sufficient

Defendants also argue – without support – that Comcast’s Complaint should be dismissed because Comcast has pleaded some of its allegations “on information and belief” (Defs. Mot. pp. 5, 6, 8, 9.) This Court has routinely held that allegations made “on information and belief” satisfy the short, plain statement requirement of Rule 8(a). See, e.g., Mitsubishi Electric Corp. v. IMS Technology Inc., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1904, 1912 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that plaintiff’s allegations were made “on information and belief”). “Information and belief” allegations are particularly justified here. Comcast has alleged that Defendants have intentionally obscured information about their activities, making such information particularly within their knowledge and control. For example, because Defendants send spam from a variety of IP addresses and domain names, registered to a variety of entities (masking the true owner of the IP addresses and domain names in question), Comcast cannot identify with certainty spam originating from Defendants without a list of all IP and domain addresses owned and controlled by Defendants. (See Comcast Compl. ¶ 22.) Defendants should
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not be allowed to complain that Comcast cannot pinpoint details of facts Defendants have made a concerted effort to hide.

3. Comcast’s Claims Do Not Require Pleading With More Particularity

Defendants assert that Comcast’s CAN-SPAM and Illinois Electronic Mail Act (“ILEMA”) claims “sound in fraud” and are therefore subject to the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). (Defs. Mot. pp. 7-9, 10-11.) Like most federal courts, this Court has yet to consider whether claims under CAN-SPAM and the state’s anti-spam laws are subject to heightened pleading requirements. District courts in Washington have considered the issue, however, holding that claims under CAN-SPAM and the analogous Washington anti-spam statute do not “sound in fraud.” Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., No. 06-0204-JCC, 2006 WL 3873368, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006); Gordon v. Impulse Mktg Group, Inc., 375 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1048 (E.D. Wash. 2005).1

[1 The Washington Commercial Electronic Mail Act is nearly identical to the ILEMA, prohibiting “the transmission of a commercial electronic mail message…that…contains false or misleading information in the subject line.” RCW § 19.190.020. Likewise, the ILEMA prohibits the sending of “unsolicited electronic mail advertisement if the electronic mail advertisement ...(ii) contains false or misleading information in the subject line.” 815 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii).]

In Virtumundo, the plaintiff claimed that defendants (also online marketing companies) had sent commercial e-mails containing materially misleading subject lines in violation of CANSPAM and Washington’s anti-spam statute.2 Acknowledging that the “materially misleading” subject line allegation could be considered an allegation of a false representation of material fact, the court nevertheless held that neither the claims nor the plaintiff’s factual allegations “sounded in fraud.” 2006 WL 3873368 at *3. The court ruled that plaintiff’s claim did not involve assertions akin to common law fraud, namely that defendants knew the subject lines were misleading, that they had the intent to deceive, nor that plaintiffs took action in reliance on the misrepresentations. Id. Accordingly, the court refused to dismiss plaintiff’s CAN-SPAM and related state claims for failure to plead in accordance with Rule 9(b). Id. Likewise, in Impulse Marketing, the Washington district court held that claims under Washington’s anti-spam statute do not “sound in fraud.” 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. As in Virtumundo and Impulse Marketing, Comcast’s claims under CAN-SPAM and the ILEMA, and the facts alleged to support these
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claims, are not “averments of fraud” subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

[2 Notably, Virtumundo is one of the companies that Comcast has alleged cooperated with Defendants to exploit the injunction obtained by Defendant e360 against anti-spam website and organization Spamhaus, by default. (Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 46-48.)]

Even if this Court were to construe Comcast’s CAN-SPAM and ILEMA claims as “averments of fraud” subject to Rule 9(b), Comcast has sufficiently pleaded these claims. It is well established that, under Illinois law, the requirements of Rule 9(b) are relaxed when, as here, the plaintiff lacks access to all facts necessary to provide the details of the claim because necessary information is particularly within defendants’ knowledge and control. Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S. ex rel. Kennedy et al. v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, 512 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1167 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Deluxe Media Services, LLC v. Direct Disc Network, Inc., No. 06 C 1666, 2007 WL 707544, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March 2, 2007); Interlease Aviation Investors II (Aloha) LLC v. Vanguard Airlines, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 898, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Trans Union, LLC v. Credit Research Inc., No. 00 C 3885, 2001 WL 648953, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2001). This Court has further recognized that a plaintiff is most likely to lack access to specific details when it makes allegations against multiple defendants engaged in a collective scheme. Vanguard, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (“‘[i]t is obvious that a plaintiff may not be privy to the workings of a group of defendants who have acted in concert to defraud him’”). Under the relaxed Rule 9(b) standard, this Court has held “information and belief” pleading can be enough. See Deluxe Media, 2007 WL 707544, at *4; Aventis, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.

Defendants are a group of at least six businesses and an individual engaged in a scheme to send unlawful e-mails. They facilitate their unlawful activities by concealing their identities, the nature of their activities, and the source of their spam. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 3, 22.)3 Thus, specific details about Defendants’ e-mail practices are particularly within Defendants’ knowledge and control, making it impossible for Comcast to allege such details in the Complaint. Although Comcast cannot identify all of the details, Comcast has set forth facts regarding the role of each Defendants in the spam scheme. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 7-14, 20-22.) Comcast has pleaded facts regarding the nature of the Defendants’ e-mails, the intended recipients of the e-mails, and the method by which the Defendants mask their identities and the
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sources of their spam. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 22-29.) Comcast’s Complaint demonstrates that Comcast has reasonable grounds for its suspicion that each Defendant has taken part in the spam scheme and that the spam violates CAN-SPAM and ILEMA, claims that Comcast reasonably anticipates will be brought out by discovery in this case.4

[3 In fact, because Defendants conceal their identities and the nature of their activities, Comcast has pleaded these claims not only against the named Defendants, but also against as yet unidentified parties.

4 Furthermore, Comcast’s Complaint satisfies the broad purpose of Rule 9(b) - to put Defendants on adequate notice of Comcast’s claims so that they may respond to Comcast’s Complaint. Defendants cannot play “hide the ball” and then claim they don’t know where the “ball” is. Rule 9(b) was not designed to encourage such tactics.]

If the Court finds that Comcast’s Complaint is not properly pleaded under the applicable standard, the appropriate remedy would be for the Court to grant Comcast leave to amend its Complaint, not dismissal.

B. Comcast Has Stated Claims Against Each Defendant

1. Comcast Has Adequately Pleaded Claims Against Linhardt

Comcast has alleged that Linhardt personally directs and controls Defendants’ activities (Comcast Compl. ¶ 8), has made misrepresentations to Comcast in furtherance of Defendants’ unlawful activities (Comcast Compl. ¶ 33), and has brought numerous frivolous lawsuits in further pursuit of the Defendants’ illegal scheme (Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 34, 39, 49). He is liable individually for the alleged torts.

The Seventh Circuit has held that where a corporate officer directs and controls the activities of his various companies, makes day-to-day decisions, and furthers an unlawful scheme to defraud consumers, the corporate officer is personally liable for such wrongdoings. FTC v. Bay Area Business Council, Inc., 423 F.2d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[a]s the mastermind behind the entire scheme… there is no question that [the corporate officer] had authority to control the defendant corporations” and was therefore liable for its unlawful activities).

Further, it is well-established that, under Illinois law, a corporate officer is liable for torts committed by his company if he participates in the tortious conduct. ITOFCA, Inc. v. Hellhake, 8 F.3d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1993); Veteran Supply co. v. Swaw, 548 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (Ill. App. 6th 1989); Nat’l Acceptance Co. v. Pintura Corp., 418 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ill. App. 2d 1981). Although Illinois courts have not specifically considered whether a corporate officer is liable for his company’s CAN-SPAM violations, a Washington District Court recently denied a corporate officer’s motion to dismiss a CAN-SPAM claim against him. Omni Innovations, LLC v. Impulse Marketing Group, Inc., No. C06-1469MJP, 2007 WL 2110337, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
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July 18, 2007). In that case, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, an officer, director and majority shareholder of his company, was directly liable for the company’s CAN-SPAM violations since he assisted the company in sending the unlawful e-mails. Id. On a motion to dismiss, the court held that because the plaintiff alleged that defendant participated in the sending of the unlawful e-mails, plaintiff had properly pleaded a claim for the officer’s personal liability under CAN-SPAM. Id.

Defendants’ caselaw is inapposite; it posits that a corporate officer enjoys a qualified immunity for the wrongs of his company under contract or torts related to contracts, not claims such as the ones alleged here. (See Defs. Mot. p. 3.) Nor is there any merit to Linhardt’s claims that he is shielded from personal liability because he is an officer of each of the corporate Defendants. Comcast is not seeking to hold Linhardt liable for torts committed by his companies simply because of his officer role. To the contrary, just as the plaintiff in Bay Area Business Counsel, Comcast has alleged that Linhardt is the mastermind of Defendants’ scheme – directing, controlling, and participating the sending of unwanted and unlawful e-mails. Linhardt is therefore personally liable for such activities. See Bay Area, 423 F.2d at 636.

2. Comcast Has Alleged That Each Third-Party Defendant Has Engaged in Unlawful Activities

Comcast has sufficiently pleaded claims against Maverick, Bargain Depot, Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, and Northgate (the “Third-Party Defendants”). Comcast recognizes (and in fact, has pleaded) that the Third-Party Defendants are each separate businesses. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Comcast is not seeking to hold them liable for the actions of any other Defendant, but for their own participation in the spam scheme.

Comcast clearly and explicitly alleges that each Third-Party Defendant has itself engaged in unlawful activities. For example, Comcast alleges as follows: “Maverick…directs and controls the sending of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails by Defendants” (Comcast Compl. ¶ 19); “Bargain Depot, among other things, provides knock-off, counterfeit or otherwise unauthorized goods marketed through mass e-mails sent by Defendants” (Comcast Compl. ¶ 20); “Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, Northgate and John Does 1-50 are in the business of registering domain names and IP addresses and sending spam on behalf of Defendants. [They] also register IP and domain name addresses …often with private registry services, for the purposes of masking the true identity of the owners… and the true parties responsible for sending spam.” (Comcast Compl. ¶ 22.)

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3. Comcast Alleges That Third-Party Defendants Are Engaged in More Than “Routine Conveyance”

Defendants’ assertion that Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting and Northgate are immune under CAN-SPAM is baseless. Comcast has clearly alleged that each of them registers domain names and IP addresses in their own name to mask other Defendants’ activities and to themselves send spam. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 22-30.) These activities go far beyond the “routine conveyance” of e-mails that is excluded from liability under CAN-SPAM.5 In addition, the CAN-SPAM Act makes clear that more than one entity can be liable for initiating an e-mail message.6 While each Defendant may have partaken in different parts of the initiation of spam e-mails, each can be held liable for violating CAN-SPAM, exactly as Comcast has alleged here.7 As such, Comcast has adequately pleaded claims against Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting and Northgate.

[5 “Routine conveyance” is defined under the CAN-SPAM Act as “the transmission, routing, relaying, handling, or storing, through an automatic technical process, or an electronic mail message for which another person has identified the recipients or provided the recipient addresses.” 15 U.S.C. § 7702(15).

6 15 U.S.C. § 7702(9) & (12); see also Omni Innovations, 2007 WL 2110337, at *2.

7 Defendants appear to make the silly argument that because Northgate’s corporate name contains the term “Internet Services,” this establishes the scope of its activities and, thus, its immunity from liability. This is yet another instance of Defendants ignoring the clear allegations of Comcast’s complaint, which state that Northgate is involved in far more than “routine conveyance,” regardless of what its corporate name might suggest.]

C. Comcast Has Sufficiently Pleaded The Elements of Each Cause of Action8

[8 While Comcast does not agree with Defendants’ characterization of its unjust enrichment claim, Comcast is willing to withdraw unjust enrichment as a separate cause of action without prejudice. At this juncture, the Court may consider Comcast’s unjust enrichment claim to be a claim for relief on the other substantive causes of action. However, because the facts surrounding Defendants’ conduct are yet to be fully explored in discovery, Comcast requests that the Court allow it to re-allege the claim at a later date should additional relevant facts be discovered.]

