Complaint

IN COURTOF COMMON PLEAS
FRANKLIN COUNTY

JOHN W. FE'RRON,
Plaintiff,

vs

E360INSIGHT LLC.
And
DAVID LINHARDT
Defendants.

COMPLAINT FOR MONEY DAMAGES, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
JURY DEMAND ENDORSED HEREON
NOW COMIES PLAINTIFF JOHN W. FERRON, by and through his undersigned counsel, and makes the fiillowing allegations and claims against DEFENDANTS e360INSIGHT, I.LC and DAVID LINHARDT.

The Parties

I. PLAINTIFF JOHN W. FERRON ("Plaintiff") is a person who has his principal place of business at 580 N. Fourth Street, Suite 450, Columbus, Franklin County. Ohio. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff has been a "consumer" as defined in R.C. §1345.01(0).

2. Upon information and belief. DEFENDAN'' E360INSIGHT LLC ("Defendant e360'), is an Illinois limited liability company having its principal place of business at
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600 Northgate Parkway, Suite A, Wheeling. Illinois 60090. Defendant e360 is not properly registered with the Ohio Secretary of State to do business in Ohio; nor is its fictitious name property registered with the Ohio Secretary of State.

3. Upon information and belief. DEFENDANT DAVID LINHARDT ("Defendant Linhardt"), is a living person and individual, resides in Illinois, has as his principal place of business 600 Northgale Parkway, Suite A, Wheeling, Illinois 60090. and, at times relevant hereto, has been the President of Defendant e360.

4. At all times relevant hereto. each Defendant has been a "supplier" as defined in R.C. §1345.01(C).

Jurisdiction and. Venue

5. This Court has jurisdiction user the parties and the claims asserted herein because Defendants transmitted many email messages to Plaintiff in Ohio.

6. Venue is proper because all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein occurred within Franklin County, Ohio, including Plaintiffs receipt of many of Defendants' cmail rtti'',ages to Plaintill: Also, Plaintiff has suffered injuries to his rights in Franklin County. Ohio.

The Claims

7. Prior to the date of the events giving rise to Plaintiit's claims, the following court determinations were available for public inspection and on file in the office of the Ohio Attorney General in its Public Inspection File (hereafter "PIF"):

(a) Slate ex rel. Fisher v. Cheeseman, Franklin C.P. 9ICVHI0-8592, OAG PIF# 1288 (Oct. 25. 1991); and

(b) Sucre ex rel. Petro v Pristine Secure Services, Stark C.P. 2005CVU0602.
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OAG PIF# 2376 (July 5, 2005); and

(c) State, ex rel. Brown v. Gem Collectors International, Ltd, Franklin CP No. 81 CV-09-4788, OAG PIF# 499 (April 6, 1983); and

(d) State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Lloyd's Sports Car Body Shop, Franklin C.P. 82CV063184, OAG Plf # 5 (May 26, 1983); and

(e) State ex rel. Brown v. Bud Fletcher Used Cars. Inc., Hamilton C.P. A 8201791, OAG PIF# 228 (April 27,1982); and

(f) State ex rel. Celchrezze v. National Church Publications, Richland County C.P. 85 548 C. OAG PlF4 698 (Dec. 30. 1987); and

(g) Smith v. Discount Auto Sales. Lorain C.P. 97CV 120022, OAG P117# 1735 (March 19, 1998);

(h) Hoard v. 4. U.L.. Inc.. Stark C.P. 1998' C V 02039. OAG PIF# 1801 (Dec. 9, 1999);

(i) State ex rel. Celebreeze v. Firestone, Franklin C.P. 84CV105745. OAG PIF# 270 (March 8, 1985);

(j) State ex rel. Celebreeze v. Mroue. Montgomery C.P. 84-925, OAG PIF# 510 (April 27, 1984); and

(k) any other PIP cases that are otherwise applicable to the claims and or issues at involved in this action.

8. Prior to the date of the events giving rise to Plaintafrs claims, Ohio Administrative Code Sections 109:4-3-03, 109:4-3-04 and 109:4-3-06 were adopted pursuant to R.C. § 1345.05(3)(2).