Comcast has adequately pleaded its claims for violation of the CAN-SPAM Act, the Illinois Electronic Mail Act (“ILEMA”), trespass to chattels, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), and abuse of process. In the service of their motion, Defendants ignore Comcast’s explicit allegations, and attempt to graft additional elements onto clear statutory causes of action.

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1. Comcast Has Stated Claims Under Section 7704(a)(1) of CAN-SPAM9

[9 Defendants have not challenged Comcast’s claim under Section 7704(a)(2) of CAN-SPAM. Thus, the Court can assume that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss does not seek dismissal for failure to state a claim under Count II of Comcast’s Complaint.]

Comcast has sufficiently pleaded facts to support its claim under Section 7704(a)(1) of CAN-SPAM. While acknowledging Comcast’s allegation that Defendants’ e-mails contain “misleading or false header or subject line information” (Comcast Compl. ¶ 25), Defendants argue that Comcast has failed to state a claim under Section 7704(a)(1) because “there is no allegation that e360 materially mislead[s]” the recipients of its e-mails. (Defs. Mot. p. 10) (emphasis added).

This court has reiterated that “there are no magic words required to survive a motion to dismiss.” McDorman v. Smith, No. 05 C 0448, 2006 WL 2355574, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2006). Even if lacking the supposedly magic word “materially,” a cursory reading of Comcast’s allegations shows that Comcast has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ e-mails contain “materially false or materially misleading header information” as required by 7704(a)(1). For example, Comcast alleges that Defendants conceal their IP and domain name addresses for purposes of sending spam and that such spam contains misleading and false subject lines. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 24, 25.) Such concealment qualifies as “materially misleading” in violation of Section 7704(a)(1) of CAN-SPAM. See FTC v. Bryant, No. 3:04-CV-897-J-32MMH, 2004 WL 2504357, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2004) (“‘materially,’ when used with respect to header information, includes the alteration or concealment of header information in a manner that would impair the ability…to identify, locate, or respond to a person who initiated the electronic mail message…”). Thus, taking the facts alleged as true, Comcast is entitled to relief under CANSPAM and this Court should not dismiss such claims.

2. Comcast Has Stated a Claim for Violation of the ILEMA

The plain language of Section 109(a)(ii) of the ILEMA is clear: a plaintiff must allege that defendant sent (i) an unsolicited e-mail advertisement that (ii) contained false or misleading information in the subject line. 815 ILCS 811/10(a)(ii). Without any support or basis, Defendants read the extra elements of knowledge, intent, and reliance into the ILEMA claim, speculating that “[s]uch language assumes violators will knowingly use false statements to induce recipients to act in reliance on such statements and that the recipients will thus be
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damaged.” (Defs. Mot. pp. 10-11.) Those elements are nowhere to be found in the ILEMA; Defendants have created them from whole cloth.10

[10 Defendants appear to argue that because the ILEMA was codified within the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”) it is subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement. (Defs. Mot. p. 11.) This Court has held, however, that the fact that a statutory claim falls under the ICFA does not, in and of itself, make it an “averment of fraud;” the ICFA prohibits not only fraud, but a broad array of unfair practices. See Gaddy v. Galarza Motor Sport L.T.D., No. 00 C 3893, 2000 WL 1364451, *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000).]

Although this Court has yet to apply the ILEMA, courts in other jurisdictions have applied nearly identical state anti-spam statutes without reading the extra elements of knowledge, intent and reliance into the claims. See, e.g., Virtumundo, Inc., 2006 WL 3873368 at *3; Impulse Mktg Group, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. Here, Comcast has sufficiently pleaded facts that establish Defendants send unsolicited e-mail advertisements containing misleading subject line information. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 24-29.) Therefore, Comcast has stated its claim under the ILEMA and this Court should deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

3. Comcast Has Adequately Pleaded a Claim For Trespass to Chattels

A long line of federal court cases, including before this Court, have expressly recognized trespass to chattels as a theory of liability against spammers. Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (allegation that defendant’s activities overburdened and diminished the functioning of plaintiff’s computer and connection supported a claim for trespass to chattels); see also America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (sending spam through AOL’s system constituted trespass to chattels); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., C-98 JWPVT ENE, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (same); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); America Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Systems, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-1652-A, 1998 WL 34016692, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998) (same); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (sending spam to plaintiff ISP’s customers damaged plaintiff’s system by demanding disk space, draining processing power, and imposing inconvenience and Internet connection costs on plaintiff’s customers).

Like other ISPs that have successfully alleged trespass to chattels claims against spammers, Comcast alleges that Defendants have deprived it and its subscribers of the legitimate use of its network and services by sending millions of spam e-mails through Comcast’s network. (See Comcast Compl. ¶ 23.) The sending of spam through Comcast’s network drains Comcast’s
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resources, degrades Comcast’s network, and interferes with Comcast’s ability to provide services to its subscribers. As set forth in the Complaint, Comcast expends significant resources protecting the integrity of its network by, among other things, filtering out Defendants’ spam. (See Comcast Compl. ¶ 2, 16, 17, 31.)11 In Illinois, this type of alleged harm supports a claim for trespass to chattels. See Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.

[11 Notably, Defendants have admitted that their e-mail practices include continually bombarding Comcast’s system by repeatedly attempting to send e-mail messages through Comcast’s network even after Comcast’s Filtering Technology has notified Defendants that their e-mails have been filtered out. (See e360 Compl. ¶ 18-19.)]

Defendants again attempt to distract the Court from the well-pleaded facts of Comcast’s Complaint by using the buzz words “nominal damages” to assert that Comcast’s trespass to chattels claim fails. (Defs. Mot. p. 13.) Despite Defendants’ reliance on Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 328, 360 (4th Cir. 2006), Illinois courts do not require allegation and proof of actual damages as Defendants assert, and expressly recognize that an ISP’s allegation against spammers that results in interference with the use of the network is enough to plead trepass to chattels.12 Sotelo, 384 F.Supp.2d at1230.

[12 Furthermore, Comcast’s Complaint alleges harm well beyond the harm alleged in Mummagraphics, 469 F.3d at 360. In that case, the Fourth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for trespass to chattels based on the sending of only eleven e-mails to its computers. Id. The Court held the sending of only eleven e-mails was insufficient to support a claim not only because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence supporting anything more than “nominal damages,” but also because Oklahoma law had not recognized trespass to chattels as a theory of liability against spammers. Id. In contrast, Illinois courts do expressly recognize trespass to chattels in cases like this one, and Comcast has alleged that Defendants send millions of e-mails a day to its subscribers. (See Comcast Compl. ¶ 23, 30.) In any event, Comcast’s allegations are not based solely on the number of spam e-mails sent by Defendants, but also on factors such as the nature of, and the means by which Defendants send spam. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 23-32.)]

4. Comcast’s CFAA Claim is Not Barred By The Statute of Limitations

In its own Complaint, e360 alleged that it sent e-mails (and thereby accessing Comcast’s “protected computers”) as recently as August 23, 2007 and December 11, 2007. (e360 Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18.) Now, Defendants claim that Comcast’s CFAA claim is time-barred by the two year statute of limitations. Comcast alleges that Defendants have been accessing Comcast’s protected computers “since 2005,” with the clear implication that their activities have continued from 2005 to the present. (Comcast Compl. ¶ 31.) Certainly, claims arising from Defendants’ activities in
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2007 are not barred by the two year statute of limitations.13 Moreover, statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and not properly subject of a motion to dismiss. Doe v. GTE, 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003).

[13 The CFAA provides that the statue of limitations begins to run either on the date of the act complained of or upon discovery of the cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1030(g). Here, Comcast could not reasonably have discovered that e360 and Defendants were unlawfully accessing Comcast’s protected computers prior to 2006 when Linhardt contacted Comcast. Comcast receives more than 500,000,000 spam e-mails daily and Defendants conceal the source of their spam e-mails. Moreover, despite Defendants’ assertions to the contrary, Comcast has not admitted being “aware” of Defendants’ activities since 2005; Comcast only learned that Defendants have been sending spam to Comcast’s protected computers since 2005 from 360’s January 15, 2008, Complaint.]

5. Comcast Has Properly Alleged Its Abuse of Process Claim Against e360 and Linhardt

Once again, Defendants ignore the well-pleaded allegations of Comcast’s abuse of process claim to mischaracterize the scope of the allegations. Comcast has alleged numerous facts regarding e360 and Linhardt’s actions far beyond merely filing a lawsuit. (Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 36-50, ¶¶ 76-80.) Comcast complains that e360 and Linhardt filed its frivolous lawsuit against Comcast with the ulterior motive of circumventing Comcast’s Filtering Technology, and that they have taken additional steps in furtherance of this motive. For example, e360 moved for a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery regarding stale three-year old claims. e360 then refused Comcast’s offer to evaluate e360’s e-mails, indicating it would use what it learned in discovery to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering Technology. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 35, 76, 77, 78).

It is simply not true that “Comcast’s only allegations relate to the allegedly ulterior purpose e360 had in filing the lawsuit.” (Defs. Mot. p. 15.) Comcast has alleged that e360’s lawsuit is part of e360 and Linhardt’s pattern of filing frivolous lawsuits, using the legal system to intimidate ISPs, anti-spam organizations, and individuals dedicated to fighting spam, all for the purpose of undermining their legitimate and sanctioned anti-spam initiatives. (See Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 49, 50, 79, 80.) Comcast has alleged that e360 marketed or sold the injunction it obtained by default in the e360 v. Spamhaus proceeding in this Court (Comcast Compl. ¶¶ 36- 50); surely selling an injunction entered by this Court to unrelated third parties to enable those parties to circumvent anti-spam measures relied upon by Comcast constitutes abuse of process.

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Taking these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Comcast’s favor, Comcast has properly pleaded a claim for abuse of process against e360 and Linhardt.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Comcast respectfully asks the Court to deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Comcast’s Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. In the alternative, to the extent the Court finds any deficiencies in Comcast’s pleading, Comcast respectfully suggests that any such deficiencies are merely technical, and that it be given leave to replead.

Dated: May 8, 2008

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By:__/s/ Douglas N. Masters_________________
Douglas N. Masters
Sharon A. Ceresnie
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, Illinois 60610
[redacted]
Attorneys for Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotDismissCounterclaimResponse.pdf05/09/08 4:43 pm76.75 KB

Reply to Response to MOTION to Dismiss

Well, we will have to wait an see what happens in this case. e360 has finally managed to bring some colorable caselaw to bear on its case. Most of it is persuasive (meaning "non-binding" rather than "Oh man! They must be right!") precedent from other district courts, especially the parts where they are trying to throw out the case because Comcast didn't THUNK down a ream's worth of paper demonstrating what spam they have been able to find that came from e360. Maybe it will persuade this judge.

I suspect that the most likely outcome will be that Mr. Linhardt may be dismissed from the suit temporarily, but everything else stays in at least through discovery. If Comcast is able to dig up some stuff in discovery that shows him as a puppetmaster pulling strings by creating a large number of shell LLCs in order to avoid liability under CAN-SPAM, then he's probably back in to stay.

-----------------------------------------
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,

DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC (“e360”) and Third-Party Defendants David Linhardt (“Mr. Linhardt”), Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), Bargain
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Depot Enterprises, LLC (“BDE”), Northshore Hosting Company, LLC (“Northshore”), Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia”) and Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”) (collectively, including Mr. Linhardt, “Counter-Defendants”) and by and through their attorneys, Carla E. Buterman of the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Bartly J. Loethen of Synergy Law Group, LLC, and for their Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), state as follows:

A. Introduction.

The counter claim should be dismissed in its entirety. Mr. Linhardt should be dismissed because he is not liable for the torts of the companies he directs unless he did so in his own interests, without justification or maliciously – which, he did not. The third-party defendants should be dismissed because Counter-Plaintiff has not stated causes of action against them. Counts I, II and III should be dismissed because Counter-Plaintiff has failed to plead with the requisite particularity. Count IV fails because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitation. Count VI should be dismissed for failure to adequately plead a cause of action. Count V should be dismissed because Counter-Plaintiff cannot claim any actual damages arising from the alleged transmission of the e-mails at issue. And count VII of the Counterclaim should be dismissed because the mere filing of a lawsuit, even with malicious intent is not a sufficient basis for the filing of a claim for abuse of process.

B. Mr. Linhardt Should Be Dismissed Because He Is Not Liable For The Acts Of The Companies.

Counter-Plaintiff claims that Mr. Linhardt is liable for his participation in allegedly fraudulent activity. However, Counter-Plaintiff fails to plead that Mr. Linhardt was doing anything other than directing the companies in a manner he thought best advanced the companies’ interest. Under Illinois law, where the director is acting “to further the corporation’s
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interest rather than his own” he is not liable. Pikes v. Riddle, 38 F. Supp. 2d 639, 640, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12665, *3 (N.D. Ill. 1998). To overcome the qualified privilege, Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and proving “that the officer's conduct was unjustified or malicious, and therefore outside the scope of the privilege.” United Labs., Inc. v. Savaian, at *9; see also, Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 249, 552 N.E.2d 973, 987 (Ill. 1989). Counter-Plaintiff has made and cannot make any allegations that Mr. Linhardt was acting in his own interests, without justification or maliciously. Mr. Linhardt is not personally liable for the actions of the Third-Party Defendant companies and he should be dismissed with prejudice from this litigation.
Even if this Court determines that Counter-Plaintiff has pled the elements necessary to seek recovery from Mr. Linhardt personally, they have certainly not done so with the particularity of Rule 9(b). Mr. Linhardt is only responsible if he participated in the allegedly fraudulent activity. To state a claim based on fraud against Mr. Linhardt, Comcast must allege: “(1) a false statement of material fact; (2) defendant's knowledge that the statement was false; (3) defendant's intent that the statement induce the plaintiff act; (4) plaintiff's reliance upon the truth of the statement; and (5) plaintiff's damages resulting from reliance on the statement.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 496, 675 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ill. 1996). Comcast has not alleged the necessary elements of fraud and therefore Mr. Linhard should be dismissed from this lawsuit.

C. All Third-Party Corporate Defendants should be Dismissed from this Action.

The third-party defendants are not liable for any of the alleged causes of action based solely on their alleged affiliation with e360. Rather, Counter-Plaintiff must allege causes of action based on the independent actions of each individual defendant. Counter-Plaintiff has failed to do so and each of the third-party defendants should be dismissed from this action. Moreover, any allegations made against the third-party defendants for violations of CAN-SPAM
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should be dismissed because CAN-SPAM imposes liability on the sender of an offending e-mail. A sender “means a person who initiates such a message and whose product, service, or Internet web site is advertised or promoted by the message.” 15 USCS § 7702(16)(a) (emphasis added). Here, there are no allegations that the third-party defendants initiated or advertised, let alone that they did both. Finally, Counter-Plaintiff alleges that Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, and Northgate are engaged in activities that make them Internet Service Providers. (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 22). Under the CAN-SPAM definitions, Internet Service Providers engaged in the “routine conveyance” of allegedly offending e-mails is not deemed to have “initiated” the allegedly offending e-mail. see 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702 (9). Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, and Northgate, as alleged by Counter-Plaintiff, are internet service providers and the mere “routine conveyance” of the allegedly offending e-mails requires that the claims based on alleged violations of CAN-SPAM must be dismissed with prejudice.

D. Counts I, II And III Should Be Dismissed For Failing To Comply With Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure 9(b).

Counter-Plaintiff’s CAN-SPAM allegations and its claim based on a violation of Illinois Electronic Mail Act (“ILEMA”) sound in fraud and are required to be pled under the heightened pleadings requirement of Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b) applies to “averments of fraud,” not claims of fraud, so whether the rule applies will depend on the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Borsellino, et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F. 3d 502 (7th Cir. 2007). A claim that “sounds in fraud” – in other words, one that is premised upon a course of fraudulent conduct – can implicate Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. Id. Both of Counter-Plaintiff’s Counts under CAN-SPAM sound in fraud and should be held to Rule 9(b)’s heightened requirements.
Counter-Plaintiff argues that this Court should follow a single case where a court held that alleged CAN-SPAM violations are not required to be pled with particularity. However,
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other courts have ruled that a party must allege, with the specificity required by Rule 9(b), all allegations arising under CAN-SPAM. see Silverstein v. E360insight, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36858 *3-4 (C.D. Cal. 2008), Asis Internet Servs. v. Optin Global, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73669 *7 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Both of Counter-Plaintiff’s Counts under CAN-SPAM sound in fraud and should be held to Rule 9(b)’s heightened requirements.

Likewise, Counter-Plaintiff’s claims under ILEMA sound in fraud and should be dismissed for failure to plead with the requisite particularity. Under the Illinois Act, “No individual or entity may initiate or cause to be initiated an unsolicited electronic mail advertisement if the electronic mail advertisement…contains false or misleading information in the subject line.” 815 ILCS 511/10. The legislature could not have been more clear when it stated that under 815 ILCS 511/15, a “violation of this Act constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.” There can be no argument that Counter-Plaintiff’s claim based on a violation of ILEMA must be pled under Rule 9(b).

Counter-Plaintiff disingenuously argues that if it is in fact required to plead with particularity, it should be forgiven for its failure because the information needed regarding the allegedly fraudulent conduct is in the possession of the Counter-Defendants. This argument is laughable. The gravamen of Comcast’s counterclaim is that the counter defendant and third party defendants sent e-mail to Counter-Plaintiff’s servers. How can Counter-Plaintiff claim that it does not have access to the allegedly offending e-mails? They can’t and this argument should be dismissed by the Court.

Counts I, II and III should each be dismissed for failure to plead with the particularity required by Rule 9(b).

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E. Comcast’s Allegations Under CAN-SPAM Fail to State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted.

Counter-Plaintiff’s Response does not address its failure to plead, in Count I, that Defendants initiated and/or transmitted email messages to a protected computer with materially false or misleading header information. Rather, Counter-Defendants seeks to ask this Court to read beyond what it alleges and infer the necessary pleading requirement. This Court should reject that request as Counter-Plaintiff repeatedly demonstrated that it does not have a basis for any of its claim and instead relies on repeated use of “on information and belief”. However, there are no allegations that e360, or any of the defendants, materially mislead or used fraudulent means as required. Moreover, simple inaccuracies are insufficient to meet the CAN-SPAM. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc, 469 F.3d 348, 357 (4th Cir. 2006). The failure to attach any of the allegedly offending e-mails demonstrates the specious nature of Counter-Plaintiff’s claims.

F. Count IV Should Be Dismissed As Barred By The Applicable Statute Of Limitations.

Once again, Counter-Plaintiff seeks to have this Court accept an “implication” of the required elements of a cause of action. Specifically, Counter-Plaintiff claims that its CFAA claim is not time barred because its allegation that “Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out Defendant’s spam since as early as 2005.” (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 31) should be read to include e-mails sent after that date. However, one is left to guess as to the dates on which Counter-Plaintiff claims Counter-Defendants sent the allegedly offending e-mails. The fact is that § 1030(g) states that “No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.” Counter-Plaintiff was aware of the allegedly harmful acts of Counter-Defendants as early as 2005. Certainly, any claim based on the 2005 e-mails is time barred. Whether there are
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any allegedly offending e-mails after 2005 is a mystery to Counter-Defendants and is not contained in the counterclaim. However, Counter-Plaintiff did not institute its claim based on alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 until March 18, 2008. Counter-Plaintiff’s claim based on 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is barred by the statute of limitation imposed by § 1030(g) and should be dismissed with prejudice.

G. Count V Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State A Cause Of Action.

Counter-Plaintiff’s response demonstrates its inability to allege and prove actual damages. Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 359 (4th Cir. 2006). Moreover, Counter-Plaintiff seeks to distract this Court by suggesting that “nominal damages” are buzz words that are not significant. However, Counter-Plaintiff cannot refute that nominal damages are insufficient to prevail on a claim for Trespass to Chattels. Id. see also Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 71 P. 3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218 cmt. e (1965)).

Counter-Plaintiff makes no response to the fact that even assuming that Counter-Defendants sent 2,000,000 a day (a number Counter-Plaintiff cannot substantiate), that would only represent .4% of the allegedly offending e-mails Counter-Plaintiff filters per day. (ECF Doc. No. 28-2 at ¶ 2). Accepting Counter-Plaintiff’s allegations as true demonstrates that the allegedly offending e-mails Counter-Plaintiff claims were sent by Counter-Defendants represent nothing more a nominal incursion and are therefore not actionable.

H. Count VI Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State A Cause Of Action.

Counter-Plaintiff literally makes no argument in support of is claim based on the theory of unjust enrichment and Counter-Defendants assume Counter-Plaintiff concedes that it does not have a valid claim for unjust enrichment.

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I. Count VII Should Be Dismissed Because The Mere Filing Of A Lawsuit Is Not Sufficient To Allege Abuse Of Process.

Again, Counter-Plaintiff makes no response to the case law cited by Counter-Defendants. Rather, Counter-Plaintiff seeks to distract this Court with allegations of Counter-Defendants actions in other lawsuits. Specifically, Counter-Plaintiff alleges the filing of other frivolous lawsuits; the alleged marketing of services based on an injunction in another lawsuit. What Counter-Plaintiff fails to do is identify any “improper use of the legal process after it has been issued.” Wade v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15300 *7 (N.D. Ill. 2003). (emphasis in original).

Count VII of Counter-Plaintiff’s Counterclaim should be dismissed with prejudice because Counter-Plaintiff has not and cannot allege an improper act in the prosecution of its lawsuit against Counter-Plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, Counter Defendant and Third-Party Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order dismissing David Linhardt from this action and dismissing all Counts with prejudice and any other relief this Court deems just.

Respectfully submitted,
Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants

By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys

Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotDismissCounterclaimReply.pdf05/23/08 9:10 am53.86 KB

Ruling on Motion to Dismiss

It's not going to be a good day for you anytime that a ruling starts off by calling your request "largely misguided".

For Linhardt, personally, this is a really, really bad day. The part of his motion that I thought had the biggest chance of being granted was the part against him personally. But, alas, that too remains. "It is difficult to seek shelter in this rule when one is alleged to be the whole owner and controller of the all the corporations involved, as is the case here."

==============================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counter-Claimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counter-Defendant,

DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY,
LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN
INTERNET SERVICES, LLC and BAY
CITY HOSTING, LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES,
LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I have before me a largely misguided motion to dismiss a counterclaim which I mostly deny. The complaint alleges1 that Counter-Defendants engaged in a concerted scheme to send millions of unsolicited commercial e-mails to many Comcast subscribers, using numerous domain names and IP addresses to conceal their own identities. Information and belief are the basis for the further allegations that some of those e-mails contain misleading headers or subject lines, that some of them promote and sell counterfeit goods or offer 'free' goods or services which are not free, and that some recipients have not opted in to receive such e-mails. When Comcast or others attempt to stop Counter-Defendants' spam, or call them "spammers", Counter-Defendants Linhardt and e360 filed and threatened to file suit. After filing, they routinely drop and re-file such suits, all this to undermine legitimate efforts to control spam.

[1 Many allegations are based on information and belief because, Comcast claims, Counter-Defendants deliberately conceal facts about their business. At the heart of this argument lies specific allegations not founded on information and belief. The complaint says Counter-Defendants "market products and services using spam," that "[s]pammers . . . try to mask their identities, the origins of their e-mails and the nature of their services" and that Counter-Defendants "have undertaken various efforts to obscure the nature, scope and participants in their activities." These allegations justify the extensive use of "information and belief" allegations.]

The causes of action are two under the Federal CAN-SPAM laws which bar spam. There is a cognate state law, the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, which also bars spam. The Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act makes illegal actions which interfere with the proper functioning of Internet service providers like Comcast. The sending of a large volume of spam e-mails does just that, (and is alleged to have done so here) by slowing the servicing of other non-spam emails.