9. Defendants' acts complained of herein, which constitute violations of the Ohio
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Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. § 1345.01. et.seq.; are subject to: (a) all court determinations that were on file in the Office of the Ohio Attorney General in its Public Inspection File as of the date of the acts of Defendant complained of herein, including, but not limited to, the PIF court determinations referenced above in Paragraph 7; and (b) all rules adopted under R.C. Section 1345.05 (B)(2) prior to the date of the acts or practices of Defendant complained of herein, including Ohio Administrative Code Sections 109:4-3-03, 109:4-3-04 and §109.4-3-06.

10. Plaintiff has Internet email accounts that are maintained by Internet service providers located within Ohio. Plaintiff regularly accesses and reads the email messages that he receives at his email addresses in Ohio.

11. Upon inihrntation and belief; between May 1, 2006 and the present date Defendants transmitted or caused to be transmitted many email messages that passed through the servers of Plaintiff's Internet service providers and were forwarded to Plaintiff's Internet email accounts, as Defendants had intended. Each of these email messages is a"consumer transaction'' as defined in R.C. Section 1345.01(A). The quantity of email messages is voluminous and for that reason, they are not attached hereto.

12. As to each email message described in Paragraph 11, above:

(a) Plaintiff is the "recipient" as defined in R.C. §2307.64(A)(11);

(b) Each email message is an "electronic mail advertisement" as defined in R.C. §2307.64(A)(4); and

(c) Neither Defendant has had with the Plaintiff. at any time relevant hereto, a "pre-existing business relationship" as defined in R.C.2307.64(A)(9).

13. As to each email message described in Paragraph 11, above:

(a) Defendant has not. at any time relevant hereto had a "pre-existing
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business or personal relationship" with Plaintiff; as contemplated by R.C. §2307.64(B)(3)(a); and

(b) Plaintiff has not "consented or agreed as a condition of service", as contemplated by R.C. §2307.64(13)(3)(b), to receive Defendants' email messages.

14. Upon information and belief, in many of the email messages Defendants sent ocaused to be sent to Plaintiff, Defendants offered for sale at deeply discounted prices various consumer goods manufactured by world renowned designers such as Dooney & Bourke Stars, Brighton, Gucci, Michael Kours. Prada, Louis Vuitton. Ray Ban, Maui Jim and Killer Loop to name a few. However, upon information and belief: Defendants actually substitute, provide, sell. and/or deliver unlawfully manufactured, non-licensed imitations or "knockoff's," of such world renowned designer consumer goods. Upon information and belief, Defendants did not intend to provide, sell and/or deliver the coffered world renowned designers goods in accordance with their email solicitations.

15. Upon information and belief, in regard to many of the email messages Defendants hove sent or caused to N. sent to Plaintiff, Defendants knowingly committed one or more unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices in violation of R.C. §I345_ 12(A) by:

(a) using the word "free" in a consumer transaction and falling to set forth clearly and consptcuuusfy at the outset of the coffer all of the terms. conditions and obligations upon which receipt and retention of the "free" goody or services are contingent;

(b) using the word "free" in a consumer transaction and failing to print all terms, conditions, and obligations of the offer in a type size half as large
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the word "free;"

(c) using the word "Tree" in a consumer transaction and failing to print all terms, conditions, and obligations of the offer in close proximity with the oiler of "free" goods or services:

(d) engaging in improper bait advertising by making representations in email advertisements that would create n the mind of a reasonable consumer a false impression as to the grade, quality, quantity, make, model, year, price, value, size, color, utility, origin or any other material aspect of the offered goods or services in such a manner that, upon subsequent disclosure or discovery of the facts, the consumer may be induced to purchase goods or services other than those offered:

(e) failing to register with the Ohio Secretary of State prior to doing business in Ohio: and/or

(f) failing to register a fictitious business name with the Ohio Secretary of State prior to doing business in Ohio under such fictitious name.