These counts (I-IV) are attacked on the grounds that they involve fraud and are not pled with the requisite particularity required by Rule 9(b). Counter-Defendants assume that all
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misrepresentation (think of it here as "flying under false colors") is fraud, but this is not so. Liability for misrepresentation does not require, in all cases, that there was intent to misrepresent or that someone relied on the misrepresentation and was damaged thereby. In civil cases at least, the law can impose an obligation upon, say, a broadcaster, to take reasonable steps to insure that it is not aiding and abetting misrepresentation. Under CAN-SPAM, concealment of IP and domain name addresses can be, and is alleged to be, materially misleading. The same is true under Illinois law. The elements of fraud appear not to be the elements of these laws.

Trespass to chattels (Count V) is appropriate as a claim - the chattel being Comcast’s system, the trespass being the unconsented to use by Counter-Defendants, and the damage being the degrading of the Comcast network. The Computer Fraud and Abuse claim is not, on its face, barred by statute of limitations since Counter-Defendants allege in their claim against Comcast that it sent e-mails less than two years ago.

The abuse of process claim also stands. Abuse of process occurs when one uses the legal system for an improper purpose. In other words, one abuses process by taking actions within the legal system that, but for improper purpose, would be lawful. The law varies from state to state, but usually filing a lawsuit and serving process are enough to trigger the tort. The allegations do say that Counter-Defendants file lawsuits, dismiss them, and re-file, but the allegations do not say that process was served. There is, however, at least one case in which process was served and the allegations of abusive filings would, as a matter of evidence, support a charge that there was an improper purpose in the one or more cases where process was served. Thus, Count VII survives.

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Count VI for unjust enrichment is not defended, and I dismiss it. I do recognize that discovery may entitle Counter-Defendants to re-plead this count and I will not now bar them from doing so in the future, although they may file a new version of an unjust enrichment claim only with leave of court.

This leaves the final point, which seeks dismissal of the only natural person among the Counter-Defendants, Linhardt. What is offered to support his dismissal from the claims is the rule which protects corporate officers from personal liability for misdeeds of the corporation. However, this rule does not cover corporate officers who are alleged to direct and control the corporation. It is difficult to seek shelter in this rule when one is alleged to be the whole owner and controller of the all the corporations involved, as is the case here. And there are allegations of specific actions by Linhardt which would establish his liability, i.e., that he deliberately lied to Comcast when he orally stated that all intended e-mail recipients have opted in to receive the emails and that he ordered the abuse of process.

The motion to dismiss is denied as to all counts except Count VI.

ENTER:
James B. Zagel
United States District Judge
DATE: July 2, 2008

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotDismissCounterclaimRuling.pdf07/02/08 8:34 pm49.74 KB

Consent Decree and Settlement Agreement With Affidavit of Confession of Judgment

The end of this case has finally happened.

What we have here are the settlement documents, which, significantly, are not sealed.

In the settlement, the Defendants agree in paragraph 1 not to send any commercial mail to Comcast at all unless they can prove affirmative consent granted to them by the Comcast subscriber. They also agree to not violate CAN-SPAM.

Paragraph 2 says that they also agree to maintain business records for three years proving that they have not violated the agreement.

Paragraph 3 allows David Linhardt to consult. That's a good thing for Mr. Linhardt, since it looks like he is already involved in doing that.

Paragraph 7 contains an odd provision that is a confession of judgment. It allows Comcast to go to court, and receive an immediate judgment against Linhardt without the need for notice or wait. As the Wikipedia article points out, these are controversial things, and I don't know what their status in the state of Illinois is (if someone knows, please leave a comment).

The Affidavit of Confession of Judgment finally lays out the monetary terms of the settlement. If the settlement is broken within the first five years, then Linhardt has to pay $250,000. If it occurs between years five and ten, then $20,000 per year (after the fifth year) are subtracted from the liquidated damages. And, finally, anything after year ten won't include the monetary damages portion of the judgment.

AttachmentDateSize
[file] CounterclaimSettlement.pdf01/19/10 6:07 pm3.53 MB

Reassignment of case

This case has been reassigned to Judge David H. Coar because Judge Zagel has a conflict of interest.

AttachmentDateSize
[file] Reassignment.pdf09/16/08 3:03 pm39.37 KB

MOTION to Vacate All Prior Orders

Everyone has pretty much seen this one coming. E360Insight is asking the new judge to vacate all prior rulings in the case because of a conflict of interest.

In Ken Magill's article on this, he quotes Linhardt as saying "According to my attorney, Zagel said he should vacate all of the rulings but even that would be a conflict." Oddly enough, that statement is no where to be found in this motion.

This motion cites 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455, and Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that all rulings should be vacated. And, indeed, that case does say, "Where the express statutory standard has been violated and a judge has sat whom Congress had disqualified from sitting, the disqualified judge's rulings are, on appeal, to be vacated."

Judge Zagel's financial reports are available for 2006 and 2005. Both reference Comcast holdings at the lowest valuation levels available and state that no money or dividends have been received.

I don't know what Judge Coar will rule on this one. Even though Davis would seem to stand for the proposition that all of Judge Zagel's rulings should be vacated, it's worth noting that the case also seems to stand for the proposition that where a judge forgot about those holdings that the rulings may stand:

In such retrospective applications we find wisdom in the observation of the Fifth Circuit interpreting Section 455(a): "Because of the harsh consequences that can result, knowledge of facts should not lightly be imputed to a judge." Health Services Acquisition Corp. v. Liljeberg, 796 F.2d 796 at 803 (5th Cir.1986). We are unwilling to presume that because the judge once knew, he could not have forgotten. The right course under Sec. 455(b) as under Sec. 455(a) is to proceed on a case by case basis, determining the existence of disqualifying knowledge at the time the judge sat, in the way that a state of mind is normally determined, from inspection of all the circumstances. If a reasonable person would conclude from all the circumstances that the judge did not have knowledge at the time he sat, his rulings stand. If the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would conclude that the judge had not forgotten but continued to know, his rulings must be vacated. The rule protects against abuse by a party who knows of or suspects a minor financial interest of which the judge is not aware, and who quietly awaits the outcome of the trial before raising the point. On the other hand, where the financial interest is substantial or appears to have had the potential of affecting the judge's rulings, the interest will be one that reasonable persons would conclude the judge was aware of, whatever his pretense of ignorance. The judge's rulings will then be invalidated.

From all indications, it would appear that Judge Zagel forgot about his Comcast holdings, which came to him, not from intentional action on his part, but by inheritance. E360Insight certainly raises nothing in this motion to suggest that Judge Zagel was aware of his holdings, they seem to be standing for the notion that it's enough to just presume knowledge. So, they may have a fairly problematic position given the caselaw that they are citing in support of their motion.

It should be an interesting hearing.
===========================================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.
________________________________________
COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,

DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S, COUNTER-DEFENDANT’S AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO VACATE ALL PRIOR ORDERS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC (“e360”) and Third-Party Defendants David Linhardt (“Mr. Linhardt”), Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), Bargain - 1 -
Depot Enterprises, LLC (“BDE”), Northshore Hosting Company, LLC (“Northshore”), Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia”) and Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”) (collectively, including Mr. Linhardt, “Counter-Defendants”) and by and through their attorneys, the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Synergy Law Group, L.L.C., and in support of the motion to vacate all prior orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) state as follows:

1. e360 commenced this action against Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) on January 15, 2008. At that time, e360 filed a Disclosure Statement identifying the parties that would be involved in the suit.

2. On April 10, 2008, Judge Zagel granted Comcast’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed e360’s complaint in its entirety. (See ECF Docket Entry No. 43, Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 10, 2008).

3. On April 30, 2008, Judge Zagel denied e360’s Motion to Reconsider, stating that Plaintiff had not added anything new but simply attempted to clarify its prior pleadings. (See ECF Docket Entry No. 53 dated April 30, 2008). e360’s Motion to Reconsider pointed out that the Court failed to take Plaintiff’s well-pled facts as true for the purpose of deciding Comcast’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (See ECF Docket Entry No. 51 dated April 24, 2008). Further, the Motion to Reconsider pointed out that the Court improperly relied on its own factual determinations, without the parties presenting any evidence to support such determinations, when deciding to dismiss e360’s complaint in its entirety. Id.

4. On July 2, 2008, Judge Zagel denied e360’s Motion to Dismiss Comcast’s counterclaims. (See ECF Docket Entry No. 61, Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 2, 2008.)

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5. On September 5, 2008, Judge Zagel voluntarily recused himself, stating that “I have a financial interest in the defenant [sic] corporation to this action.” (See ECF Docket Entry No. 65, Transfer of Case to the Executive Committee for a Reassignment dated September 5, 2008.)

I. The Court’s Violation of § 455(a) Justifies Vacatur Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)—Judge Zagel’s Financial Interest in Comcast Casts Doubt as to his Impartiality.

6. The United States Code requires “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States [to] disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Vactaur of prior rulings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), is a proper remedy for a violation of § 455(a). Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 848 (1988).

7. Impartiality can be reasonably questioned where a Judge has a financial interest in one of the parties even if the Judge does not have knowledge of the financial interest. See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 851-52 (1988) (finding a vacatur of a final judgment appropriate even where the judge did not have actual knowledge of his financial interest in a party to a case at the time of trial but where a reasonable observer would expect that the judge would have known of his personal interest given the facts and circumstances of the case).

8. Thus, regardless of whether Judge Zagel knew of his financial interest in Comcast, Judge Zagel’s failure to disqualify himself from this case is grounds for vacating the Orders entered and rulings made by him because a reasonable observer would expect him to realize his interest after receiving the Disclosure Statement clearly identifying Comcast as a party to the proceeding.

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II. The Court’s Violation of § 455(b)(4) Justifies Vacatur Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)—After Receiving the Disclosure Statement Judge Zagel Should Have Known of His Financial Interest in Comcast.

9. Furthermore, a judge must disqualify himself if “he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); see Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 851-52 (1988) (pointing out that §455(b)(4) “requires disqualification no matter how insubstantial the financial interest and regardless of whether or not the interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety.”)

10. If at the time a judge was hearing a case he or she had knowledge, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 455, of a reason for his or her disqualification then all his or her rulings must be vacated. Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987).

11. While it is not entirely clear whether Judge Zagel knew of his financial interest in Comcast before e360 filed its complaint or whether Judge Zagel became aware of his financial interest later in the case, for the purposes of resolving this Motion for Vacatur (and absent a statement to the contrary), the Court should err on the side of concluding Judge Zagel knew of his financial interest in Comcast after receiving the Disclosure Statement.

12. Because Judge Zagel had a financial interest in Comcast, he had a statutory duty to disqualify himself upon his initial review of the Disclosure Statement presented at the time the case was filed.

13. Judge Zagel, however, did not disqualify himself at that time; rather, he disqualified himself after he had already issued several rulings. (See ECF Docket Entry Nos. 43 (Order granting Comcast’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings); 53 (Order denying e360’s
- 5 -
Motion to Reconsider); and 61 (Order denying e360’s Motion to Dismiss Comcast’s counterclaims)).

14. A vacatur has been found appropriate where a judge learned about his financial interest after making two non-final orders. Brown v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., No. 95C3474 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1996). In this unpublished opinion, Illinois District Judge Shadur disqualified himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) and vacated the two non-final orders when he learned that his wife held stock in the Defendant corporation.

15. This case presents an even more compelling reason to vacate the prior rulings than found in either Brown or Liljeberg in light of the fact e360’s complaint was dismissed in its entirety and the Court denied its Motion for Reconsideration. Here, vacatur of the prior rulings is appropriate and indeed necessary to accomplish justice. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to relieve a party of a final judgment in order to accomplish justice and stating that “[w]e must continuously bear in mind that to perform its highest function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”) (internal quotations omitted).

16. In light of the above, Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant and Third Party Defendants respectfully request all prior rulings in this case be vacated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) because of Judge Zagel’s violation of U.S.C. § 455(a), or alternatively U.S.C. § 455(b).
Specifically the following rulings should be vacated:

a. Judge Zagel’s April 10, 2008, Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Comcast’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissing e360’s complaint as a whole (ECF Docket Entry No. 43);

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b. Judge Zagel’s April 30, 2008, Order denying e360’s Motion to Reconsider (ECF Docket Entry No. 53); and

c. Judge Zagel’s July 2, 2008, Memorandum Opinion and Order denying e360’s Motion to Dismiss Comcast’s counterclaims (ECF Docket Entry No. 61).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order vacating all prior judgments entered by Judge Zagel without prejudice and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Plaintiff, Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants

By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys

Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Shaina A. Moss (6283585)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotVacate.pdf10/09/08 7:40 pm51.46 KB

Response Due

11/05/2008 17:00
America/Chicago

MINUTE entry before the Honorable David H. Coar:Motion hearing held on 10/16/2008 regarding motion to vacate, 67 . Set deadlines/hearing as to motion to vacate, 67 : Responses due by 11/5/2008 (no reply). Motion Hearing set for 11/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. as to Motion to vacate.

Response to Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders

Here's Comcast's response to e360's attempt to revive the dead corpse of its case against Comcast.

As we previously mentioned, in Ken Magill's article on this, he quotes Linhardt as saying "According to my attorney, Zagel said he should vacate all of the rulings but even that would be a conflict." This time, though, we get to see what the Judge really said, as Exhibit A is the transcript of the hearing.

Here's what the judge actually said:

I've given this some thought and there are several possible courses of action, one of which is upon request of the parties to reconsider all of my prior rulings and have a new round of briefing, or to vacate my rulings and have a new round of briefing, but the truth is is I had this case for a fairly long time, a matter of months, when I was in a state where I had a technical conflict and I don't think I should even be making that decision.

So, what I'm going to do is I'm going to recuse myself, have the case reassigned, and the issue as to whether my ruling should be vacated or reconsidered should be made by the new judge and not by me.

Is someone lying? You tell me.

=====================================
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant, and
DAVID LINHARDT; MAVERICK DIRECT
MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC.; BARGAIN
DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a
bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com;
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC
d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC; RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC;
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
and JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMCAST’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF-COUNTERDEFENDANT’S AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE

Defendant-Counterclaimant, Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”), submits this memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff-Counterdefendant’s and Third-Party Defendants’ (collectively “e360”), Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders (“Motion”).

The Motion is premised on a significant misrepresentation of Judge Zagel’s awareness (or lack thereof) of his small financial investment in Comcast during the time this action was before him. In the Motion, e360 states that “it is not entirely clear” when Judge Zagel became aware of his alleged financial interest in this proceeding. Had e360 reviewed the transcript before they filed the Motion, they would have learned that Judge Zagel stated, unequivocally and
-2-
on the record: “…I was unaware of Comcast at the time I made my rulings and holdings in Comcast…” (Exh. A, Transcript 2:23-25).

It is irresponsible for e360 to impugn a judge’s integrity and ask for the finality of two significant rulings to be disturbed without even reviewing the statements upon which they base their Motion. When Judge Zagel’s actual words are considered, there is no merit to the Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit was initiated nearly ten months ago by Plaintiff-Counterdefendant, e360insight, LLC, a known spammer. In its complaint, e360insight alleged that Comcast’s legitimate e-mail filtering activities violated e360insight’s rights under various unfounded theories, including that Comcast, a private actor, was violating e360insight’s First Amendment rights. Comcast timely answered the Complaint and filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, asserting federal statutory affirmative defenses that explicitly provide immunity for internet service providers like Comcast who take steps to block unsolicited commercial e-mails, including the CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701, et. seq., and the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230. The Court granted Comcast’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismissed e360insight’s claims. Without introducing any new facts or evidence, e360insight filed a Motion to Reconsider, asserting that the Court had misunderstood e360insight’s pleadings and that it had incorrectly decided the motion. The Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

Comcast filed counterclaims against e360 for violations of the CAN-SPAM Act and other related claims. e360 filed a Motion to Dismiss Comcast’s Counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint, which the Court denied.

The parties have spent hundreds of hours and significant sums of money briefing these various motions. Recently, the parties had been engaging in meaningful settlement discussions and, prior to Judge Zagel’s recusal, appeared to be very close to a final resolution of this case.

A. Judge Zagel’s Recusal.

During a routine status conference on August 28, 2008, before the parties could inform the Court about their progress toward settlement, Judge Zagel notified the parties that he had just become aware of a small financial interest he had unknowingly held in Comcast during the pendency of this case. A copy of the transcript of that status conference is attached as Exhibit A (the “Transcript”). Judge Zagel stated that his interest in Comcast was held through a brokerage account he inherited several years ago that he “paid no attention to,” and that this account
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contained stock which, at some point after he inherited the account, became Comcast stock through a spin-off.1 Judge Zagel indicated that the existence of Comcast stock in the account had “obviously slipped [his] mind,” (Exh. A, Transcript at 2:18), and that he was “unaware of Comcast at the time I made my rulings and my holdings in Comcast at the time I made my rulings.” (Exh. A, Transcript at 2:23-25). As soon as Judge Zagel became actually aware of this fact, he sold the Comcast stock and recused himself from this case. (Exh. A., Transcript at 2:19-20).

[1 A copy of Judge Zagel’s 2006 fiscal year Financial Disclosure Report, which he stated is
automatically generated by computer, lists Comcast on the last page of the report (number 89 of 91), with an interest at less than $15,000. A copy of Judge Zagel’s Financial Disclosure Report for Calendar Year 2006 is attached as Exhibit B.]

B. e360’s Motion to Vacate.

The Motion seeks the extreme remedy of vacatur under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) claiming Judge Zagel was biased, or his actions raised the appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and 455(b)(4). In its Motion, e360 misrepresents Judge Zagel’s statements and urges improper application of well-settled principles. Specifically, paragraph 11 of e360’s motion states that:

While it is not entirely clear whether Judge Zagel knew of his financial interest in Comcast before e360 filed its complaint or whether Judge Zagel became aware of his financial interest later in the case, for the purposes of resolving this Motion for Vacatur (and absent a statement to the contrary), the Court should err on the side of concluding Judge Zagel knew of his financial interest in Comcast after receiving the Disclosure Statement.

To the contrary, the record is perfectly clear that Judge Zagel was not aware of his financial interest in Comcast until after he issued his rulings in this case. Counsel for e360 was present at the hearing where Judge Zagel disclosed his past interest in Comcast, but chose to file a motion relying on a mis-characterization of the statements rather than reviewing a transcript of Judge Zagel’s clear statement regarding when he became aware of his interest in Comcast.

e360 offers no support for its assertion that a reasonable person knowing all of the facts would question Judge Zagel’s impartiality in this case. Their sole statement on the subject is that, “a reasonable observer would expect him to realize his interest after receiving the Disclosure Statement clearly identifying Comcast as a party to the proceeding.” (Motion, ¶ 8). Obviously, if Judge Zagel did not even know that he owned stock in Comcast in the first place,
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seeing Comcast listed on a corporate disclosure statement would do nothing to alert him to his ownership.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Judge Zagel Did Not Violate Section 455(b)(4).

The plain language of Section 455(b)(4) requires disqualification where a judge knows that he holds a financial interest in a party or subject matter in a proceeding before him. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).

Courts have consistently held that the knowledge requirement is subjective, i.e., the judge must have actual knowledge of his interest. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988) (“A careful reading of the respective subsections makes clear that Congress intended to require knowledge under subsection (b)(4)…”); Union Carbide Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 714 (7th Cir. 1986) (“the statute forbids only the knowing possession of a financial interest”).

In Davis v. Xerox (a case e360 cites in its Motion that the undersigned counsel emailed to e360’s counsel to explain why vacatur was not warranted), the Ninth Circuit rejected vacatur where the judge had forgotten that he held a small financial interest in one of the parties, made rulings in the case, and then remembered the existence of his interest at some later date. Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Apparently he had forgotten and, subjectively speaking, had no knowledge of his interests when he sat on Xerox’s case.”). In applying the subjective knowledge requirement, the Ninth Circuit stated that “we are unwilling to presume that because the judge once knew, he could not have forgotten.” Id. at 1296.

e360’s argument ignores the knowledge requirement from Section 455(b)(4) and imposes a strict liability standard that is contrary to the plain text of the section and well-settled law applying it. Moreover, rather than serving Rule 455’s purpose of maintaining confidence in the judiciary, e360’s argument attacks the judiciary, saying in essence, “even though Judge Zagel stated that he was unaware of his interest, this Court should not believe him.” This is not the law.

B. Judge Zagel Did Not Violate Section 455(a).

A judge is only required to disqualify himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) where his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Such inquiry explores whether a well-informed,
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objective observer would question the judge’s impartiality under the circumstances. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861-2; see also Davis, 811 F.2d at 1296. The analysis is based on whether a “wellinformed, thoughtful observer rather than a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person” would question the judge’s impartiality. O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 989 (7th Cir. 2001).

Setting aside the issue of whether a well-informed, thoughtful observer would question Judge Zagel’s impartiality for issuing rulings in a proceeding where he was completely unaware he had a small interest in one of the parties, courts have held that where a judge’s interest in a case is not directly linked to the resolution of the case, the judge’s impartiality is not likely to be reasonably questioned. See, e.g., In re Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2nd Cir. 1988) (“where an interest is not direct, but is remote, contingent, or speculative, it is not the kind of interest which reasonably brings into question a judge’s impartiality”); Davis, 811 F.2d at 1296 (“no reasonable person …would suppose that the value of [the judge’s stock]… would be affected one thimbleful by the outcome of the present case. The judge’s own financial welfare would be advanced not one whit whichever way he decided.”).

e360 offers no support for its claim that Judge Zagel’s impartiality would be questioned, saying only that “a reasonable observer would expect him to realize his interest after receiving the Disclosure Statement clearly identifying Comcast as a party to the proceeding. (Motion, ¶ 8). Notably, this statement says only that a reasonable observer would expect Judge Zagel to “realize his interest,” not that a reasonable observer would question Judge Zagel’s impartiality, as is required by the rule. Moreover, e360 cites no authority supporting disqualification under these circumstances, citing only the Supreme Court’s Liljeberg decision. A brief review of the facts in Liljeberg demonstrates that these two cases are vastly different, and that a different result is appropriate in this case.

The judge in Liljeberg was a member of the board of trustees of a university that stood to benefit tremendously from a ruling in favor of one of the parties to a proceeding before him. The judge had forgotten about the university’s (and his own) interest at the time the case started, but had attended board meetings at which the subject matter of the controversy was discussed and reviewed minutes of other meetings that discussed the subject matter of the controversy. Moreover, the judge again reviewed minutes discussing the subject (and thereby renewed his knowledge of his pecuniary interest in the controversy) immediately before and after a bench
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trial in which he ruled consistently with the university’s interest. Upon realizing his interest, he failed to disclose his interest to the parties. Still further, in denying a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(6) based on his interest in the proceeding, the judge refused to acknowledge that he had, in fact, been aware of his interest both shortly before and shortly after the bench trial. Both the district court and the court of appeals found that these circumstances created the appearance of impropriety and, in turn, the Supreme Court held that “where both lower courts found an ample basis in the record for concluding that an objective observer would have questioned [the judge’s] impartiality, his failure to disqualify himself was a plain violation of Section 455(a) even though it was initially the product of a temporary lapse of memory.” Liljeberg 486 U.S. at 848.

Obviously, the facts in this case stand in stark contrast to those presented in Liljeberg. A reasonable observer could easily understand from the circumstances why Judge Zagel had forgotten about his small interest in Comcast, and would not question his impartiality. First, Judge Zagel’s Comcast holdings came to him by inheritance rather than by direct action on his part, and were owned through a brokerage account. Second, his lengthy financial disclosures report is automatically generated by computer, and Comcast is listed on the final page of his 2007 disclosure form as the 89th of 91 entities. It is understandable that this would be inadvertently overlooked. Third, Judge Zagel’s interest in Comcast was so small (reported at one of the lowest levels available, “less than $15,000”) that he would not have directly benefited from the outcome of this case, whichever way he ruled. Given the relative size of his interest compared with Comcast and its market capitalization of more than $30 billion, any benefit derived from this case would be speculative, remote and indirect, at best. Fourth, upon discovering his past interest in Comcast, Judge Zagel immediately and proactively brought the matter to the parties’ attention and immediately recused himself. Finally, rather than decide whether any of his judgments required vacating, he referred the matter to the Court. Based on these circumstances, Comcast respectfully submits that the Seventh Circuit’s “well-informed, thoughtful observer” would not question the impartiality of Judge Zagel’s decisions in this case and, thus, there has been no violation of Section 455(a).