16. Upon information and belief, between May 1, 2006 and the present date, Defendant; knowingly, willfully and intentionally transmitted or caused to be transmitted ti Plaintiff many email messages that materially falsity the header information in such email rnesaages in a manner that is prohibited by Section 1037(a)(3) of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM"). 15 U.S.C. 7701. el seq.

17. Upon rnfomiaiion and belief between May 1, 2006 and the present date, Defendants knowingly, willfully and intentionally transmitted or caused to he transmitted multiple email messages to Plaintiff from a combination of more than two different domain
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names where, in registering such domain names, Defendants knowingly, willfully, and intentionally used information that materially falsifies the identity of the actual registrant of the domain names in a manner that is prohibited by Section 1037(a)(4) of CAN-SPAM.

18. By this Complaint. Plaintiff also seeks this Court's declaration that:

(a) it is an unfair and/or deceptive act or practice in violation of R.C. §1345.12(A) for a supplier to transmit or cause to be transmitted to a consumer an email message that does not comply with the requirements of the Ohio Electronic Mail Advertisement Act (" EMAA"). K.C. 2307.63. et seq., specifically R.C. §2307.64(13)(1);

(b) it is an unfair and/or deceptive act or practice in violation of P. C. §1345.02(A) for a supplier to transmit or cause to be transnitted to a consumer an email message that materially falsifies the header information in the email message in a manner that is prohibited by Section 1037 (a)(3) of CAN-SPAM; and

(c) it is an unfair and/or deceptive act or practice in violation of R.C. §1345.02(A) for a supplier to transmit or cause to be transmitted to, a consumer multiple email messages from a combination of more than two different domains names where, in registering such domain names, the supplier uses information that materially falsifies the identity of the actual registrant of the domain names in a manner that is prohibited by Section 1037(a)(4) of CAN-SPAM.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT. R.C. §1345.02(A))

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19. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, as if Fully rewritten herein, all of the foregoing paragraphs.

20. Each of the email messagcs that Defendants transmitted to Plaintiff constitutes one or more unfair and/or deceptive sales practices and/or acts in violation of R.C. §1345.02(A).

21. Defendants' violations were "knowingly" committed, as Defendants knew they were engaging in the acts and practices described in the preceding paragraphs.

22. The acts and practices of Defendants described in the preceding paragraphs are acts and practices that have previously been declared to be unfair and/or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the CSPA by Ohio courts in judgments that were filed in Public Inl'omtation File of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General prior to the acts and practices of Defendant complained of herein.

23. Because Defendants knowingly committed the acts or practices which constitute violations of R.C. § 1345.02(A), Plaintiff is entitled to: (a) an award of statutory darnages against each Defendant in the amount of three times Pluintif"s actual damages or $200, whichever is greater. for each violation of K.C. §1345.02(Ai; and (bi an award of Plaintiff"s reasonable attorney's fees and costs against each Defendant pursuant to R.C.1345.09(F).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, R.C. §1345.419(D), AND §R.C. 2721.03)

24. Plaintiff hereby incorporates, as if fully rewritten herein, all of the foregoing paragraphs

25. Plaintiff respectfully submits that, under the circumstances presented in this case. he is entitlcd to the Court's entry of declaratory judgment in his favor pursuant to R.C.
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§1345.09(D) and R.C. §2721.03, including this Court's declaration that it is an unfair and deceptive act and practice, and a violation of R.C. §1345.02(A), For a "supplier'' to transmit an email message to a "consumer" in Ohio that constitutes a "consumer transaction" where the email message

(a) uses the word "free" and fails to set forth clearly and conspicuously at the outset of the offer all of the terms, conditions and obligations upon which receipt and retention of the "free" goods or services are contingent;

(b) uses the word "free" and fails to print all terns, conditions. and obligations of the offer in a type size not less than half as large as the word "free;"

(c) uses the word " free:" and fails to print all terms, conditions, and obligations of the otter in close proximity with the offer of 'free'' goods or services;

(d) makes representations that would create in the mind of a reasonable consumer, a false impression as to the grade, quality, quantity, make, model, year, price, value, size, color, utility, origin or any other rnaterial aspect of' the offered goods or services in such a manner that, upon subsequent disclosure or discovery of the facts, the consumer may he induced to purchase goods or services other than those offered;

(e) is sent by a supplier that has failed to register with the Ohio Secretary of State prior to doing business in Ohio;

(f) is sent by a supplier that has failed to register a fictitious business name with with Ohio Secretary of State prior to doing business in Ohio under
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such fictitious name; and/or

(g) fails to comply with the requirements of R.C. §2307.64(B)(1).

26. Plaintiff respectfully submits that, under the circumstances presented in this case he also is entitled to the Court`s entry of declaratory judgment in his favor pursuant to R.C. §1345.09(D) and R.C. §2721.03, including this Court's declaration that it is an unfair and deceptive act and practice, and a violation of R.C. y 1345.02(A), fix a "supplier" to transmit or cause to be transmitted to a "consumer" in Ohio

(a) an email message that materially falsifies the header information in the email message in it manner that is prohibited by Section 1037 (a)(3) of CAN-SPAM; and/or

(b) multiple email messages from a combination of more than two different domains names where, in registering such domain names, the supplier uses information that materially falsifies the identity of the actual registrant of the domain names in a manner that is prohibited by Section 1037(a)(4) of CAN-SPAM.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE. Plaintiff hereby prays for the following relief against Defendants, jointly and severally, as to his foregoing claims:

A. An award of stututory damages against Defendants in the atttount of three times Plaintiffs actual damages or $200, whichever is greater, for each of Defendants acts that constinnes a violation of R.C. §1345.02(A);

B. An award of Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys fees and costs. as allowed pursuant to R.C.: §1345.09(F).

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C. Declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. §1345.09(D) and R.C. 2721.[illegible] against Defendants in Plaintiff's favor, as requested above;

D. A permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from transmitting any more email messages to any consumer in Ohio in violation of R.C. §1345.02(A), including Plaintiff;

E. Pre- and post-judgment interest on all damages awarded; and

F. All other such relief, legal and equitable, as permitted by law.

Respectfully Submitted,

Motion to Dismiss

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN W. FERRON,
Plaintiff,

vs.

e360Insight, L.L.C., el al.,
Defendants,

MOTION OF DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

NOW COME DEFENDANTS, e360lnsight, LLC and David Linhardt, by and through counsel, and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(2) move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against them. The reasons for this Motion are set forth in the accompanying Memorandum in Support.

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff's Complaint names as defendants both a foreign limited liability company and its President, individually. Pursuant to the complaint, Linhardt is an owner and officer of Defendant e.3601nsight, LLC. e360lnsight, LLC, is an Illinois limited liability company. Linhardt is a resident of the State of Illinois. Pursuant to Ohio's long-ann statute, R.C. 2307382 and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(B)(2), the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over either of the defendants. As such, Plaintiff's Complaint against them must be dismissed.

II. FACTS

Pursuant to Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff received numerous emails allegedly sent by defendants, offering deeply discounted prices for various consumer goods and then providing knock-offs of those items and using the word "free" in a consumer transaction and failing to set forth all of the terms and conditions of the offer in type size half as large as the word, "free." (Complaint, at para. 14-15). The complaint alleges that both the company and Linhardt are suppliers and that both caused to be transmitted the large quantity of emails.

Plaintiff resides in Ohio. Defendant e3601nsight, LLC, is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of business in Illinois (see Affidavit of Dave Linhardt, attached hereto). E360Insight has no offices in Ohio (Linhardt Affidavit, at 2). Any contacts with Ohio by e3601nsight are fortuitous and are insufficient to establish minimum contacts under Ohio's long-arm statute. Linhardt is an individual who resides in Illinois (Linhardt Aff., at 4), Linhardt does not own any businesses, conduct any business, or own any real estate in Ohio (Linhardt Aff., at 4).