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C. Even If Judge Zagel Had Violated Section 455(a), Vacatur Is an Extreme Remedy Not Appropriate Here.

Even if it found that a well-informed objective observer would reasonably question Judge Zagel’s impartiality, the Court is not required to vacate all of his decisions. Unlike a disqualification under Section 455(b)(4), vacatur is only one of the available remedies and is “neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all § 455(a) violations.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864. The Supreme Court stated that “there need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of § 455(a),” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862, and limited the remedy of retroactive vacatur only to “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 864. The Liljeberg Court also stated that, while scienter is not an element in the § 455(a) analysis, it “may bear on the question of remedy.” Id. at 859. In reviewing the judge’s actions, the Liljeberg Court stated that “a full disclosure at [the time of discovery] would have completely removed any basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality and would have made it possible for a different judge to decide whether the interests – and appearance- of justice would have been served by a retrial.” Id. at 866.

As discussed above, the facts present here are far from the “extraordinary circumstances” found in Liljeberg. Judge Zagel has unequivocally stated that he was unaware of his interest in Comcast when he issued his rulings in this case. Upon discovering his interest in Comcast, he took the exact steps suggested by the Supreme Court in Liljeberg: he immediately brought the issue to both parties’ attention and has made it possible for a different judge to decide whether the merits need to be reexamined. In so doing, Judge Zagel has, as the Supreme Court suggested, completely removed any basis for questioning his impartiality. Judge Zagel’s mistake is nothing more than the harmless error expressly contemplated by the Supreme Court in Liljeberg: “[a]s in other areas of law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.” 486 U.S. at 862.

III. CONCLUSION

Judge Zagel acted as a cautious and pruduent jurist– as soon as he became aware of his small financial investment in Comcast, he divested it, recused himself from this proceeding, and refrained from expressing any opinion on the propriety of his actions. That is remedy enough to alleviate any appearance of impropriety here. e360 should not, based on misrepresentation of the relevant facts, be permitted to undo well reasoned rulings, especially where there is no reason to
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believe that a well-informed and thoughtful observer would find Judge Zagel’s decisions to be anything but impartial.

For the foregoing reasons, Comcast respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Counter-Defendant’s and Third Party Defendants’ Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), and maintain all prior rulings made by Judge Zagel in this case.

Dated: November 4, 2008

LOEB & LOEB LLP

By: /s/ Douglas N. Masters_______________
Douglas N. Masters
Sharon A. Ceresnie
Nathan J. Hole
321 North Clark Street, Suite 2300
Chicago, Illinois 60654
[redacted]
Attorneys for Defendant-Counterclaimant,
Comcast Corporation

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotVacateResponse.pdf11/06/08 3:12 pm2.93 MB

Reply to Response to Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders

Here is e360's counter-argument to Comcast's response to their request that this case receive a reboot.

============================================
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff,

v.

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.
________________________________________

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant,

v.

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant,

DAVID LINHARDT,
MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING
SOLUTIONS, INC.,
BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC,
d/b/a bargaindepot.net and
bargainshoppecorp.com,
NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a
ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET
SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING,
LLC,
RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC,
NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC,
JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S, COUNTER-DEFENDANT’S AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO VACATE ALL PRIOR ORDERS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

NOW COMES, Plaintiff, e360Insight, LLC (“e360”) and Third-Party Defendants David Linhardt (“Mr. Linhardt”), Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“BDE”), Northshore Hosting Company, LLC (“Northshore”), Ravinia
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Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia”) and Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”) (collectively, including Mr. Linhardt, “Counter-Defendants”) and by and through their attorneys, the Law Office of Carla E. Buterman and Synergy Law Group, L.L.C., respectfully submit their Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and in support thereof, state as follows:

I. Judge Zagel Had a Statutory Duty to Recuse Himself.

The United States Code requires “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States [to] disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and further requires a judge must disqualify himself if “he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). It is undisputed that Judge Zagel had a duty to recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). Judge Zagel possessed a financial interest in the Defendant corporation at the time the motions of the parties were presented and at the time Judge Zagel made his rulings. Judge Zagel acknowledged that a conflict existed which required recusal. Exhibit A, Transcript at 3:12. Whether it was knowingly or unknowingly, Judge Zagel violated 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4) when he failed to recuse himself prior to ruling on the motions before him. It is clear that Judge Zagel should not have made any rulings in this matter while he possessed a financial interest in the Defendant.

II. Judge Zagel had Knowledge of the Conflict at the Time his Rulings Were Made.

Judge Zagel had knowledge of his financial interest in the Defendant when his rulings were issued. Judge Zagel stated that “he must have known” of his interest at the time he received the financial interest. Exhibit A, Transcript 2:17-18. Furthermore, Judge Zagel listed
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his financial interest in the Defendant corporation on his financial disclosures. If there is any question as to Judge Zagel’s knowledge, justice requires the Court err on the side of caution and find Judge Zagel had knowledge of his financial interest in the Defendant at the time of his rulings.

III. Knowledge of the Conflict is Not Required.

Actual knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance is not required under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988). As the Supreme Court in Liljeberg noted,

The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it
would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of the facts that
would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is
created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall
the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the
judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The judge’s forgetfulness, however, is
not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of
partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 861, quoting
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986).

Judge Zagel issued several rulings in favor of a Defendant in whom he had a financial interest. Even assuming Judge Zagel did not recall his financial interest at the time he issued his rulings, the appearance of partiality was created. Judge Zagel recognized this and thereafter recused himself and went as far to suggest that his rulings be vacated. Exhibit A, Transcript 3:5-13. As the Supreme Court noted, it is the appearance of partiality that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) sought to avoid.

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IV. Vacatur is Not Only Appropriate but Required.

The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 455 is “to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.” Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988). Whether or not Judge Zagel “knew” of his financial interest in the Defendant at the time he made his rulings, it is undisputed that a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455
occurred. While Judge Zagel brought this matter to the attention of the parties and recused himself, the fact remains that Judge Zagel made several rulings which he never should have been in the position to make. Judge Zagel admits that he made rulings “largely in favor of Comcast during the period of time where I actually held an interest in Comcast.” Exhibit A, Transcript at 3:2-4.

Judge Zagel himself acknowledged that vacatur of the prior rulings was a proper remedy:

I’ve given this some thought and there are several possible courses of action, one
of which is upon request of the parties to reconsider all of my prior rulings and
have a new round of briefing, or to vacate my rulings and have a new round of
briefing, but the truth is is (sic) I had this case for a fairly long time, a matter of
months, when I was in a state of where I had a technical conflict and I don’t think
I should even be making that decision. Exhibit A, Transcript 3:5-13.

Vacatur and reconsideration of the motions ruled upon by Judge Zagel would not prejudice either party, while failure to reconsider these issues would amount to a great injustice and severely prejudice the Counter-Defendants. The appearance of impropriety is to be avoided at all times and attempting to guess or speculate upon Judge Zagel’s knowledge or motives does not further this goal. The fact remains that Judge Zagel ruled in favor of a party in whom he had a financial interest, in direct violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455. Justice demands the harm be undone, particularly when doing so results in no prejudice to either party. For the system to prevail, Judge Zagel’s rulings must be vacated.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order vacating all prior judgments entered by Judge Zagel without prejudice and any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

PLAINTIFFS, COUNTER-DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS

By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys

Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Shaina A. Moss (6283585)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

AttachmentDateSize
[file] MotVacateReply.pdf12/02/08 12:35 pm2.36 MB

Hearing on MOTION to Vacate All Prior Orders

11/19/2008 09:00
America/Chicago

MINUTE entry before the Honorable David H. Coar:Motion hearing held on 10/16/2008 regarding motion to vacate, 67 . Set deadlines/hearing as to motion to vacate, 67 : Responses due by 11/5/2008 (no reply). Motion Hearing set for 11/19/2008 at 09:00 AM. as to Motion to vacate.

Order on Motion to Vacate All Prior Orders

Can you say "grounds for appeal"?

I knew you could.

Judge Coar has denied e360's request to give the case a reboot. I think it's a good call on his part, but you can be certain that e360 will seek to get this decision overturned, probably in an interlocutory appeal.

====================

MINUTE entry before the Honorable David H. Coar: Motion Hearing Held. Motion by Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, and Third Party Defendants to vacate all prior orders pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is denied for reasons stated in open court.

Review of Judge Zagel's Orders

After denying e360's attempt to reboot this case, Judge Zagel decided to review all of the non-routine matters (in other words, substantive rulings). The following is his decision concerning the merits of e360's request to get a mulligan: "Having reviewed each of these rulings, the court finds no compelling reason to revisit them. None of the rulings is a close enough call to justify vacatur or additional briefing, and so they will stand."

===========================
This case was transferred to this court after Judge Zagel recused himself. The plaintiff, e360 Insight, LLC, filed a motion to vacate all of Judge Zagel’s rulings, which this court denied on November 19, 2008.

On its own motion, this court then reviewed Judge Zagel’s rulings on all non-routine matters, reserving the possibility of additional briefing or vacatur if any of Judge Zagel’s rulings were close calls.

This court has reviewed (1) the dismissal of e360’s complaint (R. 43); (2) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of that ruling (R. 53); and (3) the denial of the motion to dismiss Comcast’s counterclaims (R. 61). The following is a summary of that review.

e360, an e-mail marketing service, initiated this lawsuit based on Comcast’s refusal to deliver e360’s e-mails to Comcast subscribers, despite e360’s assertion that the e-mails are not spam and that the company complies with Comcast’s terms of use. e360 pursued four avenues for relief: (1) a claim under Illinois law for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (2) a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5), premised on what e360 described as Comcast’s “denial of service attacks” and transmission of false “bounce” information; (3) a claim that Comcast is muzzling e360 in violation of its First Amendment rights; and (4) a claim of unfair competition and business practices under Illinois law.

Judge Zagel granted Comcast’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c),
because, under the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Comcast’s good-faith efforts to filter spam protect it from civil liability. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). He noted that courts have interpreted spam to be “objectionable” material under the Act, and that if a provider subjectively, and in good faith, deems material
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to be spam, the provider may block the material without risking civil liability. Although e360 had alleged a lack of good faith based on Comcast’s purportedly different treatment of other mass-marketers, Judge Zagel concluded that this allegation was not enough to raise a plausible claim for relief. In the alternative, Judge Zagel ruled that e360 had failed to state a claim under each of the laws it invoked. e360 then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

In the meantime, Comcast filed counterclaims against e360 and third-party defendants David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, and as many as 50 unnamed individual defendants, alleging that they were sending (or attempting to send) spam to Comcast subscribers, bombarding Comcast’s servers with spam, sending false or misleading advertising, selling counterfeit goods, making fraudulent representations to Comcast, filing frivolous lawsuits, and using deception to circumvent Comcast’s spam-filtration efforts. Comcast brought these counterclaims under the CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)&(2), the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), and the Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 815 ILCS 511/10, along with counterclaims of trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment, and abuse of process.

e360 and the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss each of the counterclaims. Judge Zagel dismissed the unjust enrichment claim without prejudice, but otherwise denied the motion. He explained that Comcast had adequately alleged that each of the named defendants played a role in the spamming scheme, and that Linhardt was properly named as an individual defendant because he was alleged to have acted as the owner of a corporation and to have personally made misrepresentations and directed lawsuit abuse. Judge Zagel rejected e360's argument that Comcast’s claims under the CAN-SPAM Act and the Illinois Electronic Mail Act were subject to Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements because the claims involved misrepresentations, not fraud, and he allowed them to proceed “based on information and belief” because Comcast alleged that the third-party defendants concealed many of their tactics to avoid detection. He also explained that the CFAA claim (based on e360 sending massive volumes of e-mails to Comcast’s servers), was not obviously time-barred given e360’s own allegations that it had sent e-mails to Comcast subscribers within the last two years. As for the trespass to chattels claim, Judge Zagel concluded that Comcast had alleged more than nominal damage to its servers based on the bombardment of e-mails from e360. And, finally, Judge Zagel allowed the abuse-of-process claim to proceed because Comcast had alleged use of the legal system for an improper purpose and that, in at least one case, such misuse occurred after process had been served.