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III LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews a district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. The burden of establishing jurisdiction generally lies with the Plaintiff. American Greetings Corp. v.. Cohn, 839 F. 2d, 1164, 1168 (6th' Cir. 1988). When. jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff may not rely solely on the pleadings in the case; rather, he must show by affidavit or other documentary evidence specific facts establishing personal jurisdiction. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6t" Cir. 1991). Jurisdiction may be either general or specific. Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 87.3 (6"' Cir. 2002). General jurisdiction exists over a defendant when his or its "contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal .jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state." Id. (citing Third Nat '1 Bank in Nashville v, WEDGE Group, Inc.., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6"' Cir. 1989)). Specific .jurisdiction exists if the defendant's contacts are related to the case at hand. Here, neither general nor specific, jurisdiction exists and Plaintiff will not be able to meet his burden of proof to establish personal jurisdiction over either defendant.

B. Neither General Nor Specific Jurisdiction Exists.

There is a two-step analysis to determine personal jurisdiction under the laws of Ohio. First, whether the state's long-arm statute and the applicable civil rule confer personal; Jurisdiction; and second, whether granting jurisdiction under the statute and rule would deprive the defendant of the right to due process of law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution. Oasis Corp. v. Judd, 132 F.Supp.2d 612 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
Section 2307.382 of the Ohio Revised Code, provides, in pertinent part:

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(A) A court may exercise personal,jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:

(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;

(C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.

The Sixth Circuit has recognized that Ohio's long-arm statute does not reach the full limits of the federal constitution. Bird, supra, 289 F.3d, at 871.

In the instant case, the complaint against defendants is based upon the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (Revised Code section 1.345.02) and Revised Code Section 2307.64 - a state statute which governs electronic advertisements. While the complaint claims that Defendants sent him numerous emails offering products at discounted prices or advertised them as free in violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, noticeably absent from Plaintiff's complaint is any allegation that Plaintiff entered into any business transactions with Defendants. Moreover, there is no basis under either statute to include David Linhardt as a defendant in the action.

In order for a website or internet activity to create personal jurisdiction, it must satisfy the three-prong test established by the Sixth Circuit in Southern Machine Co. v Mohasco Industries, Inc,, 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968). That test is, as follows: (1) whether the website constitutes purposeful availment, (2) whether it is the basis of the cause of action against the defendant, and (3) whether jurisdiction over, the defendant is reasonable.. "The operation of an internet website can constitute the purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state.. , if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with
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residents of the state." Bird, supra, at 874. There is no allegation that the Defendant, E360Insight's website is interactive, at all, or that its website is specific to interact with residents of the State of Ohio. While Plaintiff's internet service provider's are in Ohio and Plaintiff is a resident of Ohio, Plaintiff can access his email or Defendant's website from anywhere in the country; if not the world. As such, whether Defendant reads his email or accesses the internet while sitting at home in Ohio, on vacation in Florida, on business in New York, or anywhere else is simply irrelevant, The relevant issue is whether Defendants intended to specifically interact with residents of Ohio. The answer is "no." (Lirihardt Aff, at 5). Most email addresses do not divulge the location of the email addressee. For instance, Plaintiff's email address jferron@ferronlaw.com provides no indication where his email address may be. There is, therefore, no revelation that contact with residents of the State of Ohio is intended by Defendants. As such, neither the first nor third prong of Southern Machine is met in the instant case.

C. Personal Jurisdiction Not Consistent With Due Process

If authority exists under Ohio's long-arm statute to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants, which it does not, the Court must also consider whether the jurisdiction granted under the longarm statute is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In order to meet the International Shoe standard, defendant must have engaged in "continuous and systematic" conduct in the forum state. Id See also, Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int'l Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 790, 793 6th Cir. 1996). Even if Plaintiff received numerous email messages from Defendant's website, hailing Defendants into Court in Ohio is not reasonable and offends the notions of fair play and substantial justice, This is because the email addresses to which communications are
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sent are automatically sent via internet (interstate commerce), with no specific intent to send advertisements to Ohio residents. When the defendant's alleged contact with the forum state occurs via the internet, the plaintiff faces an initial hurdle in showing where this internet conduct took place for .jurisdictional purposes. The Sixth Circuit holds that the operation of a website that is accessible to anyone over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction, even where the website enables the defendant to do business with residents of the forum state, because such activity does not approximate physical presence within the state's borders. The Cadle Company v. Schlichtntann, 123 Fed. Appx. 675, 677. Similarly, the automated emails merely present an opportunity to do business with persons in every state, and, in fact, in different countries; and should not and does not constitute physical presence within the State of Ohio, As is averred by Mr, Linhardt, any contact with Ohio is merely fortuitous and unintended (Linhardt Aff., at 5).