Having reviewed each of these rulings, the court finds no compelling reason to revisit them. Cf. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 868-69 & n.16 (1988) (concluding that fairness required revisiting debatable rulings when they were made by a judge who should have recused himself); Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). None of the rulings is a close enough call to justify vacatur or additional briefing, and so they will stand.

AttachmentDateSize
[file] ReviewZagelRulings.pdf12/19/08 3:42 pm19.44 KB

Scheduling Order

Here's the scheduling order for the case. It's not difficult to comply with from a time standpoint, but he's also indicating that he will be hard-nosed about the time-line: "This schedule will not be altered/amended."

====================

MINUTE entry before the Honorable David H. Coar:

Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference held on 12/16/2008. Counterdefendant and Third-Party Defendants' answer to the counterclaim and third party complaint shall be made on or before 1/20/2009. Discovery shall commence on 1/27/2009. All disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) shall be made on or before 2/2/2009. Any amendments to pleadings or actions to join other parties shall be filed on or before 5/4/2009. Fact Discovery is ordered closed on 8/31/2009. The parties shall disclose expert testimony pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) on or before 9/30/2009. The parties may depose the other side' s expert at any time prior to 10/31/2009. The parties shall disclose any rebuttal expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)( c) at any time prior to 11/30/2009. The parties may depose the opposing party's rebuttal expert by 12/20/2009. The cutoff for all discovery shall be 1/1/2010 Discovery materials are not to be filed with the Court pursuant to N.D. Ill. Local Rule 26.3 (discovery "shall not be filed with the court"). Dispositive motions with supporting memoranda due by 9/15/2009 (all motions are to be filed in accordance to and noticed for presentment for a date certain pursuant to Local Rule 5.3(b)). Final Pretrial Order due by 1/26/2010. Final Pretrial Conference set for 2/5/2010 at 10:30 AM. Jury Trial set for 2/22/2010 at 10:00 AM. This schedule will not be altered/amended. The parties are directed to review this Court's standing orders. Copies are available in chambers or through the Court's web page. Mailed notice (pm, ) Modified on 12/16/2008 (pm, ). (Entered: 12/16/2008)

Answer to Counter Claims and Third Party Claims

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Plaintiff, v.
COMCAST CORPORATION,
Defendant.
________________________________________

COMCAST CORPORATION,
Counterclaimant, v.
E360INSIGHT, LLC,
Counterdefendant, and
DAVID LINHARDT; MAVERICK DIRECT MARKETING SOLUTIONS, INC.; BARGAIN DEPOT ENTERPRISES, LLC, d/b/a bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com; NORTHSHORE HOSTING COMPANY, LLC d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN INTERNET SERVICES, LLC and BAY CITY HOSTING, LLC; RAVINIA HOSTING COMPANY, LLC; NORTHGATE INTERNET SERVICES, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-50,
Third-Party Defendants.

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

e360Insight (Counter-Defendant) and David Linhardt, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc., Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC, Northgate Internet Services, LLC, (Third-Party Defendants) state for their Answer to Counter-Plaintiff’s Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint as follows:

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I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Defendants operate a business designed to facilitate the e-mail marketing of products and services through, among other things, the sending of unwanted, unauthorized, unlawful and/or otherwise objectionable commercial e-mail messages (generally referred to as “spam”).

ANSWER: Denied.

2. Internet service providers (“ISPs”), such as Comcast, with the assistance of others, filter e-mail messages to prevent spam from reaching consumers. It is essential to the operation of its ISP services that Comcast utilize the tools at its disposal, tools sanctioned by federal and state law, to protect its subscribers from receiving spam. About 90% of all e-mail sent to Comcast’s subscribers is spam. Comcast filters about 500,000,000 spam e-mails per day.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

3. Spammers, on the other hand, try to mask their identities, the origins of their emails, and the nature of their services in order to deliver spam to consumers and to remain profitable. Defendants here utilize a variety of illegal and fraudulent activities to pursue their objectives, and have undertaken various efforts to obscure the nature, scope, and participants in their activities. Indeed, the filing of this action and pursuit of a preliminary injunction and expedited discovery are part of Defendants’ attempts to pressure and harass those who protect consumers from Defendants’ objectionable e-mails.

ANSWER: Denied.

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4. Comcast brings this counterclaim and Third-Party complaint to prevent Defendants’ ongoing assault on Comcast’s business and to hold Defendant liable for its unlawful acts.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

II. JURISDICTION

5. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. The Court also has federal question jurisdiction over the claims arising under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (“CAN-SPAM”) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“CFAA”), jurisdiction being conferred in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).

ANSWER: Admit.

III. PARTIES

6. Counterclaimant, Comcast, is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business located at One Comcast Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103.

ANSWER: Admit.

7. Counterdefendant, e360insight, LLC (“e360”), is an Illinois limited liability company with a principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090.

ANSWER: Admit.

8. Third-Party Defendant, David Linhardt (“Linhardt”), is an individual residing at 500 Sumac Road, Highland Park, Illinois 60035. On information and belief, Linhardt is the president and founder of e360, the majority and only shareholder of Maverick, the owner of Ravinia
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Hosting, the president of Northshore Hosting (as these entities are defined below), and directs and controls the complained of activities of each of the named Defendants.

ANSWER: Defendant Linhardt denies that he is the owner of Ravinia Hosting. Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants admit the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

9. Third-Party Defendant, Maverick Direct Marketing Solutions, Inc. (“Maverick”), is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot and Northshore Hosting.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants admit only that Maverick is the single member of e360, Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC and Northshore Hosting, LLC.

10. Third-Party Defendant, Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“Bargain Depot”), d/b/a bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com, is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. On information and belief, Bargain Depot is a division of e360 and is wholly owned by Maverick.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants admit only that Third-Party Defendant, Bargain Depot Enterprises, LLC (“Bargain Depot”), d/b/a bargaindepot.net and bargainshoppecorp.com, is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are denied.

11. Third-Party Defendant, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC d/b/a Rocky Mountain Internet Services, LLC and Bay City Hosting, LLC (“Northshore Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600
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Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is wholly owned by Maverick.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants admit only that Third-Party Defendant, Northshore Hosting Company, LLC d/b/a Rocky Mountain Internet Services, LLC and Bay City Hosting, LLC (“Northshore Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. Maverick is the sole member of these companies.

12. Third-Party Defendant, Ravinia Hosting Company, LLC (“Ravinia Hosting”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A. Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is owned and controlled by Linhardt.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendants and Third-Party Defendants admit only that Third-Party Defendant, Ravinia Hosting Company, is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. Maverick is the sole member of Ravinia Hosting Company.

13. Third-Party Defendant, Northgate Internet Services, LLC (“Northgate”), is a Delaware limited liability company. On information and belief, its principal place of business is at 600 Northgate Pkwy., Ste. A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090, or another location in Illinois, and it is an affiliate of e360.

ANSWER: Admit.

14. Third-Party Defendants, John Does 1-50, are companies or individuals with unknown identities and addresses that are business partners or affiliates of the other Defendants or provide services or assistance to, or facilitate the complained of activities of, the Defendants.

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ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Comcast’s Cable and Internet Services.
15. Comcast, by or through its subsidiaries, is one of the leading cable and internet service providers in the country with over thirteen million high-speed internet subscribers.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

16. Consumers subscribe to Comcast High-Speed Internet services, in part, because of the stability, security and reliability of its network. Comcast’s network remains secure and reliable in part because the system is maintained by filtering out spam and preventing it from reaching subscribers’ inboxes. Comcast, using a proprietary and highly confidential system in accordance with industry standards, filters and otherwise limits spam from reaching subscribers’ inboxes (“Comcast’s Filtering System”).

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

17. Comcast’s Filtering System is a continually evolving system that relies on a variety of resources to determine whether an incoming e-mail is spam. These resources include Third-Party software, lists generated by anti-spam organizations, subscriber complaints, the sender’s reputation, and other highly proprietary and confidential systems and methods.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

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18. If an e-mail is filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering System, the sender receives an error message with a code and links to follow for instructions on why the e-mail was filtered out and how to address the issue that caused the e-mail to be filtered out.

ANSWER: Denied.

B. Defendants’ Unlawful Activities.
19. Defendants market products and services using spam directed at hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of consumers, including Comcast’s subscribers.

ANSWER: Denied.

20. On information and belief, Maverick wholly owns e360, Bargain Depot, and Northshore, and directs and controls the sending of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails by Defendants.

ANSWER: Denied.

21. On information and belief, Bargain Depot, among other things, provides knockoff, counterfeit or otherwise unauthorized goods marketed through mass e-mails sent by Defendants.

ANSWER: Denied.

22. On information and belief, Northshore Hosting, Ravinia Hosting, Northgate, and John Does 1-50 (“Third-Party Marketers”) are in the business of registering domain names and IP addresses and sending spam on behalf of Defendants. On information and belief, the Third-Party Marketers also register IP and domain name addresses in their own name, often with private registry services, for the purposes of masking the true identity of the owners of the IP addresses and domain names, and the true parties responsible for sending spam.

ANSWER: Denied.

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C. Defendants’ Email Practices.
23. Defendants, acting together, have engaged in a concerted scheme to send millions of unsolicited commercial e-mails for their own commercial benefit, including to many thousands of Comcast subscribers.

ANSWER: Denied.

24. Defendants have used numerous domain names and IP addresses to conceal their identities and scheme and to facilitate the sending of the unsolicited e-mails.

ANSWER: Denied.

25. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails contain misleading or false header or subject line information.

ANSWER: Denied.

26. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise, promote, and sell counterfeit or unauthorized goods supplied by Bargain Depot.

ANSWER: Denied.

27. On information and belief, some of Defendants’ commercial e-mails advertise “free” promotions when the goods or services are not, in fact, free.

ANSWER: Denied.

28. On information and belief, not all of the intended recipients of Defendants’ commercial e-mails have opted in to receive such e-mail messages.

ANSWER: Denied.

29. On information and belief, Defendants fabricate opt-in records of intended e-mail recipients.

ANSWER: Denied.

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30. On information and belief, Defendants have attempted to send hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of spam e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers since as early as 2005, including e-mails advertising Bargain Depot’s counterfeit or unauthorized goods.

ANSWER: Denied.

31. Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out spam sent by Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers. On information and belief, Comcast’s Filtering Technology has filtered out Defendant’s spam since as early as 2005.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants deny that they sent any “spam” to Comcast’s subscribers.

32. On information and belief, when Defendants’ commercial e-mails have been filtered out by Comcast’s Filtering Technology, Defendants have received an error message and link to follow to learn why their e-mails were filtered out and how to revise their e-mail practices so that Defendants’ e-mails may reach the intended Comcast subscribers.

ANSWER: Denied.

33. To facilitate the business of the Defendants, Linhardt has made fraudulent misrepresentations to Comcast about the commercial e-mails sent by or through Defendants to Comcast’s subscribers.

ANSWER: Denied.

34. For example, on January 6, 2006, Linhardt telephoned Comcast and falsely and fraudulently represented to a Comcast employee that all of the intended recipients of e360’s email messages have opted-in to receive such messages. Additionally, on March 4, 2007, Linhardt sent a letter to Arthur J. Block of Comcast making the following fraudulent representations: “All of the individuals requesting emails from us have signed up with us through
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web sites operated by us or by our partners. Our customers have all been through an opt-in process that exceeds all requirements in the provisions of CAN-SPAM.” The letter went on to notify Comcast of a default judgment obtained in this Court against a United Kingdom-based anti-spam operation, seeking to use that default judgment to coerce Comcast into allowing Defendants’ unsolicited e-mails through Comcast’s Filtering Technology. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

ANSWER: Denied.

35. After e360 commenced this litigation, Comcast offered to work with e360 to review e360’s e-mail practices in order to evaluate the e-mails to Comcast’s subscribers and the reasons they have been filtered out. e360 refused the offer, asserting that it would learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System through discovery.

ANSWER: Denied.

D. Defendants’ Abuse Of The Legal Process To Circumvent Anti-Spam Initiatives.
36. Spamhaus Project (“Spamhaus”), a non-profit Internet watchdog group located in the United Kingdom, generates and maintains the Register of Known Spam Operations (‘ROKSO”) which is a collation of information and evidence on known professional spam operations that have been terminated by a minimum of three ISPs for spam offenses. Spamhaus also offers the Spamhaus Block List (“SBL”), which is a database of IP addresses that have been identified as the source of spam.

ANSWER: Admit.

37. ISPs, such as Comcast, rely on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists as part of the process of filtering e-mails.

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ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

38. As early as 2006, e360 discovered that it was listed on the ROKSO and/or SBL lists and, as a result, numerous ISPs were blocking Defendants’ spam.
ANSWER: e360 admits only that it was unjustifiably listed on the ROKSO and SBL lists as early as November 2003. e360 denies the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

39. On June 21, 2006, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Skokie, Illinois, asserting claims arising from Spamhaus’ listing of e360 on its ROKSO and/or SBL lists. On information and belief, e360 and Linhardt sued Spamhaus in Illinois knowing that the Illinois courts did not have jurisdiction over Spamhaus for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam activities.

ANSWER: e360 and Linhardt admit only that they initiated a lawsuit against Spamhaus for the illegal interference by Spamhaus with e360’s business. e360 and Linhardt deny the remaining allegations of this paragraph.

40. Spamhaus did not contest the action. As a result, the Northern District of Illinois (upon removal of the case) granted a default judgment and entered an order drafted by e360 requiring Spamhaus to “not take any action to cause email sent by [e360] or their affiliates, subsidiaries, or related companies … to be blocked, delayed, altered or interrupted in any way … unless Spamhaus can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff’s have violated relevant United States law” (the “Court Order”).

ANSWER: Denied.

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41. After the Court Order was entered, Defendants’ began marketing a new service called “IP Protection Services” to unrelated Third-Party e-mail marketers whose e-mail marketing messages were blocked by various ISPs, so that Spamhaus would be required to de-list those marketers from its lists.

ANSWER: e360 admits that it marketed a service for entities. Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

42. The IP Protection Service entails modifying the Third-Party marketers’ IP addresses to appear as if they are e360’s IP addresses, or providing the Third-Party internet marketers access to e360’s servers for use in sending mass e-mail marketing messages through e360’s servers that have been de-listed with Spamhaus pursuant to the Court Order. e360 describes how it plans to use the Court Order to mislead Spamhaus:

“As you know, the American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN) assigns all IP address in the U.S. ARIN maintains a registry of all IP addresses on www.arin.net which acts as a kind of phone book for the Internet. When Spamhaus investigates the originating IP address for an email message, they rely heavily on the information provided by ARIN. E360’s IP Identity Management Solution effectively modifies the ARIN listing for your existing ip addresses and points them to one of our legally protected entities. The result is immediate protection against Spamhaus listings as provided by the federal injunction. This solution protects against future listings, and also forces Spamhaus to remove any existing SBL listings.” [Emphasis Supplied]

Attached as Exhibit B are marketing materials issued by e360 advertising the IP Protection Service.

ANSWER: Denied.

43. Once the Third-Party e-mail marketer enrolls in the IP Protection Services, Defendants use the Court Order to request that Spamhaus de-list the Third-Party marketers’ IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that the third party is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

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ANSWER: Denied.

44. On information and belief, some Third-Party internet marketers who have enrolled in the IP Protection Service are purveyors of dpam. (sic)

ANSWER: Denied.

45. On information and belief, a purpose of the IP Protection Services is to launder Third-Party spam that would otherwise be blocked through e360’s de-listed IP addresses and servers.

ANSWER: Denied.

46. For example, e360 entered into an agreement with Virtumundo, Inc. (“Virtumundo”) on June 6, 2007, to provide the IP Protection Service. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Services Agreement entered into between e360 and Virtumundo.

ANSWER: e360 admits only that it entered into an agreement with Virtumundo but that agreement was terminated by Virtumundo prior to implementation.

47. On information and belief, Virtumundo sends spam.

ANSWER: On information and belief, Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants deny the allegation contained in this paragraph.

48. After entering into the Services Agreement with Virtumundo, e360 demanded that Spamhaus de-list Virtumundo’s IP addresses from the ROKSO and/or SBL lists on the basis that Virtumundo is now an “affiliate” of e360 within the meaning of the Court Order.

ANSWER: Denied.

49. e360 and Linhardt have filed and threatened to file lawsuits in the Illinois courts against parties who call e360 and/or Linhardt a “spammer” or block e360’s e-mails. e360 and Linhardt routinely file, drop, and re-file these actions against the same parties. For example, e360 and Linhardt sued Mark Ferguson for defamation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
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District of Illinois in March 2007; voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice in May 2007; filed a similar lawsuit against Mark Ferguson in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, later in May 2007, dismissed it without prejudice in August 2007; and then refiled an action against Mark Ferguson in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in January 2008.

ANSWER: e360 and Linhardt admit only that they filed an action against Mark Ferguson based on Mr. Ferguson’s tortious actions. To the extent the allegations contained in this paragraph are inconsistent with the foregoing, they are denied.

50. On information and belief, these litigation tactics are pursued for the improper purpose of undermining Spamhaus’ ability to engage in legitimate and lawful anti-spam activities and to disrupt the ability of ISPs, such as Comcast, to rely on anti-spam data generated by Spamhaus and other anti-spam entities.

ANSWER: Denied.

COUNT I
VIOLATION OF THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED PORNOGRAPHY AND MARKETING ACT (“CAN-SPAM”) OF 2003 – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)
51. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

52. Defendants regularly initiate the transmission of e-mails to Comcast subscribers and other consumers that contain false and misleading information about the origin of the e-mail, the author of the e-mail, and the IP address of the sender of the e-mail in violation of 15 U.S.C. §7704(a)(1).

ANSWER: Denied.

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53. Defendants regularly send e-mail messages that include originating e-mail addresses, domain names, and IP addresses that were obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations that are materially misleading in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1).

ANSWER: Denied.

54. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $100 for each violation in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(i).

ANSWER: Denied.

55. Each of these violations of this section was committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

ANSWER: Denied.

COUNT II
VIOLATION OF CAN-SPAM – 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2)
56. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

57. Defendants knowingly send and/or attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain subject headings that mislead the recipient, including, but not limited to statements regarding “free” consumer merchandise and the origin of designer or luxury goods, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a).

ANSWER: Denied.

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58. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages that violate § 7704(a) and, therefore, Comcast is entitled to statutory damages of $25 for each violation of this section in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(A)(ii).

ANSWER: Denied.

59. Each violation of this section has been committed willingly and knowingly and, accordingly, Comcast is entitled to aggravated damages under § 7706(g)(3)(C)(i).

ANSWER: Denied.

COUNT III
VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS ELECTRONIC MAIL ACT – 815 ILCS 511/10
60. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

61. Defendants send and attempt to send to Comcast subscribers and other consumers e-mails that contain false or misleading information in the subject line, in violation of Illinois Electronic Mail Act, 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and the laws of various states.

ANSWER: Denied.

62. Defendants have sent hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mail messages violating the laws of various states, including 805 ILCS 511/10(a)(ii), and, therefore, Comcast is at least entitled to statutory damages of the lesser of $10 per e-mail message or $25,000 per day, in accordance with 805 ILCS 511/10(d).

ANSWER: Denied.

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COUNT IV
VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT – 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)

63. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

64. Computers used by Comcast in its role as an ISP constitute “protected computers” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

65. Defendants have knowingly bombarded Comcast’s network and servers with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of e-mails, causing Comcast’s network to operate more slowly, and reducing the service provided to Comcast’s subscribers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1030(a)(5) and 1030(g).

ANSWER: Denied.

66. The damages suffered by Comcast as a result of e360’s conduct include the impairment of the integrity and/or availability of data, programs, systems, and/or information on Comcast’s protected computers. Comcast’s damages aggregate at least $5,000 in value in the year preceding the date of filing of this counterclaim and Third-Party complaint.

ANSWER: Denied.

COUNT V
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
67. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

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ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

68. The computers, servers, and networks that support Comcast’s ISP services are the personal property of Comcast.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants have insufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore deny the same.

69. Defendants have intentionally and repeatedly obtained access to, and made use of, Comcast’s computers, servers, and networks for their own economic benefit.

ANSWER: Denied.

70. Even after knowledge that e-mails were blocked by Comcast’s Filtering System, Defendants continued to bombard Comcast’s servers and networks with massive amounts of emails. This practice of repeatedly transmitting e-mail messages through Comcast’s network and servers constitutes a wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’s network and services in denial of Comcast’s rights to that property. Such wrongful exercise of dominion over Comcast’s network and servers has deprived Comcast and its subscribers of the legitimate use of the network and servers.

ANSWER: Denied.

71. Under the common law of the various states, including the State of Illinois, Defendants’ conduct constitutes trespass to Comcast’s chattels.

ANSWER: Denied.

COUNT VI
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Count VI of Counter-Claimant’s Complaint was previously dismissed.

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COUNT VII
ABUSE OF PROCESS

75. Comcast re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 50.

ANSWER: Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants restate and incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully set forth in this paragraph.

76. On information and belief, e360 knew when it filed the complaint in this action that Comcast is immune from Plaintiff’s claims under the Communications Decency Act, CAN-SPAM, and the laws of the various states including Illinois and Pennsylvania, and that Comcast is not a state actor subject to liability under the First Amendment.

ANSWER: Denied.

77. On information and belief, e360 is pursuing this meritless legal attack for the improper purposes of: a) learning how to circumvent the lawful Comcast Filtering System; b) obtaining discovery, the purpose of which is to undermine the viability of filtering systems used by ISPs, including Comcast’s Filtering Systems, and to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

ANSWER: Denied.

78. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, e360 knew of its claims as early as 2005, three years prior to the commencement of this litigation. e360’s Motion for Expedited Discovery is not proper in the regular prosecution of this proceeding. The discovery sought is not needed in an expedited manner, and the scope of the discovery evidences e360’s improper motivation to learn how to circumvent Comcast’s Filtering System.

ANSWER: Denied.

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79. e360’s misuse of the Court Order in the Spamhaus matter is an attempt to undermine the ability of Spamhaus to provide reliable data to ISPs such as Comcast.

ANSWER: Denied.

80. e360’s threats to sue, and the multitude of suits already brought (and routinely dropped and re-filed) in Illinois, against those who have identified e360 and Linhardt, as a “spammer” or blocked Defendants’ commercial e-mails, have been pursued for the improper purpose of undermining the ability of Spamhaus and ISPs, such as Comcast, from legally identifying and filtering out spam.

ANSWER: Denied.

81. As a result of e360’s abuse of process, Comcast has incurred significant expenses and damages, including but not limited to its attorneys’ fees and costs.

ANSWER: Denied.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims in whole or in part fail to state a claim against Counter-Defendants and Third Party Defendants upon which the relief sought could be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims in whole or in part are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

THIRD DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims in whole or in part are barred by the doctrine of waiver.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims in whole or in part are barred by the doctrine of laches.

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FIFTH DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims in whole or in part are barred because Counter-Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Counter-Plaintiff’s claims are barred because Counter-Plaintiff’s subscribers requested the commercial e-mail sent by Counter-Defendant and Third-Party Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS, COUNTER-DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS
By: /s/ Bartly J. Loethen
One of their Attorneys

Bartly J. Loethen (6225484)
Joseph L. Kish (6197916)
Shaina A. Moss (6283585)
Synergy Law Group, L.L.C.
730 West Randolph, 6th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 454-0015
Facsimile: (312) 454-0261

Carla E. Buterman (6281101)
Law Office of Carla E. Buterman
555 Skokie Blvd., Ste 500
Northbrook, IL 60062
Telephone: (847) 480-1020
Facsimile: (847) 480-5879

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