D. Personal Jurisdiction Over Linhardt Does Not Exist.
Even if this Court determines that personal jurisdiction exists over defendant E:360Insight, LLC, there is no personal jurisdiction over David Linhardt and the claims against him must be dismissed. Analyzing jurisdiction relative to Linhardt, there is no allegation or evidence that Linhardt himself transacted business in Ohio, personally caused the Plaintiff injury in Ohio, or any other element listed in Ohio's long-arm statute. In fact, the affidavit of Linhardt reflects that Linhardt does not live, work, transact business, or own real estate in Ohio. He is a resident of Illinois. Based upon Southern Machine, supra, there is no basis to assert personal jurisdiction over Linhardt.

Even if personal jurisdiction exists over Linhardt, which it does not, Plaintiff cannot establish that Linhardt is a supplier under Section 1345.02 of the Revised Code, as alleged by
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Plaintiff. Nor has Plaintiff alleged in his complaint facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of E360Insight, LLC and include Linhardt as a Defendant. Without either of these bases, the claims against Linhardt personally must be dismissed.

Revised Code section 1345.01 defines a supplier as:

(C) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, franchisor, or other person engaged in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions, whether or not the person deals directly with the consumer. If the consumer transaction is in connection with a residential mortgage, "supplier" does not include an assignee or purchaser of the loan for value, except as otherwise provided in section 1.345.091 of the Revised Code. For purposes of this division, in a consumer transaction in connection with a residential mortgage, "seller" means a loan officer, mortgage broker, or nonbank mortgage lender.

Other than the bare assertion that defendants are suppliers, there is no allegation that Linhardt sent or caused to be sent, on behalf of himself or E360Insight, any communication to Plaintiff.

Even if E360Insight, LLC, is a supplier, which it is not, its member and officer is not necessarily a supplier for purposes of the statute. Nor is a member or officer of a business entity personally liable for the acts of such entity. Thus, assuming personal jurisdiction over E3601nsight exists, and assuming further that E360Insight is a supplier, Plaintiff's complaint still fails to allege facts sufficient to include Lifflhardt personally.

Generally, corporate officers and shareholders are not liable for the debts of their entities. See, eg. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil (1991) 1-4. A shareholder or officer of a corporation may be personally liable for violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act but only if the Plaintiff can meet the elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil. State ex. Rel. Fisher v. Warren Star Theater, 84 Ohio App.3d 435, 44.3 (Ohio Ct. App_ 1992). In the instant case, the elements to pierce the corporate veil are not present and have not been alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint.

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In the Sixth Circuit, the corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held liable for corporate misdeeds when (1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable is so complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity, and (.3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong. Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Association v. R.E. Roark Companies, Inc,, 67 Ohio St. 3d 274, 289 (1993).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any of the three Belvedere elements and, as such, there is simply no basis for piercing the corporate veil of E360Insight, LLC, to reach Linhardt. There has been no allegation and certainly no evidence presented that E.360Insight is controlled by Linhardt such that the entity has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own, Plaintiff has not made sufficient allegations to warrant piercing the corporate veil, As such, Linhardt is an improper party defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint Against Defendants must be dismissed.

Respectfully Submitted,
S/Karen S. Hockstad
Karen S. Hockstad (0061.308)
Hockstad Law Office, Ltd.
5003 Horizons Drive, Suite 200 Columbus, Ohio 43220
(614) 360-1048 (telephone) (614) 451-3156 (facsimile)

Lead Attorney to Be Noticed on Behalf of
Defendants E.360Insight, LLC and David Linhardt